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The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 finds that, despite 
progress in disaster risk reduction over the last decade “evidence indicates that 
exposure of persons and assets in all countries has increased faster than 
vulnerability has decreased, thus generating new risk and a steady rise in disaster 
losses” (p.4, UNISDR 2015). Fostering cooperation among relevant stakeholders 
and policy makers to “facilitate a science-policy interface for effective decision-
making in disaster risk management” is required to achieve two priority areas for 
action, understanding disaster risk and enhancing disaster preparedness (p. 13, p. 
23, UNISDR 2015). In other topic areas, the term science-policy interface is used 
interchangeably with the term boundary organisation. Both terms are usually used 
refer to systematic collaborative arrangements used to manage the intersection, 
or boundary, between science and policy domains, with the aim of facilitating the 
joint construction of knowledge to inform decision-making. Informed by 
complexity theory, and a constructivist focus on the functions and processes that 
minimize inevitable tensions between domains, this conceptual framework has 
become well established in fields where large complex issues have significant 
economic and political consequences, including environmental management, 
biodiversity, sustainable development, climate change and public health. To date, 
however, there has been little application of this framework in the disaster risk 
reduction field. In this doctoral project the boundary management framework 
informs an analysis of the research response to the 2010-2011 Canterbury 
Earthquake Sequence, focusing on the coordination role of New Zealand’s 
national Natural Hazards Research Platform. The project has two aims. It uses this 
framework to tell the nuanced story of the way this research coordination role 
evolved in response to both the complexity of the unfolding post-disaster 
environment, and to national policy and research developments. Lessons are 
drawn from this analysis for those planning and implementing arrangements 
across the science-policy boundary to manage research support for disaster risk 
reduction decision-making, particularly after disasters. The second aim is to use 
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this case study to test the utility of the boundary management framework in the 
disaster risk reduction context. This requires that terminology and concepts are 
explained and translated in terms that make this analysis as accessible as possible 
across the disciplines, domains and sectors involved in disaster risk reduction. Key 
findings are that the focus on balance, both within organisations, and between 
organisations and domains, and the emphasis on systemic effects, patterns and 
trends, offer an effective and productive alternative to the more traditional focus 
on individual or organisational performance. Lessons are drawn concerning the 
application of this framework when planning and implementing boundary 
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Chapter 1  
 





Research and technological developments over the last thirty years (Berkes 2007) 
have seen growing awareness of the extent to which physical, biological and 
social environments function as vast and intricately interlinked sets of complex 
systems (Duke 2006, Berkes 2007, Folke 2006, Helm 2009).  While the ecological 
and mathematical science is complicated, the properties found to characterize 
complex systems can be easily conceptualized, and have been widely understood 
to offer new and more useful articulations of “the nature of the problems to be 
solved” (p. 427, Duke 2006). The idea that simple rules can drive very complex 
behaviours and sets of behaviours has drawn attention to the commonalities in the 
dynamics of complex systems as diverse as the weather, the stock market and 
biological ecosystems, which have all been found to manifest spontaneous 
emergent features, like hurricanes and stock market crashes. Generated by the 
interaction of behaviours within the system, these emergent features exhibit self-
similarity, but cannot be predicted on the basis of their component behaviours 
(Finnigan 2005, Duke 2006). It follows that complex systems create irreducible 
uncertainty, and rather than being stable, are in a constant state of change (Berkes 
2007). While this change can remain within wider regime parameters, moreover, 
complex systems can also be more or less resilient to sudden extreme regime 
shifts, or flips, as in the beginning of an ice age, the collapse of an empire, or the 
eutrophication of a lake (Folke 2006, Rockstrom et al. 2009, Berkes 2007).  
 
While these findings have implications for a wide range of topic areas, they have 
been hailed as particularly relevant when it comes to strategies for addressing 
large, complex so-called wicked problems, such as biodiversity loss, climate 
change, the global economic crisis, and – most pertinently for this project – 
steadily rising disaster exposure and losses (Rockstrom et al. 2009, Duke 2006, 
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Berkes 2007, UNISDR 2015). This perception of relevance is usually related to the 
need to apply relevant scientific approaches in order to research, understand and 
address these problems as complex system effects (Duke 2006). The extent and 
complexity of such issues are also understood to require multi-disciplinary, 
integrating initiatives, which will bring researchers and end-users together to co-
develop knowledge, and so improve the uptake of the understandings promised 
by complexity theory in action and decision-making. The establishment of 
coordinating governance arrangements, such as national platforms, to increase 
the integration of stakeholders across domains, sectors and levels, and to “foster 
cooperation among scientific and technological communities, other relevant 
stakeholders and policymakers in order to facilitate a science-policy interface for 
effective decision-making in disaster risk management,” for example, is a Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction guiding principle (p. 13, UNISDR 2015). 
This doctoral project uses insights from complexity theory to analyze the research 
coordination role of a national research platform in support of response and 
recovery decision-making during and after the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquake 
sequence in New Zealand. Three broad developments linked to this wider debate 
thus have an immediate bearing on the project. 
Firstly, recent decades have seen the environmental management and science 
policy fields develop and apply constructivist research approaches informed by 
complex systems theory to the so-called wicked problems associated with 
environmental management and governance. This body of work has emerged 
from the study of biological ecosystems and network theory, on the one hand, and 
policy theory, organization theory and science and technology studies on the 
other (Folke 2006, Jasanoff 2011A). Diverse disciplinary origins have given rise to 
a range of closely related terms, including resilience, adaptive co-management or 
adaptive governance, boundary management or systems for the translation of 
knowledge into action, boundary organizations, the science-policy interface, and 
the umbrella term transdisciplinarity, sometimes used to refer to this family of 
concepts (Cash et al. 2003, Weichselgartner & Kaspersen 2012, Folke 2006, 
Berkes 2007, Jasanoff 2011A, Guston 2001, Van den Hoven, 2007, Sarkie et al. 
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2013, Regeer & Bunders 2007).1  
All these approaches conceptualize knowledge domains as complex discursive 
systems, and focus on the way that simple rules that drive activities in particular 
domains result in processes, functions and procedures that impede or enhance 
collaborative, integrated approaches (Cash et al. 2003, Folke 2006, Berkes 2007, 
Jasanoff 2011, Guston 2002, Sarkie et al. 2014). The interfaces between research, 
policy and decision-making domains are understood to be effects of the relevant 
system dynamics, constructed by the boundary work processes that occur around 
the interface, as individuals, groups, organizations and other relevant bodies work 
to maintain and develop their respective domains of expertise (Folke 2006, Crona 
& Parker 2012, Parker & Crona 2012, Cash et al. 2003, McNie 2007, Berkes 2009). 
This emphasis on system dynamics is, in effect, a widening of focus beyond the 
immediate specifics of science/policy interactions (such as decision-making and 
actions at individual or group level) to include the wider context that bears on 
such interactions. Moving away from the attribution of responsibility, motive or 
blame at individual or group levels, the focus on systemic effects instead allows 
the processes that occur around domain boundaries to be considered in relation 
to the wider scientific, policy and other domain systems that generate them. The 
aim is to identify factors that can be applied to more active management of 
boundary work processes, to reduce risks and enhance opportunities through 
more integrated approaches to management and governance. This framework has 
already been applied, to a limited extent, in the hazard and disaster management 
context (Berkes 2007, Folke 2006, Djalante 2012, Weichelgartner & Kasperson 
2010). As Berkes notes, due to this complex systems approach to environmental 
management “ecosystems research has moved closer to hazards research” (p. 
286, Berkes 2007). In this thesis, this movement is reciprocated. Informed by this 
broader, constructivist framework, the analyses that follow adapt and apply the 
boundary management framework in an analysis of the coordination of research 
response to the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence, and so demonstrate 
                                                       




the utility of such approaches in the post-disaster context.2  
Secondly, boundary management approaches can be related to debates in a 
wider range of complex topic areas in the science domain concerning the need for 
research approaches that are interdisciplinary, and that integrate the needs of 
research end-users (McNie 2007, Duke 2006, Folke 2006). In the hazard and 
disaster risk reduction field this need has been widely acknowledged for more 
than a decade (Tobin & Montz 1997, Miletti 1999, White et al. 2001, Alexander 
2007, ICSU 2003, 2005, 2005B, 2008, 2010, UNISDR 2005, 2011, 2015, Kapucu et 
al. 2010, Few & Barclay 2011). In their 2011 review of the international natural 
hazard and disaster funding landscape, however, Few and Barclay confirmed that 
programs directed toward end-users were still under-explored in a research field 
with such important implications for society (Few & Barclay 2011). Four of their 
eight key recommendations addressed this finding: the promotion of integrated, 
inter-disciplinary approaches, the strengthening of two-way links between 
research providers and end-users, increased experimentation with research 
mechanisms (such as embedded approaches) to support more effective 
research/end-user partnerships, and more research into the potential offered by 
the national research platform approach exemplified by the New Zealand Natural 
Hazards Research Platform (NHRP) (Few & Barclay 2011). By adapting and 
applying constructivist frameworks developed in other topic areas to analyze the 
NHRP’s coordination of research in support of Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 
(CES) response and recovery operations, this doctoral project is situated in the 
gap in this field identified by Few and Barclay (2011). 
Thirdly, it is important to situate both of the preceding developments in the wider, 
global context. On the one hand, policy theorists have argued that the rise in 
importance of evidence based policy in democratically governed nations is a 
functional effect of the growing complexity and fragmentation of governing 
                                                       
2 Throughout this thesis the term ‘post-disaster’ is used to refer to the broader time-frame 
in which affected social and physical environments are largely dominated by the impacts of 
the initial event; in the context of the Canterbury earthquakes, this period is understood to 
begin with the September 4th 2010 Darfield Earthquake, and to have continued to the 
present date (May 2015).  
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environments caused by globalization (Skogstad 2003, 2005, Gluckman 2013, 
2014, Jasanoff 2011A). At the national level, democratic governments have 
responded with an increasing reliance on non-government actors for scientific, 
technological and other expertise and resources (Skogstad 2003, 2005, Jasanoff 
2011A, 2011B, Gluckman 2013). As a result the science policy interface has 
become increasingly complex and blurred, or overlapping, as policy formation 
processes involve extended sub-governmental networks that bring relevant non-
governmental actors together with policy and decision-makers (Skogstad 2003, 
2005, Birkland 1998, Jasanoff 1987, 1990, 2011A). At the same time, the 
integration of science, technology and policy is also strongly driven by top-down 
global initiatives.  
In the disaster risk reduction arena, reciprocal initiatives driven by the United 
Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) are designed to 
effect this from either side of the policy/research relation. Calling for the 
establishment of national governance structures or multi-stakeholder platforms to 
integrate ongoing disaster risk reduction over time,3 the Hyogo Framework for 
Action 2005-2015 and the more recent Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction 2015-2030 provide guidelines that include the integration of research 
and science into disaster reduction policy and strategies (UNISDR 2005, 2015). 
UNISDR has also partnered with the International Committee for Science (ICSU) in 
a parallel global initiative targeting the research domain (ICSU 2008). The 
Integrated Research on Disaster Risk (IRDR) program was founded on concerns 
about the increasing distance between scientific and technological advances and 
the ability of society to capture and use these to reduce the impacts of disasters 
(ICSU 2005A). IRDR has been tasked with fostering a more integrated, multi-
disciplinary international hazard and disaster research environment (ICSU 2005A, 
2008). Promoting inter-disciplinary research approaches that integrate the needs 
of policy and decision makers (ICSU 2008), IRDR is also a response to the “great 
shortfall in current research on how science is used to shape social and political 
                                                       
3  This thesis relies on the UNISDR distinction between hazard and disaster risk 
management, applied to strategies, activities and measures used to prevent, mitigate and 
prepare for disasters, and disaster risk reduction, the umbrella term referring to the concept 
and practise of implementing such measures over time  (UNISDR 2009). 
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decision-making in the context of hazards and disasters” (p. 15, ICSU 2008). 
Again, this doctoral project makes a start on addressing this shortfall. 
Finally, this project is concerned with the New Zealand context. It has been well 
established that approaches to managing the science/policy interface are closely 
tied to cultural and normative contexts (Lentsch & Weingart 2011). The US system, 
for example, uses expert committees required to be representative in terms of 
knowledge, the UK favors the use of appropriately credentialed experts with 
demonstrated commitment to serving the public good, while the German model 
requires that collective expert bodies represent all relevant stakeholder domains 
(Jasanoff 2011B). In New Zealand, management of the disaster risk reduction 
science policy interface has been informed by recent policy shifts explicitly 
informed by the complex systems debate. Developed throughout the 1990s, and 
particularly apparent in the Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) 
Act 2002, these changes have been designed to move hazard and disaster risk 
management away from a prime focus on known hazards (the source of the 
problem) towards strategies designed to increase integrated, collaborative 
networking, and so enhance the resilience of what Helm describes as “the wider 
‘Source-Community’ system” (p. 69, 2009). These have included tasking Crown 
Research Institutes with responsibility for science advice and support during 
emergency response and recovery, and the more recent formation of the national 
research consortium the NHRP as a first step towards building a more 
collaborative and networked research community. The reliance of this emerging 
New Zealand model of science and non-science integration on concepts taken 
from the complex systems debate makes the boundary management framework 
highly applicable when it comes to analyzing this model in action, as in this 
doctoral project; it is equally applicable as a tool for future planning and 
implementation. While this thesis is thus centrally concerned with the New 
Zealand systems approach to disaster risk management and security, which is 
described in more detail in the context section, the primary focus is on the 
involvement of the NHRP. The NHRP was newly formed when the earthquake 
sequence began in September 2010. Although not explicitly formed as a 
boundary organization, this consortium was awarded the functions and higher 
 
 7 
level procedures that define boundary organizations set up to manage 
science/policy tensions. In addition, it was mandated to support response and 
recovery organizations after major natural hazard events. 
1.1.1 Doctoral Project Aims: 
 
The doctoral project has two broad aims. Using the boundary management 
framework as an analytic tool, it aims to tell the nuanced story of the way this 
national platform’s research coordination role evolved in response to both the 
complexity of the unfolding post-disaster environment, and to national policy and 
research developments. The goal here is to draw lessons from this analysis of 
value to those planning and implementing arrangements across the science-policy 
boundary to manage research support for disaster risk management decision-
making, particularly after disasters. The second aim is to use this case study to test 
the utility of the boundary management framework in the disaster risk 
management context. This aim requires that terminology and concepts are 
explained and translated into terms that are as accessible as possible across the 
many disciplines, domains and sectors involved in disaster risk reduction. The goal 
is to bring the boundary management approach further into the mainstream, in 
both the national New Zealand context and the international hazard and disaster 
risk reduction arena, where it has the potential to offer so much to other 
disciplines and fields, as well as to practitioners, policy and decision-makers, and 
other stakeholders.  
  
1.2 Theoretical context 
 
1.2.1 Collaboration and integration across the science/policy boundary 
 
Recent concerns about the ability of society to use science and technology for the 
purposes of disaster risk reduction, and recognition of the need for more inter-
disciplinary, integrated approaches to hazard and disaster research are part of a 
growing chorus of such calls, around the world, pertaining to a range of topic 
areas (McNie 2007).  
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While commentators have noted the short fall in research directly addressing 
integrated approaches to research in the area of hazard and disaster risk 
management, such research is wide-ranging and multi-disciplinary in other, 
related topical areas (McNie 2007). Policy and science studies, in particular, have 
been investigating the integration of research and policy for many years (Clark & 
Majone 1985, Jasanoff 1987, 1990, McNie 2007, Lentsch & Weingart 2011). 
Recently, moreover, boundary management approaches to integrating research 
and decision-making developed in the environmental management and science 
policy fields have been applied in a number of new topic areas concerned with 
large, complex issues, including biodiversity (Koetz et al. 2011, Koetz et al. 2008, 
Perrings et al. 2011, Sarkki et al. 2014), sustainable development (Hotes & 
Opgenoorth 2014, Runhaar & van Nieuwaal 2010), climate change (Lee et al. 
2014, Hoppe et al.  2013, Friman & Strandberg 2014, Iyalomhe et al. 2013) and 
public health (Drimie & Quinlan 2011, Casale et al. 2009, Creech 2001), as well as 
environmental management, where the boundary organization concept first 
gained traction (Cash et al. 2003, Sternlieb et al. 2013, Pesch et al. 2012, Parker & 
Crona 2012, Crona & Hubacek 2010,  Van den Hove 2007). 
 
Although equally applicable in the disaster risk reduction context, this framework 
has not as yet been widely adopted in this topic area (Folke 2006, Berkes 2009). 
There are some important exceptions. Most notably, Birkland’s (1998, 2009) 
groundbreaking analyses found that some major US disaster events had a focusing 
effect in the policy domain. When cross-sector policy communities were 
established before the event, and sufficiently mobilized by this focusing effect, 
they were able to drive through evidence-based US disaster risk management 
policy, resulting in long-term cross-sector management of hazard and disaster risk. 
Busenberg (2000A, 2000B, 2008) follows the development of one of these 
arrangements over time, the collaborative management of oil spill hazard in 
Alaska established through legislation following the Exxon Valdez disaster. He 
found that in addition to relying on internal resources, this participatory 
mechanism depended on support from those with authority in this policy domain 
to translate proposed risk management measures into action (Busenberg 2000B, 
2008). Although framed in terms of policy theory, rather than boundary 
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management, these analyses of cross-sector collaboration across the policy 
boundary after major disasters lay the foundation for this thesis. 
 
More recently, Weichselgartner and Kasperson (2010) have focused closely on the 
science/policy interface, assessing the influence of twenty major hazard 
assessments in the practical disaster mitigation area on decision-making. They 
found that policy and decision-making was typically insufficiently informed by 
available, relevant research, while researchers typically failed to produce 
knowledge that was usable by end users. Decision-makers in disaster-related 
policy fields were more likely to base decision making on science, however, and 
much more likely to require that research processes include all stakeholders than 
those in non-disaster fields (Weichselgartner & Kasperson 2010).  
 
Finally, Djalante (2012) applies this framework in a comparative assessment of the 
contributions of local, national, regional and global multi-stakeholder platforms to 
disaster risk reduction in Indonesia. As promoted by UNISDR, disaster risk 
reduction platforms integrate the concept and practise of disaster risk reduction 
across and should be strongly driven from the highest political level (p. 3, UNISDR 
2007).  
Djalante (2012) finds out that a sequence of high profile disaster events have 
stimulated the development of regional, national and local disaster risk reduction 
platforms in Asia, and in Indonesia specifically. At the global, regional and national 
level, these platforms are able to extend disaster risk reduction activities beyond 
the traditional responsibility of governments in Indonesia. This is due to their 
capacity to function as boundary organisations, able to mutually support and 
connect with other platforms, and recognise and strengthen the involvement of a 
range of stakeholders (Djalante 2012). Local Indonesian disaster risk reduction 
platforms, however, were largely administrative, with little obvious influence on 
planning and implementation; those that had made progress had done so due to 
strong support from the national government level, (Djalante 2012). He concludes 
that international and regional level tend to have more technical, financial and 
coordinating capacity than lower scale multi-stakeholder platforms, and that more 
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funding and support for local multistakeholder platforms is required from national, 
regional and global levels (Djalante 2012). 
Consistent with the ‘focusing effect’ of disasters identified by Birkland (1998), 
Djalante’s findings also bears out those of Busenberg concerning the key role of 
high level political support in the translation of local, collaboratively produced risk 
management proposals into action (Birkland 1998, 2009, Busenberg 2000B, 2008). 
Djalante’s work is of particular value in that, like this project, its analyses are 
informed by the boundary management framework.  
His research also provides the opportunity to briefly clarify the difference between 
the disaster risk reduction platforms advocated by UNISDR, that are Djalante’s 
focus, and the national research platform, the NHRP, that is the focus of this 
thesis. UNISDR guidelines suggest that disaster risk reduction platforms should 
include “conventional economic sectors and/or ministerial or departmental 
divisions within the public sector, such as agriculture, finance, health, education, 
etc., and disaster management institutions and systems” (P3, UNISDR). This list of 
stakeholders is consistent with those involved in the global, regional, national and 
local multi-stakeholder platforms assessed by Djalante, exemplifying a strong 
focus on disaster risk management policy and implementation, and on the 
integration across economic, policy and NGO sectors (Djalante 2012). Science and 
technology are among the resources required for disaster risk reduction, while 
academia and universities are also mentioned, but to a large extent remain a 
given. As mentioned earlier, this focus is reversed in the global IRDR program, 
which is squarely focused on and situated within the science domain. The NHRP is 
similarly situated and focused: a research consortium, it is constituted of research 
organisations and concerned with the production of research.  
In topic areas where boundary management approaches have been applied to 
other complex issues with significant social and political consequences, global 
platform structures more explicitly integrate science and policy domains. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), for example, is defined on its 
website as both a scientific body under the auspices of the United Nations, and an 
intergovernmental body open to all UN and World Meteorological Organisation 
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(WMO) member countries (IPCC n.d.). Similarly, the more recently established 
Intergovernmental Panel on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services is explicitly 
constituted as an integrated scientific and intergovernmental platform, established 
to “strengthen the science/policy interface for biodiversity and ecosystem 
services” (IPBES 2012). Subsequent discussion of the newly formed platform in 
Science has revolved around the extent to which the IPBES structure tips the 
balance in favor of governmental (rather than scientific) influence over IPBES 
decision-making (Hotes & Opengarth 2014, Perrings et al. 2011, Koetz et al 2011). 
The emphasis on the involvement of science, on integrating structures and 
processes, and on balance across domain and sector boundaries is a defining 
feature of most boundary management literature. It is informed by a constructivist 
emphasis on the processes and functions involved in the maintenance of 
knowledge domain boundaries by (those engaged in) the broadly distinct domains 
and cultures on either side of the boundary (Clark & Majone 1985, Jasanoff 1990,  
2011A, Cash et al. 2003, McNie 2007, Sarkie et al. 2014).  
 
Indistinct, ambiguous and dynamically shifting, this boundary is understood to be 
constantly evolving. That dividing science and policy domains, for example, is 
modified and maintained by those involved as part of their professional roles, 
through the daily round of reinforcing and refining the evolving drivers, norms, 
value systems and behaviours that define the fields of expertise and policy (McNie 
2007). This boundary work process is intensified, moreover, when science and 
policy fields are brought together, forcing scientists and decisionmakers to jointly 
negotiate, contest and maintain the boundary as they struggle with the 
fundamental tension between the primary drivers on either side: scientific 
credibility and political relevance (Cash & Moser 2000). At this dynamic interface, 
or hybrid boundary zone, the strategic demarcation of scientific and other tasks 
involves a degree of crossover from either side (Guston 2001, Jasanoff 2011A, 
2011B, Parker & Crona 2010, Drimie & Quinlan 2011). Inevitable to some degree, 
this blurring of the boundary between these domains has been found to be 
productive when it comes to producing socially robust knowledge that is of value 
in both domains (Jasanoff 1990, Drimie & Quinlan 2011, Iyalomhe et al. 2013). 
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Equally, however, an associated potential for instability carries significant 
reciprocal risks to scientific credibility and political process, which are most 
apparent in debates and processes surrounding scientifically complex issues with 
significant and emotive political consequences, such as genetic modification, 
health and safety regulation, climate change and disaster response (Jasanoff 1990, 
2011A,  2011B, Guston 2001, Hayward 2013). 
 
Boundary management approaches are informed by these premises: since 
crossover between domains is inevitable, is increasing, and carries significant 
opportunities and risks, evidence-based management of domain boundaries has 
the potential to increase opportunities, while also addressing the risks. The focus 
of these approaches on process and function, rather than structure, has made it 
possible to clarify the extent to which such collaborations require a continuous 
process of boundary management, involving extensive deliberation, negotiation 
and joint learning within problem-solving networks (Carlsson & Berkes 2005). 
Environmental management case studies from around the world have uncovered a 
range of complex, dynamic processes and relationships that occur, change and 
develop over time, within – and bringing together – complex formal and informal 
social networks linking government agencies, researchers, and communities 
(Carlsson & Berkes 2005, Folke 2006,  Berkes 2009, Crona & Hubacek 2010). 
Rather than being a starting point, effective collaboration has been found to be an 
outcome of such knowledge generating processes, and dependant on the way 
they continue to develop over time (Berkes 2009).  
 
This emphasis on the collaborative process has also made it possible to identify 
the tightly linked relationship between three factors required by such 
arrangements. As early as 1985, Clark and Majone warned that while the uptake of 
scientific information by policy makers depended on balancing issues of (scientific) 
credibility and (policy) relevance, perceptions that the knowledge generating 
process had been legitimate, or fair and balanced in its treatment of diverging 
and conflicting stakeholder views were equally critical (Clark & Majone 1985). 
While legitimacy, or fairness thus includes the requirement that the collaborative 
process effectively balances credibility and relevance, subsequent findings have 
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confirmed that all three of these requirements are equally essential, and are so 
tightly linked together that the enhancement of any one component at the 
expense of another will put the outcome in question (Cash et al. 2003, Berkes 
2009).  
  
It should be noted that these findings apply to related collaborations across other 
relevant boundaries. The primary focus of this project is on the coordinating role 
of the NHRP after the Canterbury Earthquakes, and the potential this arrangement 
represents to manage boundary tensions affecting the uptake of science into 
policy; it is thus concerned primarily with the boundary between these larger 
domains. Complex systems, however, have been found to manifest self-similarity 
across scales (Song et al. 2005). It follows that in any large collaborative enterprise 
of this sort tensions created by relevant drivers are likely to play out in differing 
configurations around boundaries at smaller and larger scales, meaning that 
successful collaborations between individual approaches, between different 
branches of a discipline or policy field, between disciplines, or different arms of 
government, different nationalities, and so on will all rely on a shared perception 
that the processes involved have balanced relevance, credibility and legitimacy.  
 
Three major, related streams of work, all based on this broad theoretical 
framework are adapted and applied in this thesis project. The earliest, and most 
influential of these, is represented by Cash et al. (2003), who drew on a range of 
existing research and environmental case studies to develop earlier findings 
concerning these tensions into a succinct framework for understanding the 
effectiveness of systems that link knowledge to decision making. They found that 
each driver was paired with a function, so that communication, translation and 
mediation functions (respectively) increased the relevance, credibility and 
legitimacy of collaboratively produced knowledge (Cash et al. 2003). Ongoing, 
inclusive communication was found to be the crucial function associated with the 
generation of relevant information. Perceptions of relevance diminished when the 
flow of communication was infrequent or flowed in only one direction (either from 
experts, or from policy makers), while perceptions of exclusion from the 
communication process led to doubts as to the legitimacy of information, 
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regardless of its relevance or credibility (Cash et al. 2003). By reducing 
misunderstandings, translation was found to improve information flow between 
policy and science communities divided by different languages and usages, 
enhancing perceptions of credibility (Cash et al. 2003).  Communication and 
translation alone, however, cannot effectively address the fundamental tensions 
between relevance, credibility and legitimacy. These require active mediation to 
resolve conflicts, “enhancing legitimacy by increasing transparency, bringing all 
perspectives to the table, providing rules of conduct, and establishing criteria for 
decision-making” (p. 8088, Cash et al. 2003). The case studies involved clarify that 
the processes through which these tensions are balanced amounts to a continuous 
process of learning on both sides of the boundary, in order that all involved 
understand and commit to the criteria for credibility and relevance, producing 
research outputs that are of high value to all stakeholders. 
These boundary management functions were found to have been most effective, 
moreover, in case studies where boundary-spanning institutions or procedures 
had been positioned across the science/policy divide to facilitate them (Guston 
1999, Cash et al. 2003, McNie 2007, Berkes 2009). Whether formalized in a 
specialized boundary organization, or present in or across organizations with 
broader suites of roles and responsibilities, three institutional features 
characterised effective science/policy collaborations (Cash et al. 2003). Firstly, 
serious commitment high level commitment to managing boundaries between 
science and policy was necessary, including significant investment in 
communication, translation and mediation functions. Secondly, it was critical that 
key actors on both sides of the science/policy divide were made institutionally 
accountable for boundary management, and so forced to address the interests, 
concerns and perspectives of those from both sides. The third procedure involved 
the joint, collaborative production of boundary objects, or outputs such as reports, 
models, scenarios and workshops. By involving end-users early in defining data 
needs, these processes enhanced the relevance of the output; including a range 
of expertise enhanced credibility, and legitimacy was increased by the provision of 
more transparent access to the research development process to multiple 
stakeholders (Cash et al. 2003). 
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Subsequently dubbed CRELE (CRedibility, RElevance, LEgitimacy) (Sarkki et al. 
2014), Cash et al.’s (2003) framework has been widely used in a range of topic 
areas to examine the balance of tensions arising out of science/policy 
collaborations in more detail, and in relation to time. End-users, for example, have 
been found to prefer more applied, consultative scientific approaches, involving a 
range of disciplines, whereas scientific organizations and funding agencies value 
basic science, conducted autonomously within a particular discipline over longer 
time periods (Parker & Crona, 2012, Sarkki et al. 2014, Regeer & Bunders 2009, 
Van den Hove 2007). Similarly, end-user preferences for clear scientific information 
delivered in real time have been found to be inconsistent, respectively, with the 
acknowledgement of complexity and uncertainty required by scientific credibility, 
and with time-consuming scientific verification and peer review processes (Van 
den Hove 2007, Sarkki et al. 2014).  Parker and Crona (2012) have conceptualised 
such tensions and mapped them out as a spectrum, or landscape within the hybrid 
boundary zone between science and policy domains (Figure 1). 
 
Note that these tensions are not understood to map literally or cleanly onto 
domains. Credibility, relevance and legitimacy are ideal drivers, which are 
important to some extent to all involved in policy and research domains, and 
understood in widely different ways. An actor in either domain can be positioned 
at a range of different points on several tension spectra at any point in time (Cash 
et al. 2003, Sarkki et al. 2014). The spectrum is used to schematise the trends in 
domain preferences that arise from principal drivers, in order to clarify aspects of 
the dynamic, messy processes through which boundary organizations evolve over 
time (Parker & Crona 2012, Sarkki et al. 2014). Although balance remains a goal, 
these organizations do not achieve stability as such, but rather enable a 
collaborative knowledge creation process that continues to unfold unpredictably 
across tensions within the hybrid boundary zone. Charting the development of a 
US boundary organization over four years of operation, for example, Parker and 
Crona (2012) found that an early focus on applied research addressing stakeholder 
needs gave way to a focus on basic science, due to pressure from both the 
academic community and research funding bodies; over time, this focus shifted 




Figure 1: The tension spectrum within the hybrid boundary zone between policy and 
science domains (adapted from Parker & Crona 2012, Sarkki et al. 2014 & Van den 
Hove 2007).  
represented these changes in research focus as position shifts back and forth 
across the tension spectrum inside this zone. This boundary organization’s shifting 
focus was attributed to changes in the relative ability of stakeholders, over time, to 
affect funding and other decision-making by proving that their interests were 
more compelling, or salient than those of other stakeholders (Parker & Crona 
2012). Salience is the combined effect of perceptions of the stakeholder’s power 
to affect decision-making, their legitimacy (in relation to norms and values), and 
the urgency of their claim (Mitchell et al. 1997, cited in Parker & Crona 2012). Thus 
boundary organizations necessarily remain in a dynamic, fluid state, continually 
adapting to the divergent, changing and sometimes fundamentally 
incommensurate interests of a range of stakeholders who hold unequal and 












Sarkki et al. (2013) also followed the development of boundary organizations over 
time, and also found that boundary organizations were in a constant state of 
adaptive management, as they struggled to keep science/policy boundary 
tensions in balance.  Their focus, however, was on the complex trade-offs and 
synergies between the processes that enhance credibility, relevance and 
legitimacy. Since it is time-consuming to use networks to gather a range of views, 
there are potential synergies between the consensus-building required to achieve 
legitimacy, and that involved in the scientific verification and peer review 
processes required to ensure the credibility of scientific information (Sarkki et al. 
2014, see also Parker & Crona 2012, Hackett 1997, Fordham 2007). This creates 
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the need for trade-offs between these consensus-building processes and the 
political need for the timely or rapid provision of policy-relevant knowledge. Sarkki 
et al. (2013) found that the latter requirement had no synergies among either 
credibility or legitimacy requirements. Where other trade-offs were often context 
specific, or resource dependent, moreover, the trade-offs required by the 
relevance requirement for timeliness were found to be fundamental (Sarkki et al. 
2014).  
 
The third stream of work in this area that is adapted and applied in this project is 
also centrally concerned with boundary organizations that are set up to manage 
projects across multiple domains. But rather than focusing on the tensions across 
domain boundaries, this body of work is focused on the determinative effects, 
over time, of decisions and judgments concerning the parameters, or boundaries, 
of the relevant management arrangement itself (van Meerkerk et al. 2013, Verweij 
et al. 2014). Their findings indicate that more flexible or wide initial parameters 
increase the capacity of the relevant arrangement to adapt, as time goes on, in 
response to issues that emerge either as a result of unforeseen consequences of 
the new arrangement, or related to changes in the wider environment (van 
Meerkerk et al. 2013, Verweij et al. 2014, van Meerkerk & Edelenbos 2014). 
 
1.3 The post-disaster research context 
Berkes (2007), Weichselgartner and Kasperson (2010) and Djalante (2012) provide 
support for the application of the constructivist approach developed in the 
environmental management field in the hazard and disaster management context. 
However these projects are all primarily concerned with boundary management 
processes that occur in the usual conditions that inform disaster mitigation 
research, policy and decision-making, and so with an environment that closely 
resembles that in which most environmental management processes occur.4 How 
                                                       
4 There are a number of terms used to distinguish usual decision-making environments from 
those affected by a disaster event. Birkland (1998) has referred to these as inter-event 
periods, while Olshasky et al. (2012) refer to normal times or real life. In the interests of 
clarity and consistency, this project uses the word usual to denote environments that are 
not facing the challenges associated with a recent disaster event, unless discussing the 
 
 18 
applicable is this constructivist focus on boundary management processes, 
however, to the post-disaster research environment?  
 
Olshansky et al. (2012) have established that the key feature that distinguishes 
post-disaster conditions from what they term normal times is the abrupt 
compression of development activities in time and in a limited space, as the spike 
in the depletion of capital services creates an immediate surge in demand for 
resources of all kinds, including information. Increasing globalization over recent 
decades has meant that normal times have involved increasing change, 
fragmentation and complexity across multiple domains, driving the need for 
integration across the boundaries that divide policy from other domains. The 
intensification of this need is part of the larger post-disaster surge in demand for 
resources, in the form of the urgent operational drive to ensure that policy and 
decision-making designed to respond effectively to the impact of the event is 
informed by evidence that is both relevant and scientifically credible. It follows 
that the boundary management framework is well-placed to clarify interactions 
between this rapidly changing environment and post-disaster management 
arrangements used after disasters to manage the additional complexity, across 
multiple domains, created by these time compression effects.  
 
Disasters are followed by increased research opportunities and activity, as 
individuals and organizations are motivated to advance scientific knowledge by 
gathering data available only in the post-disaster context (Birkland 2009, 
Rodriguez et al. 2007, Liu et al. 2012, Li et al. 2011, Taskin 2010). Birkland has 
established that high profile disasters have had the capacity to activate 
science/policy collaborative initiatives that result in effective disaster risk reduction 
policy and decision-making (Birkland 1998). Since the compression created by 
disasters occurs not only in time, but also in space (Olshansky et al. 2012), this 
data is usually gathered in areas being actively managed by responding agencies. 
Overlapping with operational activities, post disaster research activities thus also 
necessarily involve a degree of collaboration. Both researchers and decision-
                                                                                                                                            
work of others. 
 
 19 
makers must work, moreover, not only under immense time-pressure, but also 
with impacted populations, within the infrastructure and resource constraints 
caused by the disaster impact, and often under media scrutiny. It follows that, in 
addition to increasing research opportunities, disasters can also increase the 
range of risks associated with research activity in impacted areas (Birkland 2009, 
Rodriguez et al 2007, Citraningtyas 2010, Sumathipala 2010). Boundary 
management literature reveals that science/policy collaborations in any case 
intensify tensions around the credibility, relevance and legitimacy of knowledge. 
The literature concerned with appropriate research conduct after disasters 
suggests that these tensions are further amplified, in the post-disaster research 
environment, not only across the research and policy boundary, but also across a 
range of disciplinary, agency, institutional and national boundaries.  
 
1.3.1 Ethical issues associated with post-disaster research 
 
Most of the literature focused on appropriate research conduct in disaster 
impacted regions comes from medical and social science disciplines, and is 
informed by concerns about research compounding the psycho-social impacts of 
disasters within affected populations. Such debates are usually framed in the 
research ethics context, with most structured as a risk/benefit analysis of research 
conducted in the post-disaster environment. 
 
The benefits generated by post-disaster research are obvious. Agencies involved 
in response and recovery urgently require reliable science advice, to inform 
situational awareness, policy and decision-making, and also public information 
management (Olshansky et al. 2012, Johnson & Mamula-Seadon 2014). In 
addition to the need for access to existing scientific knowledge, agencies also 
require information that can only be obtained through research carried out after 
the relevant disaster, to establish the extent and nature of impacts and likely 
secondary risks (Black 2003, Ausbrooks et al. 2009, Gill et al. 2007, Brown & 
Donini 2014). Conversely, there is general agreement that researchers have a duty 
to assist agencies and so contribute to response and recovery (Kilpatrick 2004). 
Post disaster data also constitutes a comparatively scarce commodity, and so 
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access to this directly benefit the research community, who can translate data into 
findings and publications, and so gain peer recognition and career advancement 
(Buranakul et al. 2005, Siriwadhana 2010). In the case of private providers, 
research data and access to research participants can also be traded as a direct 
source of revenue. 
 
There is also general agreement that researchers bear a wider public good 
responsibility, usually framed in general, futuristic terms, as a requirement to 
gather and analyze post-disaster data to address the prospective needs of 
populations and regions impacted by future disasters (Sumathipala et al. 2010, 
Collogan et al. 2004, Ausbrooks et al. 2009, Knack et al. 2006). Some have argued 
that in view of these responsibilities, and the potential benefits of the research 
process and findings that may accrue to populations, it would be unethical not to 
conduct research after disasters (Kilpatrick 2004, Sumathipala et al. 2010).  
 
Even the most optimistic assessments of the potential benefits of post-disaster 
research, however, are careful to balance these against potential risks. This 
risk/benefit approach is (explicitly or implicitly) informed by a recommendation in 
the Belmont Report (1979), which sets out the three basic principles that underpin 
most contemporary approaches to ethics.5 Developed from the Nuremburg Code, 
itself a response to Nuremberg trial revelations of unethical scientific practices, all 
three basic principles elaborate the Hippocratic maxim do no harm. The first, 
respect for persons, requires both that persons be considered capable of 
autonomous decision-making, and also that those who are not so capable, for 
whatever reason, be protected. The second, beneficence, stipulates that in 
addition to doing no harm, research has a duty to attempt, wherever possible, to 
actively promote wellbeing. The third, justice (or distributive justice,) requires that 
research benefits and burdens be distributed equably across society (1979). In 
addition, the Report includes guidelines for the application of these principles, 
requiring that research projects must establish participant capacity to make 
                                                       
5  The Belmont report is framed for medical and psychosocial research in particular. 
However it is now widely understood to be the basis for understandings of ethical behavior 
in a much wider range of contexts, as Werhane (1991) for example suggests.  
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autonomous decisions, and carry out risk/benefit analyses of the research in 
question, including the issue of distributive justice (Belmont Report 1979).  
 
Much recent discussion of the broader ethical implications of post-disaster 
research appears to have responded to the above principles by focusing closely at 
the level of the individual participant. This includes considerations of the extent to 
which trauma and other disaster impacts may influence the capacity of individuals 
to make autonomous decisions about research participation, assessments of the 
potential psychological risks and benefits to individuals participating in medical 
and/or psycho-social research projects after disasters, and attempts to balance 
these against the wider ‘public good’ benefits of post-disaster research (Kilpatrick 
2004,  Levine 2004, Collogan et al. 2004, Newman & Kaloupek 2004, Rosenstein 
2005, Knack et al. 2006, Dennis et al. 2006, Ausbrooks et al. 2009). Those that 
acknowledge the possibility that increased researcher demand for access may 
create an unacceptable research burden for impacted populations after disasters 
tend to do so only in passing (Black 2003, Brun 2009, Collogan et al. 2004, 
Newman & Kaloupek 2004.)  
 
There are three notable exceptions, which contribute to the post-disaster research 
debate by focusing squarely on the risks posed by research practices in post-
disaster environments.  
 
The International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth’s Interior 
(IAVCEI) report on the professional conduct of scientists during volcanic crises is 
the earliest significant work to extensively document the “problems of personal 
and institutional interaction” (p. 323, Newhall et al. 1999) that have characterized 
post-disaster research environments, and the only major contribution to this area 
from – and concerning – one of the physical sciences. For this reason, it is framed 
in terms of appropriate conduct, rather than ethics.  Unlike medical and social 
scientists, physical scientists are not routinely required to interact with others as 
part of data collection, and so are not usually required to apply for ethics 
approval, or trained to consider the possible ethical implications of their research 
activities. In a post-disaster environment, however, visiting physical scientists 
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usually need to interact with local response agencies, researchers and 
communities to gain access to data. The report drew on extensive documented 
field experiences gathered by an 11 member subcommittee for crisis protocols 
(Newhall et al. 1999). Noting that it was usual for a primary local team of 
volcanologists to be made responsible for coordinating research into the relevant 
volcanic crisis and providing advice to local response agencies, the subcommittee 
reported that, during past volcanic crises, visiting scientists who had not been 
invited by the primary local team had often created a significant burden for local 
researchers, and further drained already scarce local resources (Newhall 1999). 
Citing instances in which such visitors had failed or refused to recognize and defer 
to the needs of local researchers and response agencies, and to cultural 
differences in local contexts, the report also noted that international scientists 
often struggled to communicate appropriately with local response agencies and 
media. Amounting to interfering with response operations, such conduct on 
occasion put local populations at risk (Newhall 1999).  
 
The issues and thrust of the IAVCEI report were to be echoed, ten years later, in a 
special issue of the Asian Bioethics Review dedicated to discussions of the 
research environment after the 2004 tsunami in South East Asia (Asian Bioethics 
Review 2:2 2010). All contributors were in agreement with earlier publications as 
to the importance and value of post-disaster research. Most, however, were also 
members of the Working Group for Disaster Research Ethics (the Working Group), 
which had been convened in response to the wider impacts of the intense 
international research interest and activity generated by this disaster on local 
response agencies, communities and researchers. Accordingly, the collection of 
articles and case studies in this special issue documented a range of overtly 
unethical practices (Ahmad & Mahmud 2010, Shamim 2010, Siriwadhana, 2010, 
Siribaddana et al. 2010, Sumathipala et al. 2010), and the negative impact of 
western research approaches that conflicted with local cultural norms and values 
(Citraningtyas et al. 2010). Contributors documented instances in which the North-
South divide significantly disempowered local agencies and researchers after the 
tsunami, making it difficult to conduct their own research, to support local 
response activities, and to effectively respond to unethical research practices by 
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international researchers (Siribaddana et al. 2010, Citraningtyas et al. 2010, 
Sumathipala et al. 2010). Moreover, they noted that while the burden of 
international research (including the basic need to resource the large numbers of 
incoming researchers and their activities) often fell on already severely impacted 
communities and agencies in these developing countries (Citraningtyas et al. 
2010), the latter did not directly benefit from the majority of this research activity 
(Siribaddana et al. 2010, Citraningtyas et al. 2010, Sumathipala et al. 2010).  
 
Both bodies, convened to address problems arising in the post-disaster research 
environment, effectively document instances in which research processes were 
perceived to completely lack either scientific credibility and/or relevance to the 
needs of local agencies, researchers and populations. These processes were 
thereby also perceived to lack legitimacy. This lack was compounded, on the one 
hand, by the research burden such activities placed on the resources and time of 
impacted communities, agencies and researchers, and on the other, by related 
tensions around interfaces between international and local research and national 
cultures, languages, norms and values. The picture that emerges is of an 
environment where the credibility, relevance and legitimacy of both socio-medical 
and physical science research endeavors come under significant pressure. Putting 
local operations and communities at risk, this pressure also risks the legitimacy of 
research endeavors.  
 
1.3.2 Integrated, collaborative post-disaster research  
 
It is notable that both large representative bodies frame this issue as the failure to 
collaborate effectively with local responses and research teams. The clear 
implication is that all research carried out in disaster impacted environments is in 
effect, whether actively or in ignorance, interacting with those communities, 
agencies and researchers already engaged in a collaborative response to the 
event. From a boundary management point of view, failing to collaborate 
effectively, in this context, is to compromise legitimacy by completely 
disregarding the needs of these involved stakeholders. Although not directly 
concerned with research activity as such, recent major humanitarian initiatives 
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have similarly argued that needs assessment and aid provision approaches in 
post-disaster environments must be as collaborative and integrated as possible 
with local authorities and communities (Walton-Ellery & Rashid, 2012; Brown & 
Donini, 2014).  
  
Both the IAVCEI and the Working Group also make the case for such collaboration 
as an imperative. After disasters, all researchers are or should be required to 
collaborate with local research and operational response teams. The IAVCEI 
subcommittee for crisis protocols articulates this as an overriding directive: 
volcanologists must at all times defer to “the primary jobs at hand: to use and 
improve the science for public safety and welfare,” and that this can only be 
achieved in collaboration with (and by deferring to) to local response agencies, 
and the local team of volcanologists given the primary responsibility for the 
direction and outcome of a crisis response (p. 323, Newhall et al. 1999). This 
directive was challenged at the time on the grounds that requiring scientists to 
consider the needs of the local response and the communities they serve 
amounted to undermining scientific credibility, and undervaluing research carried 
out by volcanologists not aligned with the hazards team (Geist & Garcia 2000). 
Indicating the guidelines have been interpreted as a direction to subordinate 
concern for scientific credibility to the relevance requirements of responding 
agencies, this response underlines the tensions that have inhibited collaboration in 
past disasters. Detailed IAVCEI protocols require visiting researchers to contact 
and arrange research collaboration prior to arrival, to come only if invited by the 
local team, and go on to detail appropriate professional conduct when interacting 
(in different scenarios) with local researchers, agencies, communities and media, 
and each other. The same themes inform the ethical guidelines for conducting 
post-disaster research in developing countries set out in the Asian Bioethics 
Review special issue by the fifteen-member Working Group. Applying the 
distributive justice and beneficence principles of the Belmont Report to the wider 
post-disaster research environment, Sumathipala et al. (2010) produce guidelines 
consistent with, and designed to supplement, accepted national and international 
ethical guidelines. They include requirements for culturally sensitive research to be 
carried out in collaboration with local researchers and communities, for research to 
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prove that it is essential (not possible in other conditions), that it is relevant and 
responsive to local needs, and that it will not disrupt or further burden existing 
infrastructure (Sumathipala et al. 2010).  
The Working Group guidelines include higher level recommendations, moreover, 
calling for the establishment of a central/national mechanism responsible for all 
ethics review and research coordination in the disaster-affected area, and for 
managing a research clearing house on an open website. This recommendation is 
likely to have been informed by the third example of work that addresses the 
impact of post-disaster research on affected populations and response agencies, 
the best known documented example of a successfully integrated disaster 
research response of this kind. Within two days of the  bombing of the Murrah 
Building in Oklahoma City by US nationalists in 1995, an integrated Disaster 
Health Study Group (the Health Study Group) made up of representatives from 
fifteen research and response organizations was set up to help steer a 
collaborative research coordination process (North et al. 2002, Quick 1998). It 
aimed to maximise data collection and research quality, while minimising the 
burden on impacted populations, and protecting survivors of the bombings (Quick 
1998). After agreement, at the first meeting, to set up a data base for all bombing 
related research and other data, for both response and research purposes, the 
State Health Commissioner enforced this initiative by declaring “all disaster-
related injuries to be reportable events requiring report to the Oklahoma State 
Department of Health” (p. 623, Quick 1998). Subsequent discussions with the 
Governor’s performance team on how to improve interagency collaboration in 
disaster management led to a decree from the Governor, requiring “that all 
bombing-related research and educational activities be monitored and 
coordinated by appointed officials of the state” (p. 581, North et al. 2002, Quick 
1998). The University of Oklahoma’s (UO) Office of Research Administration was 
given overall responsibility for research coordination, while all research protocols 
had to be submitted to the UO Health Sciences Center Institutional Review Board 
for review and approval (Quick 1998). In addition to prioritising research likely to 
be of immediate use to response and recovery agencies, this body required all 




The Oklahoma collaboration is likely to have been significantly enabled by the 
localised nature and scale of the bombing’s impact. As North et al. note (2007), 
moreover, quality research projects may have been excluded due to the mandate 
given to the ethics review panel. Even so, it does seem to have managed the 
post-disaster research environment in a way that avoided the type of issues 
documented by the IAVCEI and the Working Group. Plainly, this collaborative 
initiative featured the three institutional procedures found by Cash et al. (2003) to 
characterise successful boundary organizations. Official decrees by the Governor 
and State Health Commissioner enforced a high level of commitment to this 
boundary spanning initiative, and set up clear lines of accountability on either side 
of the boundary.  In addition to constituting much of the collaborative process, 
the regular ongoing meetings of the boundary-spanning DHSG also facilitated the 
joint production of a number of boundary objects, including the official bombing-
related database, a Research Registry, post-disaster research training seminars, 
standardised consent forms, and so on. Ensuring that the collaborative process 
was inclusive from the outset, this group continued to facilitate communication, 
translation and mediation functions. The outcomes of this process were a highly 
collaborative research network, integrated with local agencies, and a large body 
of scientifically rigorous data and findings (North et al. 2002, Quick 1998). 
When considered together, this work indicates that the post-disaster research 
environment should be recognized as one dominated by the highly complex and 
urgent collaborative effort that begins immediately after the onset of the 
disruptive event, as local communities, agencies and researchers respond and 
adapt to its impacts. All research conducted within and/or concerning this 
impacted environment thus needs to be recognized as in effect a part of this wider 
collaborative effort – if more or less actively, and wittingly. Failure to recognize 
and collaborate effectively with this effort can greatly increase unproductive 
tensions between the scientific credibility, relevance (particularly to the needs of 
local agencies and researchers involved in response and recovery) and legitimacy 
of the research processes, at the expense of impacted communities, and 
‘research’ itself (Sumathipala et al. 2010). Conversely, collaborative research 
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initiatives coordinated by local agencies and research organizations, and 
supported by proven boundary-spanning procedures have proved effective in 
managing these tensions (Quick 1998, North et al 2002).  
By including the complex wider context within which such collaborations occur, 
boundary management approaches developed in the environmental management 
context may be more effective in researching, understanding and acting to 
improve the processes that effect such highly complex post-disaster research 
collaborative endeavors than those which are solely informed by narrower critical 
or ethics-based approaches. The debate around the ethics of research activities in 
the time-compressed post-disaster environment is thus also a reminder that the 
tensions that emerge so starkly in this context are to a greater or lesser extent 
fundamental to all research environments. Much social science research, for 
example, relies on access to data – and research participants – in the name of the 
public good  (Collogan et al. 2004, Ausbrooks et al. 2009, Knack et al. 2006). The 
post-disaster context foregrounds an obvious but rarely stated fact – that where 
manifest benefits accrue to the researcher, those experienced by participants are 
less direct (Brown & Peek 2014). This is not usually expressly acknowledged in 
applications for ethics approval, or in discussions of the ethics of research 
activities. Equally, this environment raises related questions around research 
activities in the physical sciences. Since basic science is not usually understood to 
involve human participants, scientists are not usually trained to consider the wider 
ethical implications of research activities, even when they contribute directly to 
risk analyses, or are required to engage with local agencies and populations. It 
seems likely that the findings of this research project may thus also be applicable 
to the wider research environment, which – as a complex discursive system – is 
constituted of complex collaborative networks. Better understandings of the 
research processes involved may thus help manage tensions associated with 
scientific credibility, relevance and legitimacy more productively, in the basic, as 





1.4 Case study context  
 
1.4.1 New Zealand hazard management  
 
The Canterbury earthquake sequence occurred at the end of a decade of change 
in New Zealand informed by a decentralizing, deliberative and integrated national 
approach to both managing and researching natural hazard and disaster risk 
(Johnson & Mamula-Seadon 2014, Helm 1996, 2009, Smith 2009). This approach 
has been explicitly informed by growing awareness of the risks posed by 
cascading interactions between the intricately linked sets of complex systems that 
make up the physical and social environments (Helm 1996, 2009). The earlier 
Crown Research Institute (CRI) Act 1992 and the Earthquake Commission (EQC) 
Act 1993 both regulated for the provision of hazards research in the national 
interest. In 2002 the Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) Act built 
on these and other legislative changes to shift national hazard management “from 
centralized, rules-based, response organizations towards more flexible 
arrangements based on principles, culture, mitigation and local knowledge” (p. 
70, Helm, 2009). This was explicitly articulated as part of a new, systems approach 
to the management of unpredictable complex system dynamics, designed to 
move away from a prime focus on hazards (as the source of problems), towards 
the management of the total “Source-Community” system (p. 69 Helm, 2009; 
Helm 2014). On the one hand, resulting measures were designed to devolve 
responsibility for disaster mitigation and response to local level, and to greatly 
increase horizontal networking at that local level, with a view to enhancing the 
resilience of linked social, physical and environmental networks (Helm 2009).  
'Resilience in this context has been defined as a function of situation awareness, 
management of keystone vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity in a complex, 
dynamic and interconnected environment (McManus et al. 2007). On the other, 
this wider strategy was supported by a top-level centralized system for national 
security management known as Domestic and External Security Coordination 
(DESC). Developed to enable the ‘fast, flexible, adaptive management of all 
national security issues,’ including ‘all hazards’ (Helm 2009), this top down, 
command and control mechanism was designed to make it possible for 
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governments to respond tactically to challenges ‘as they arise’ (p. 69, Helm 2009). 
Effecting a whole-of-government approach to security, the ODESC system was 
also tailored to facilitate the coordination of devolved sectoral and regional 
capabilities where a rapid national response is required (Helm 2009).  
 
In emergency management terms, the goal was, and is, improved situation 
awareness. When used in its widest sense, this term refers to a quality of the wider 
system, its overall ability to comprehend elements in any present situation and 
project their effects into the future (McManus et al. 2007). Effective situation 
awareness requires highly networked systems, and the effective utilization of these 
networks in response to disruptive events. Facilitating a focus on risk mitigation, 
and the identification and minimization of vulnerabilities, this wider situation 
awareness also increases the systems capacity to adapt effectively to major 
events. In recent international disasters, limited situation awareness has led to 
major deficiencies in emergency response (Van de Walle & Turoff 2008, McManus 
et al. 2007). Effective emergency response requires what Stanton et al define as 
'distributed situation awareness:' the 'dynamic and collaborative process binding 
agents together on tasks' and in time in response to an emergency (Stanton et al. 
2006). Since this relies on the extent to which the relevant system is already highly 
networked, distributed situation awareness during an emergency response is to 
this extent a function of the overarching situation awareness that already exists in 
the system. (McManus et al. 2007, Stanton et al. 2006). Leading to a change in 
focus from 'post-crisis response to pre-crisis planning,' this recognition has 
informed initiatives designed to increase horizontal and vertical linkages in hazard 
and emergency management networks, actively engaging stakeholders, 
organizations and government in order to foster ongoing communication and 
collaboration. 
 
The CDEM Act (2002), for example, requires and sets out the conditions for 
collaboration between District, Regional and National levels of government during 
emergencies, and (at each level) between government and first response 
organizations, including the police, the army, and private lifeline providers  (CDEM 
Act 2002). The aim was to improve horizontal networking between District and 
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Regional councils. Established under the Local Government Act and the Resource 
Management Act, respectively, District and Regional councils have evolved 
historically as parallel, rather than integrated structures, loosely linked, with 
significant overlap in several areas. As Glavovic et al. (2010) point out, aspects of 
the relationships between these levels of government, and their respective 
responsibilities for hazard management are still not clear, despite the clarification 
provided by the CDEM Act. 
 
The CDEM plan, required under the Act, has been explicitly designed to function 
as part of a linked set of plans, policies and legislation (Figure 2), reflecting the 
same drive to increase networking and collaboration between the organizations 




















Figure 2: Relationship between the CDEM plan and other plans, policies and legislation as 
of 4th September 2010 (CDEM 2009). 
 
The modular Coordinating Incident Management System (CIMS) structure, first 
introduced in the 2005 CDEM Plan, explicitly spells out the collaborative links and 
protocols between levels of government, and – at each level – between 
government and other organizations involved in emergency response. Detailing 
the highly specific project management structure to be used during emergency 
response situations (Figure 3), the CIMS system also requires that those involved 
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in such responses meet regularly, to train, plan and conduct exercises together. In 
this way it incorporates a regular collaborative requirement, attempting to create 
networks and so lay the groundwork for future emergency responses (Helm 2009). 
Thus the CDEM act is designed to involve individuals, families, communities, and 
private organizations, as well as government organizations, in the task of building 


















Figure 3: Multi-incident CIMS structure & interface for CDEM coordination as at 4th 
September 2010 (CDEM 2009).  Note that the diagram inverted the usual hierarchy by 
putting communities at the top, to underline the devolution of responsibility to local levels.  
 
1.4.2 Research advice and Coordination: CRIs and the NHRP 
 
GNS Science (GNS) and National Institute of Water and Atmospheric research 
(NIWA) are Crown Research Institutes with statutory responsibilities under the 
1992 CRI Act for providing science advice to New Zealand government agencies. 
The 2005 CDEM Plan awarded these organizations specific responsibilities for 
providing science advice to agencies involved in emergency response and 
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Recognition, in 2007, that a highly competitive research environment was 
significantly inhibiting research collaboration in New Zealand led to related 
initiatives aiming to build collaborative research networks by developing 
collaborative hazard and disaster research clusters (Smith 2009). As a first step in 
changing funding channels to provide more incentives for collaborative 
engagement with both end-user agencies and other research organizations, the 
then-Ministry of Research, Science and Technology (MRST) worked with EQC and 
CDEM to develop the multi-stakeholder NHRP. Set up by Ministerial directive, the 
NHRP framework consisted of research and advisory groups linked primarily by a 















Figure 4: Founding management structure of the Natural Hazards Research Platform (NHRP 
2009B). 
 
GNS Science, the Host Research Organization (with existing responsibility in this 
area, and chosen through a tender process) collaborates with the other CRI 
Anchor organization (NIWA) and organizations contributing under subcontract to 
strategically identified research theme areas (Figure 5). The NHRP was designed 
as the first step in developing a more integrated and collaborative research and 
funding environment in New Zealand, by building connections across agencies 
and disciplines, and between research providers and end-users. The aspiration 
was to enhance the adaptive capacity of a networked research and hazard 
management community, and so contribute to the larger strategic aim of building 
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Figure 5: Natural Hazards Research Platform structure, integrating organizations, 
disciplinary ‘theme’ areas and stakeholders 
 
While the overall emphasis of the Interim Research Strategy document was on the 
coordination of research funding and activities to inform hazard management 
policy and decision making, it also required that, during significant hazard events, 
the NHRP was to ensure the provision of science capability ‘to assist decision 
makers’ (NHRP 2009A). Thus when the Darfield earthquake initiated the 
Canterbury earthquake sequence on the 4th September 2010, it was to provide a 
major challenge for the NHRP. In place for less than six months, and based on an 
Interim Strategy, it had not had time to develop systematic guidelines as to the 
nature and management of collaborative relationships, and its role in coordinating 







1.4.3 The Canterbury earthquake sequence 
 
The Canterbury earthquake sequence was also to pose the first real test of the 
new, more devolved, networked and adaptive approach to hazard management in 
New Zealand.  It began on 4 September 2010 with the Mw 7.1 Darfield earthquake. 
The epicentre was 10 km deep and ~35km west of Christchurch, New Zealand’s 
second largest city (pop. 390,300 as at June 2010 http://www.stats.govt.nz/). 
Ground shaking resulted in widespread liquefaction in eastern Christchurch, and 
caused ground, building and infrastructure damage (Cubrinovski et al. 2010; 
Bradley et al. 2014). This was the first in a sixteen-month sequence of earthquakes 
that trended eastwards across Christchurch, punctuated by a further three large 
earthquake events which caused significant additional damage (Bradley et al. 













Figure 6: The Canterbury earthquake sequence from 4th September 2010 – 4th June 2012 
 
The second, and most damaging of these larger earthquakes, occurred on 22 
February 2011, when the Mw 6.2 ‘Christchurch Earthquake’ led to 185 deaths and 
more than 6,500 injuries (Johnston et al. 2014). Originating 5 km under the city’s 
southern suburbs, only 6 kilometers away from the city’s central business district, 
unusually high vertical accelerations caused extensive liquefaction and associated 
ground and building damage (Chang et al. 2014). Partial or total building collapse 
 
 35 
during this event caused 175 of the 185 deaths; 133 resulted from the collapse of 
two large multi-story buildings in the central business district (Cooper et al. 2012). 
The Darfield earthquake had been coordinated at the regional level. The scale of 
the disaster caused by the Christchurch earthquake, and the magnitude of the 
required response and recovery operations, led to the declaration of the first state 
of national emergency in New Zealand, on the 23rd February 2011, which lasted 
until the activation of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) on 
the 1st May 2011. A purpose-built central government agency of limited duration, 
CERA was tasked with managing the overall recovery strategy, and given a range 
of powers designed to reduce obstacles to recovery decision-making (Johnson & 
Mamula-Seadon 2014). The third and fourth of the larger events, on 13th June (Mw 
6.0) and 23rd
 
December 2011 (Mw 5.9), respectively, were less disruptive, although 
they significantly compounded liquefaction and damage effects (Bradley et al. 
2014, King et al. 2014). This article uses Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) 
when referring to the larger, cumulative earthquake disaster.  
 
Damage to older buildings and facades in the central business district after the 
Darfield earthquake informed the decision to cordon off a significant proportion of 
the city center for safety reasons for a week, from 4-10 September (Chang et al. 
2014). After the 2011 Christchurch earthquake, damage to the ~2,000 commercial 
buildings in the CBD was so extensive that the entire 349 hectare district bounded 
by the city’s four central avenues was cordoned off as a red zone (Chang et al. 
2014). Although progressively reduced in size, a substantial cordon manned by 
the NZ Defence Force remained in place for more than two years, from 22/2/2011 
to 30/6/2013 (Chang et al. 2014, McGregor 2013). More than half the commercial 
buildings in the CBD have been demolished, including a significant proportion of 
the city’s heritage buildings (Cooper et al. 2013, Chang et al. 2014). A large 
majority of residential buildings also sustained damage, as evidenced in more 
than 500,000 residential insurance claims for earthquake damage to buildings, 
land and contents from approximately 160,000 dwellings, as well as 30,0000 non-
residential insurance claims (King et al. 2014).  
 
The dominant cause of building damage was widespread liquefaction ground 
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damage throughout central and eastern suburbs, particularly in the Christchurch 
earthquake (Cubrinovski et al. 2011, Bradley et al. 2014). Liquefaction also caused 
severe damage and disruption to road networks and aging, buried infrastructure 
networks, compromising water, electricity and sewage systems (Rogers et al. 
2014, van Ballegooy et al. 2014). The extent and range of land damage caused by 
liquefaction and slope instability in some areas of the city was such that in 2011 
the decision was made to categorize over 7,500 residential properties (~5% of 
total housing stock) as too difficult, uneconomic, dangerous and/or impractical to 
repair (Chang et al. 2014, Rogers et al. 2014). Those with properties zoned red on 
this basis were able to engage with a Government offer process, which provided 
eligible homeowners in these zones with the opportunity to relocate (Rogers et al. 
2014). 
 
The total cost of recovery and reconstruction has been estimated at as much as 
NZ$40 billion, which is equivalent to around 19% of New Zealand’s GDP (New 
Zealand Treasury 2013, cited by Stevenson et al. 2014). 
 
Rather than coordinating the response to the Christchurch Earthquake from the 
National Crisis Management Center  in Wellington, as specified in the CDEM plan, 
the National Controller and some National Crisis Management Center staff did so 
on location in Christchurch, based together with the CDEM Group and 
Christchurch City CDEM teams in a specialized Christchurch Response Center. The 
NHRP staffed a science desk in the Christchurch Response Center, and teams 
made up of local and international (academic and consulting) engineers, geo-
technologists and geologists conducted coordinated seismic, damage and risk 
assessment programs across the city in support of the response. Concern about 
mounting research pressure on local researchers, agencies and communities led 
the National Controller to consult with the NHRP and others concerning a 
moratorium declaration, which was focused in particular on all active social science 
research engagement with impacted communities that was not directly 
contributing to response operations, throughout the national emergency period 
(NCMC Log 2011, McLean et al. 2012).. 
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SEPTEMBER 6th 2010 
Gerry Brownlee appointed Minister for 
CER; Cabinet Committee on CER formed.  
 
SEPTEMBER 4th 2010 
M7.1 ‘Darfield’ earthquake hits 
Canterbury. Local states of emergency 
declared. 
 
SEPTEMBER 14th 2010 
CERR Act enacted; CERC established. 
SEPTEMBER16th 2010 
State of local emergency lifted by 
Christchurch Mayor 
 
DEC EMBER 26th 2010 
M4.9 ‘Boxing Day’ earthquake  
 
FEBRUARY 23rd 2011 
State of national emergency declared 
 
MARCH 14th 2011 
Royal commission of inquiry established. 
MARCH 24th 2011 
CERA announced publically.  
 
APRIL 14th 2011th  
CER Act enacted. APRIL 30th 2011 
State of national emergency lifted 
Social science research moratorium 
lifted. 
 
JUNE 13th 2011 
M6.3 earthquake 
 
MAY 1st 2011 
Recovery process transferred to CERA. 
 
DECEMBER 23rd 2011 
M5.8 followed by M6.0 earthquakes.  
 
 
MARCH 11th 2011 
Declaration of Social Science research 
moratorium by National Controller 
 
FEBRUARY 22nd 2011 
M6 ‘Christchurch Earthquake’ MARCH 11th 2011 





















Figure 7: The Canterbury Earthquake Sequence timeline, showing key events (adapted 
from Brookie, 2012) 
In May 2011, the government passed the CER Act. The Act vested strategic 
responsibility for the recovery in a purpose-designed authority, based, like the 
national response, in Christchurch, and to include representatives from all relevant 
government agencies (Johnson & Mamula-Seadon 2015). This authority was a 
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departure from the recovery arrangements specified in the CDEM plan, and it 
again reported to the Minister for the Recovery, the Minister of Economic 
Development, rather than the Minister of internal affairs. 
This research project was primarily concerned with the major response and 
recovery operations that followed the Darfield and Christchurch earthquakes 
(Figure 9). It was focused on the engagement of the NHRP and its offshoot 
advisory group, the Psychosocial Recovery Advisory Group, with the sequential 
departures from existing CDEM plans established in response to the scale of the 
destruction caused by the Christchurch earthquake.  
1.5 Thesis Organization  
 
The chapters that follow build a sequentially layered picture of the research 
response to the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence, in relation to both the aims of 
this project. Although all are concerned with this research response, each chapter 
has a different focus, and is concerned with a different time frame. The chapters 
become progressively more closely focused on the NHRP and more explicitly 
theoretical. Each chapter begins by briefly rehearsing (and to a small extent 
repeating) relevant aspects of the larger context discussed in this first chapter, as 
required for the discussion that follows, in the interests of clarity. Chapters three 
(Research coordination after the 2010-2011 CES) and five (Boundary organizations 
after disasters) have both been submitted for publication. They are largely 
reproduced in this thesis as submitted, although efforts have been made to 
reduce obvious repetitions. 
 
Chapter two provides a wider context for the case studies that follow it. A 
bibliometric analysis compares a data set of publications concerned with the 
Canterbury Earthquake Sequence with data sets of publications concerned with 
three other recent disasters. This contextualization was deemed necessary 
because of the limited comparative context. Existing literature provides only one 
other case study of the use of a large research coordination body to coordinate 
research support for agencies after disasters, and there are few options available 
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for assessing and comparing research activity between different disasters. In this 
chapter’s bibliometric analysis a research publication field linked by name to the 
2010-2011 CES is compared with those in fields concerned with the 2005 
Hurricane Katrina disaster, the 2009 Black Saturday Bushfires Bushfire disaster, 
and the 2010 Haiti Earthquake. Metadata is used to compare levels of affiliation to 
international organizations, to agencies and levels of items that fall into the broad 
Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM) category (as defined by 
Bastow et al. 2014). The findings of this chapter contextualize the case studies that 
follow in two ways. Firstly, they indicate that levels of agency affiliation to 
publications are broadly consistent across all four disasters, and consistently 
higher than those identified in a recent bibliometric analysis of a very large sample 
of current disaster risk reduction literature. This is consistent with the limited 
(although seminal) findings indicating that the post-disaster environment can 
stimulate integrated research activity, suggesting this effect may be linked to 
factors common to all post-disaster environments. Secondly, they indicate 
proportional disaster impact as a likely factor in variations in international affiliation 
levels, which were higher in the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence and Haiti 
Earthquake data sets, and highest in the Haiti Earthquake publication field. High 
levels of affiliation density to a few national research organizations were 
characteristic of data sets concerning disasters in developed countries, and 
highest in the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence data set. Mixed international and 
national affiliation levels were also highest in the Canterbury Earthquake 
Sequence data set.  
 
These findings contextualize the case study in Chapter three, which is focused on 
the research risks and opportunities arising in the immediate aftermath of the 
Christchurch Earthquake, and so concerned with research activity during the state 
of National Emergency, which was declared the day after this earthquake on 23rd 
February 2011, and lifted on April 30th. The boundary management framework is 
used to analyze the NHRP’s coordination of research in support of the two month 
response operation over this period, focusing on the logistical and ethical issues 
created by the urgency and time-compression of this environment, international 
and national research pressure, and the effects of shared perceptions concerning 
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the parameters of both this organization and its operation. It finds that the NHRP 
was effective in bringing the resources of its member organizations, and the 
associated national and international networks, into a larger research operation in 
support of agency decision-making. Perceptions of exclusion however were 
created by attempts to manage the risks arising out of research pressure, and by 
widespread erroneous assumptions about the NHRP’s role, giving rise to new risks 
to legitimacy. Lessons drawn from this analysis include the necessity of the joint 
management of the risks associated with research pressure after disasters through 
a collaboration between response agencies and research communities, the value 
of using an inclusive research coordinating platform or organization in such 
collaborations, the need to ensure that it is responsible for all research activity in 
the impacted region, and the importance of ensuring that coordinating 
arrangements are transparent and widely disseminated. The chapter also 
recommends the use of an existing structure, with a permanent national research 
coordination function. It concludes by reiterating calls made elsewhere for more 
awareness of the risks associated with research pressure after disasters, of the 
need for research communities to respect moral and ethical principles, and of the 
importance of being guided by the needs of local response operations, 
researchers and impacted populations. (This chapter has been published in the 
journal Earthquake Spectra). 
 
The decision-making framework that informed Chapter Three is explained in more 
detail in Chapter four, where it is applied in a case study of the Psychosocial 
Recovery Advisory Group (PRAG), a small advisory group established by the 
NHRP. This case study is focused on the transition from response to early recovery 
in the 18-month period after the earthquake, and the associated changes in 
agency demand indicated by this group’s caseload over this period. The chapter 
finds that the initial scope, function, membership and geographical parameters of 
this Advisory Group reflected agency need, immediately after the event, for rapid 
commentary from existing Wellington contacts with disaster specialization. As the 
recovery operation developed in Christchurch, and agency focus shifted onto the 
need for knowledge concerning recovery from this disaster, the limiting effects of 
these early parameters made it difficult for this group to adapt. Lessons include 
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the need to anticipate both the early reliance on existing knowledge, networks 
and specialist capacity, and the subsequent shift of focus onto the development of 
new knowledge, networks and capacity, by ensuring that the parameters of 
organizations facilitating research support for agencies are as flexible as possible. 
The chapter also notes the utility of the boundary organization framework focus on 
the effects of decision-making concerning organizational parameters in the post-
disaster context. 
 
Chapter five reverses the emphasis of earlier case studies, by using a case study of 
the NHRP as a boundary organization to test the utility of the boundary 
organization concept in the disaster risk reduction context. The foregrounding of 
the framework’s utility makes this the most explicitly theoretical chapter. The 
analysis assesses the impact of the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence on the wider 
performance of the NHRP during its first five years of operation. The framework is 
used to map the NHRP’s collaborative arrangements in relation to boundary 
tensions over time, distinguishing pre-existing and ongoing structural effects from 
the effects of the disaster. Key findings are that the NHRP was largely based in the 
research domain, and so was well placed to resist the negative pressure of post-
disaster time compression on research quality. This left it less well placed to resist 
the impact of this environment on the networking required to integrate 
disciplinary, organizational and higher level science/policy domains, and so 
increase the legitimacy of the larger collaboration. Five points are made 
concerning the utility of the boundary organization concept as a schematic 
template. It requires attention is paid to striving for balance between domain 
drivers, engagement and between organizational parameters. It provides the 
breadth of perspective facilitated by the emphasis on assessing the relevant 
organization in relation to wider domains, and brings social, political and cultural 
contexts into view. It is focused on system effects that create self-similar patterns 
at smaller and larger scales, affording a flexible focus, and facilitating a nuanced, 
layered perspective. Lastly, the focus on effects, patterns and trends, rather than 
individual or organizational performance serve as a valuable counterweight to the 




Chapter six provides concluding comments linking the key findings from the 
project to the project aims, drawing out implications for current and future 




This project is primarily reliant on the large range of secondary material available 
after the CES. It also draws from the observations and knowledge of the author, 
her supervisory team, and others who were involved in different capacities in 








Post-disaster research integration:  
indications of stakeholder engagement  
and international involvement  





Disasters are officially defined in relation to levels of disruption and losses that 
overwhelm the ability of impacted communities and society to function (UNISDR 
2009). The scale of this disruption catalyzes an immediate spike in demand for 
information and decision-making, and high levels of focus across domains and 
sectors (Olshansky et al. 2012, Johnson & Mamula-Seadon 2014, Birkland 1998, 
2009). Such environments have been found to trigger increases in research 
funding and activity, greater likelihood of science/policy collaboration and the 
uptake of science by policymakers (Gall et al. 2015, Liu et al. 2012, Birkland 1998, 
2009, Taskin 2010). Escalations of research activity after disasters have also been 
linked to increased risks to research quality, however, and been identified as an 
additional burden on regions struggling to function after the disaster (Birkland 
2009, Newhall et al. 1999, Sumathipala et al 2010, Citraningtyas et al. 2010, 
Brown & Donini, 2014,  Walton-Ellery & Rashid, 2012,  Brun 2009, Gill et al. 2007).  
Existing literature has also indicated that the integration of research activity into 
the larger collaborative response to the disaster event has the potential to reduce 
such risks and enhance some of the opportunities generated by this environment 
(Newhall et al 1999, Sumathipala et al 2010, Citraningtyas et al. 2010, Black 2003, 
North 2002).  
 
This larger doctoral project uses research coordination and response after the 
2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence as a case study, to gain a better 
understanding of the role of knowledge domain boundary tensions in this 
particular post-disaster environment. Case studies provide a more detailed 
understanding of a phenomenon of interest, although as a single instance cannot 
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be used as the basis of generalized empirical knowledge (Stake 1995). Existing 
findings concerning post-disaster risks and opportunities, and the use of national 
research coordination bodies to manage them provide valuable comparative 
context, by contextualizing and so considerably increasing the understandings 
provided by this case study. 
 
Although the existing literature in the area discussed in the introduction does 
indicate that more detailed understanding of this phenomenon is required, this 
material is limited, making it difficult to situate research activity after the 
Canterbury Earthquake Sequence alongside that which has occurred after other 
disasters. Publications concerning the Disaster Health Study Group established in 
the immediate aftermath of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing in the United States 
amount to the only relevant case study involving the use of a science/policy 
boundary organization to coordinate post-disaster research (North et al. 2002, 
Quick 1998). Literature focused directly on post-disaster risks and opportunities 
includes Birkland’s seminal body of work focused on the risks and opportunities 
relating to the quality and integration of disaster risk reduction research and policy 
in the aftermath of US disasters, and two guideline documents by representative 
panels from different disciplinary fields based on reported evidence of the risks 
international research pressure has posed to disaster-impacted response 
agencies, communities and researchers (Birkland 1998, 2005, 2009, Newhall et al. 
1999, Sumathipala et al. 2010). Several recent bibliometric studies have also 
indicated that specific disasters have stimulated research activity (Gall et al. 2015, 
Liu et al. 2012, Taskin 2010), while a 2006 National Academy of Sciences synthesis 
study found that disaster events have played a role in increasing historically low 
rates of social science involvement in disaster risk reduction (NAS 2006).  
 
The high proportion of synthesis and bibliometric studies in this sample is 
consistent with the limited range of tools available for research domain 
assessment; this has contributed to a corresponding lack of information 
concerning integration in the broader hazard and disaster risk management field 
(Johnson & Hayashi 2012, NSF 2006, Few & Barclay 2011, Hackmann et al. 2013, 
Gall et al. 2015). Recent analyses of bibliometric disaster risk reduction and 
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earthquake research data sets are of particular value, in that they have helped to 
clarify the shape and general focus of related publication fields (Gall et al. 2015, 
Taskin 2010, Liu et al. 2012, Li et al. 2009). They thus provide both a precedent 
and context for this chapter, which reports a comparative bibliometric analysis 
comparing the shape and distribution of a Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 
publication field with fields related to three other recent disasters: the 2005 
Hurricane Katrina disaster in the US, the 2009 Black Saturday Bushfires in 
Australia, and the 2010 Haiti Earthquake.  
 
The analysis was designed to build on and contribute to existing work concerned 
with post-disaster research opportunities and risks, and so further contextualize 
the understandings provided by this doctoral case study. Bibliometric data was 
used to derive broad indications of integration across organizations, disciplines 
and sectors, of relative proportions of social science activity, and of levels of 
national and international engagement. The aim was to compare patterns of 
findings across examples of recent disasters that differ in type (earthquake, 
bushfire, hurricane), and location (New Zealand, Haiti, Australia, United States). 
Indications of collaboration (between organizations, disciplines, and nationals and 
internationals) were used as a proxy for integration. Web of Science (WoS) was 
used to collect items published within four years of each disaster.  
 
The comparative bibliometric analysis presented and discussed in this chapter also 
drew on and contributes to the limited body of work concerned to establish broad 
levels of integration in the general disaster risk reduction domain. Recent 
nationally commissioned United States and United Kingdom synthesis studies 
relating to disaster-related social sciences have found little integration between 
physical and social branches of science (NAS 2006), and that stakeholder 
integration remains scarce (Few & Barclay 2011). A steady increase in multiple 
authorship in most disciplinary fields has been observed over the last twenty 
years, particularly in STEM categories (Corley & Sabarwhal 2010, Glänzel 2002, 
Porac et al. 2004), and recent findings concerning global disaster risk reduction 
and earthquake research publication fields indicate that multiple authorship has 
also increased in these fields (Liu et al. 2012, Gall et al. 2015). Although indicating 
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a limited increase in multi-disciplinarity over the last decade, these studies found 
little evidence of integration when it came to more disparate disciplinary fields 
and methodologies (Liu et al. 2012, Taskin 2010, Gall et al. 2015). Researchers 
from developed countries are responsible for the majority of publications in both 
disaster risk reduction and earthquake research areas, even when publications are 
based on research activities conducted in other parts of the world (Gall et al. 




The analysis provided context for a recent disaster in an English speaking nation; 
this, together with the focus on integration informed an emphasis on recent 
disasters in English speaking nations, where such research might be expected to 
be more accessible to policy and decision-makers. The search was limited to 
English language articles. Four disasters were included in the analysis: the 2010-
2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence, New Zealand, the Black Saturday 
Bushfires that occurred in Australia in 2009, the Haiti Earthquake in 2010, and 
Hurricane Katrina, which impacted southern United States coastline in 2005. Three 
of these disasters were roughly comparable in relation to fatalities and losses 
proportional to national population and gross domestic product (GDP), and 
occurred in English speaking developed Pacific countries (Figure 1). The United 
States has produced the largest volume of disaster research publications, and 
Hurricane Katrina tops the five most heavily researched disasters in the English 
language (Gall et al. 2015, Liu et al. 2012). Thus the inclusion of this domestic US 
disaster offered a basis for comparison with disasters in developed countries with 
less internationally active research communities (Liu et al. 2012, Gall et al. 2015). 
                                                       
6 Note that the value offered by the analysis that follows lies in the comparison it is able to 
provide between the shape and distribution of publication data sets that have been 
gathered in the same way, concerning different disasters. This means that it is restricted to 
comparing the extent of integration as represented by these limited publication data sets, 
and cannot provide a more comprehensive indication of the extent of integration indicated 





Table 1: Comparative fatalities (as proportion of national population) and economic losses 
(as proportion of total annual GDP the year of the disaster) as indicators of level of 
disaster impact (Sources include http://www.stats.govt.nz/; http://www.abs.gov.au/; 
http://www.multpl.com/united-states-population/table (US Bureau Statistics); 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/; http://www-wds.worldbank.org/; Stevenson 
et al. 2013; Johnston et al. 2014). 
Disaster name & year Fatalities 




Total damage & 
losses (millions US$)




Hurricane Katrina 2005 1,833 295.520 0.001 108,000 13,100,000 0.824
Black Saturday Fires 2009 173 21.875 0.001 4,400 926,700 0.475
Haiti Earthquake 2010 220,000 9.896 2.223 7,804 6,623 117.832
Canterbury Earthquake 
Sequence 2010-2011
185 4.403 0.004 21,000 163,800 12.821
 
 








The 2010 Haiti Earthquake is another of the five disasters most heavily researched 
in the English language (Gall et al. 2015; see also Liu et al. 2012). This is perhaps 
surprising, since French, rather than English, is spoken in Haiti. Haiti also differs 
from the other disaster locations in being a developing, extremely poor Carribean 
island nation. The Haiti Earthquake thus afforded comparison between 
contemporaneous earthquake disasters in developed and developing small island 
nations. This event was also chosen because it marked the higher end of the 
disaster scale in terms of catastrophic impacts, as indicated in both fatalities as 
proportion of total population, and losses in relation to annual GDP (Table 1). 
Together these four disasters afforded diverse comparison between disasters 
caused by geophysical (i.e. earthquake) and climatic (i.e. wildfire and storm) 
hazard types, and include two (Haiti Earthquake and Hurricane Katrina) of the five 
recent disasters most heavily researched in English (Gall et al. 2015).  
 
2.2.1 Data Retrieval 
 
Web of Science (WoS), formerly the Institute of Scientific Information (ISI), is a 
citation database provided by Thomson Scientific. WoS remains the standard and 
most widely used tool for bibliometric analysis, and has been found to be the 
most accurate and consistent of available tools (Meho & Yang 2007, Waltman & 
Van Eck 2012). It was chosen as the sole database for this comparative study to 
maintain consistency across the data sets, and to allow for comparisons with other 
recent bibliometric research findings concerned with disaster risk reduction and 
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earthquake disaster research publications, which are also based on searches of 
WoS (and, in the case of historical publications, older ISI citation databases).7 
 
Data was gathered through WoS searches using the name or names of the 
relevant disaster as found in keywords, titles and abstracts. Retrieved data was 
then manually cleaned of duplicate entries, and items that were either not 
concerned with the relevant disaster, or which lacked organizational affiliation 
details (see appendix below for more detail concerning search terms and 
processes). This resulted in 978 Hurricane Katrina entries, 407 concerned with the 
Haiti Earthquake, 192 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence entries, and 85 concerned 
with the Black Saturday Bushfires.  
 
2.2.1 Content analysis  
 
Content analysis consisted of manual coding of the WoS data sets to identify 
relevant research characteristics (place, stakeholder involvement, broad 
disciplinary category). The coding was based on data retrieved by WoS, including 
abstracts, and affiliation data. Much of the information (particularly concerning 
organization type) was not derivable from the data set, and required supplemental 
Internet research. 
 
Organizational affiliation details retrieved through WoS were used as the main 
indication of the national origin(s) of the research author, and of national and 
international involvement in the research projects that informed the relevant 
publication (Gall et al. 2015). This nationality data was then used to code each 
citation in relation to the geographic location of the relevant disaster. 
Organizations affiliated with the relevant citation were coded as being either 
within the nation impacted by the disaster (N), or outside that affected nation (I). 
                                                       
7 WoS has, however, been found to be less capable of retrieving conference proceedings 
than some other databases (see Meho & Yang 2007 for the limitations of WoS). This means 
that the data sets gathered for the purposes of this study should not be taken as 





Combined, these codes indicated the extent to which each output involved 
collaboration across more than one organization, and whether collaborations were 
within the impacted nation, between national and international collaborators or 
involved only internationals.  
 
Each citation was also coded according to the type of author-affiliated 
organization, based on the extent to which the provision of research was the 
primary function of the relevant organization. Those with the provision of research 
as their primary function included tertiary organizations, national and international 
research institutes, not-for-profit research providers and think tanks (all coded ‘R’), 
and private research consultancies (coded ‘RP’). Organizations with primary 
functions associated with the provision of key government services were coded 
‘A’, a category that included hospitals and armed forces as well as other national 
agencies and some branches of international governing bodies (such as the 
United Nations and the European Union). A third category included a range of 
non-governmental organizations, including large charitable and disaster relief 
organizations such as the Red Cross and other UN initiatives (such as the United 
Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund), as well as local community 
initiatives (all coded ‘NGO’). Finally, corporate organizations (including insurance 
providers, critical infrastructure, mining and other companies) that did not fall into 
any of the above categories were coded ‘Corp’. Since the numbers of both NGO 
and Corp affiliations were low, they were included in an ‘other’ category.  Again, it 
is important to reiterate that since many organizations fell into more than one of 
these categories, this coding was derived from the primary function of the relevant 
organization. Mèdicins Sans Frontiéres, for example, was coded as an NGO, 
although this organization also provides the key service provided by hospitals, 
which were coded (A). Similarly, research providers were coded R and hospitals A, 
although both can sometimes also be corporations, while teaching hospitals 
generate research as a significant secondary function. Collaborations that included 
‘other’ organizations were also counted in the ‘other category.’  
 
Combinations of organizations affiliated with a single citation were taken as 
evidence of collaborations between those organizations. First authorship was used 
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to derive some indication of which organization took the lead, and gained most 
credit from the research publication. Again, this was a loose measure, particularly 
when considering the anticipated audience and purpose of each publication may 
influence the author order in cross-sector collaborative research publications, 
which are more likely to feature a researcher as first author than policy documents 
or NGO reports. Research conventions can also vary widely, with some disciplines 
(such as mathematics) listing authors alphabetically (Venkatraman 2010). There is 
emerging consensus, however, concerning the value accruing to primary 
authorship (Venkatraman 2010, Yukawa et al. 2014). Usually taken as an indication 
of the author with most responsibility for both research and writing, it is also 
valuable because of the visibility of the primary author’s name when 
collaboratively authored work is cited (Yukawa et al. 2014, Venkatraman 2010). 
The number of items affiliated with each organization was also used as a broad 
indicator of the organizations most active after each disaster, while the ratio of 
organizations to items indicated the density of organizational activity in each 
publication field.  
 
The disciplinary details provided by the relevant publication source were used to 
code each item in terms of a broad distinction between the physical and social 
sciences. Given the difficulty of clearly establishing such a distinction, the analysis 
relied on an existing categorization provided by Bastow et al. (2013), who include 
the physical sciences (including the medical sciences), technology, engineering, 
and mathematics groupings as a single category under the acronym (STEM). Items 
were coded as STEM, non-STEM or a combination of both. The social sciences, 
including economics, management and finance, policy, public administration and 
so on were thus coded non-STEM, as were the humanities and creative arts (Table 
4: Appendix A). In instances where the details provided by the publication source 
were not definitive in terms of the STEM non-STEM distinction (such as ’Public 
health policy and services’ & ‘Multi-disciplinary’), individual article abstracts were 







The analysis was concerned to identify patterns of affiliation that provided 
indications relating to the opportunities and risks related to research integration, 
and found to characterize the post disaster environment. Opportunities identified 
in the literature included a general increase in research opportunities, increased 
opportunities for collaborative science-policy integration leading to disaster risk 
reduction operations and policy, and opportunities to recruit social scientists into 
the historically STEM-dominated disaster-related research domain. The 
involvement of international researchers in such environments has also been found 
to increase opportunities to grow national research capacity and linkages into 
international research networks. High volumes of research activity, however, have 
been identified as posing risks to impacted communities and response agencies, 
particularly when they are not integrated into the collaborative response effort.  
 
The findings are reported in two broad thematic categories. Organizational 
integration includes the involvement of stakeholder and national and international 
organizations. Disciplinary integration is concerned with the distribution of items in 
relation to broad disciplinary groupings.  
 
2.3.1 Organizational integration  
 
Organizational affiliation is based on authorship, and in this analysis collaborative 
authorship is used as a proxy for collaborative research activity. All four post-
disaster data sets are consistent with identified trends concerning multiple 
authorship, in that the majority of items (between 76-90% of items) featured 
multiple authors, with slightly higher multiple authorship levels in STEM categories 
(from 86-92% of total STEM items were multiply authored).  
 
Distributions of affiliated organization type were broadly consistent across all four 
post-disaster data sets. Between 70% and 82% of publications were research-only 
publications and between 89% and 96% of publications featuring some research 
organization affiliation (i.e., research only or research and agency), and only 
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Figure 8: Involvement of government agencies (A) and research organizations (R) in 
publication data sets (as indicated by organizational affiliation with publications). 
 










affiliated this way (Figure 8). All featured correspondingly low levels of affiliation 
with other organizations, a category that included NGOs and corporations      











Levels of agency involvement in publications (i.e., A&R and A only inclusive) were 
above 16% for each disaster. Between 14% and 16% of publications involved 
authors with affiliations with at least one agency and one research organization, 
and between 2% and 9% were affiliated to an agency only. 16-25% featured 
affiliation with at least one agency.  
 
A chi-squared analysis on the number of agency only, research only, research and 
agency and other publications as a function of disaster revealed a significant 
effect, X2 (9) = 97.5, p <.0001. Post-hoc tests (p <.001) revealed significant effects 
for each disaster except for the Black Saturday Bushfires data set and for each 
publication type except for the combined agency-research publications.  
 
For the Hurricane Katrina data set there were more agency only publications and 
fewer other publications than expected. For the Haiti Earthquake data set there 
were fewer agency only and research only publications and more than expected 
other publications. For the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence data set there were 
fewer agency only, national only and more research-only publications than 
expected.  
 
There were more agency only publications than expected for the Hurricane 
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Katrina data set and fewer than expected for the Haiti Earthquake and Canterbury 
Earthquake Sequence data sets. There were fewer research only publications than 
expected for the Haiti Earthquake data set and more than expected for the 
Canterbury Earthquake Sequence data set. There were fewer other publications 
than expected for the Hurricane Katrina data set and more than expected for the 
Haiti Earthquake data set. 
 
Affiliation density indicated variations in the distribution of organizational activity 
in these data sets. Since most documents were affiliated to more than one 
organization, the ratio of organizations to documents indicated the overall 
affiliation density. The Hurricane Katrina data set featured the lowest ratio of 
organizations (712) to documents (978), at 0.7 organizations for each 1 document, 
indicating research activity more intensively focused through fewer organizations. 
Both the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (197/192) and Black Saturday Bushfires 
(88/85) data sets featured ratios close to 1:1. The Haiti Earthquake data set 
featured the highest ratio of organizations (587) to documents (407) at 1.44, 
indicating research activity across a larger number of research organizations.  
 
The organizations affiliated with the most documents in each data set provided a 
second indication of the intensity of organizational affiliation (Table 2). The 
Canterbury Earthquake Sequence, Black Saturday Bushfires and Hurricane Katrina 
data sets all featured considerably higher affiliation density to a few research 
organizations. The most highly affiliated organization in each of these datasets 
was linked to 35%, 26% and 10% of total items (respectively). In the Haiti 
Earthquake data set the three most highly affiliated organizations were each 
linked to only 4% or less of overall items, indicating less intensive affiliation to a 
few key organizations (Table 2). These differences appeared to be related to 
differences in the distribution of internationally and nationally affiliated 
organizations. 
 
The three most highly affiliated organizations in the Hurricane Katrina, Black 
Saturday Bushfires and Canterbury Earthquake Sequence data sets were all large 




Figure 9: Involvement of national (N) and international (I) organizations, and 
national/international collaborations (as indicated by primary author affiliation). 
 










Table 2: Comparison between the three most highly affiliated organizations in each data set 
Affiliations to items as a percentage of the total number of items in each data set 





Canterbury (NZ):  35%  
GNS Science (NZ):  
19% 




USGS (US): affiliated to 
4% 
University of Miami 
(US): affiliated to 4% 
Center for Disease Control 





(Australia):  25%  
University of 
Melbourne 
(Australia):  18% 
La Trobe University 




University (US):  10%  
Tulane University 
(US):  8%  
University of New Orleans 
(US): 4%  
 
 
Each of these three data sets featured a university centrally based in the relevant 
disaster impacted region with the most publication affiliations. By contrast, the 
three most highly affiliated organizations in the Haiti Earthquake data set were all 
based in the US. There were, moreover, only two national research Haitian 
research organizations affiliated to documents in this data set (the Université Etat 
Haiti – affiliated to 5 items/1% – and the Université Quisqueya – affiliated to a 
single item). This reflects lower overall national affiliation in the Haiti Earthquake 
















In the Haiti Earthquake data set, 99% of publications were affiliated with 
international organizations, and 97% featured a first author from an international 
organization. Only 11% of the Haiti Earthquake publications involved Haitian 
organizations, and only 2% featured a first author from a Haitian organization 
(Figure 9). This distribution was reversed in the Hurricane Katrina and Black 
Saturday Bushfires data sets, which featured broadly similar levels of national and 
international involvement in publications (Figure 9). More than 90% of publications 
in each of these two data sets were affiliated with at least one national 
organization, and 94% of both data sets featured a first author affiliated with a 
national organization.  
 
The Canterbury Earthquake Sequence data set falls between these extremes, with 
65% of all Canterbury Earthquake Sequence related publications featuring a first 
author affiliated with a New Zealand organization (Figure 9). 49% of items were 
affiliated only with national organizations, compared with 90% and 87% of 
Hurricane Katrina and Black Saturday Bushfires items, and 2% of the Haiti 
Earthquake data set. 50% of Canterbury Earthquake Sequence publications 
featured some international involvement, compared with 99% of the Haiti 
Earthquake data set, and only 13% and 10% of Black Saturday Bushfires and 
Hurricane Katrina publications respectively.  
 
Since all four data sets featured similar proportions of overall organizational 
affiliation (Figure 8 above), further analysis of the relation between organizational 
type and international and national affiliation was carried out (Figure 10). When 
analyzed according to organization type, both the Hurricane Katrina and Black 
Saturday Bushfires data sets feature low levels (7% or less) of international 
affiliation in items featuring collaborations between research organizations and 
agencies (A&R (Figure 10). At 41% and 27%, the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 
and Haiti Earthquake data sets (respectively) appear to feature larger proportions 






Figure 10: Distributions of national (N) and international (I) affiliation in relation to 
organizational type, comparing overall items with those affiliated to at least one agency 
and one research organization (A&R), to agencies (A), to research organizations (R), and to 
other.  
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A chi-squared analysis on the number of agency only, research only, research and 
agency and other publications combined across the data sets revealed a 
significant effect, X2 (6) = 113.71, p <.0001. Post-hoc tests (p < .001) revealed 
significant effects for national only and mixed national-international publications 
but not for international only publications, and significant effects for each type of 
organization.  
 
For international only publications the number of each type of publication did not 
differ from that expected. For the national only publications there were 
significantly higher than expected numbers of agency only publications, and 
significantly lower numbers of research only and other publications than expected.  
For the national/international publications there were significantly higher than 
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expected numbers of other and agency/research publications but significantly 
fewer publications agency or research only organizations than expected. 
 
For agency only publications there were fewer than expected international only 
and more than expected joint national/international. For research only 
publications there were fewer than expected national/international publications 
and more than expected both international only and national only publications. 
For agency/research publications there were fewer than expected international 
only and more than expected national/international publications. For other 
publications there were fewer than expected national only and more than 
expected national/international publications. 
 
A separate chi-squared analysis was conducted for each of the 4 disasters, which 
revealed no significant effect in either of the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence or 
Black Saturday Bushfire data sets.  
 
For the Haiti Earthquake data set, low levels of national affiliation meant that the 
comparison was only between international only and international-national 
publications. There was a significant effect, X2 (3) = 88.90, p <.001. For the 
international only publications there were higher numbers of research publications 
and lower numbers of agency/research and other affiliated publications than 
expected. For the international/national publications there were fewer affiliated to 
research organizations only, and more affiliated to agency/research and other 
organizations than expected. 
 
For Hurricane Katrina the comparison excluded “other” publications, which were 
few. There was a significant effect, X2 (4) = 15.40, p <.01. Post-hoc tests revealed 
no significant effects for either the international only or national only publications. 
For the national/international publications there were fewer agency only and 
agency/research publications than expected. 
 
Note that 7% of agency/research organization collaborations in the Black Saturday 




Figure 11: Comparative proportions of STEM & non-STEM categories overall, and by 
international and national affiliation.  
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and 68% of those in the Haiti Earthquake data set are affiliated only with 
international organizations. The numbers of international agency affiliations are 
small, even in the Haiti data set. While the proportions of agency involvement are 
consistent overall (at 18-23%), they vary in terms of international affiliation. 
 
Only the Haiti Earthquake data set featured significant international involvement in 
the agency-only affiliated category (Figure 10). In the other three data sets 
agency-only affiliated items were almost all national. International agency 
affiliation in items affiliated to both agencies and research organizations was 
higher in the earthquake disaster data sets.  
 
2.3.2 Disciplinary integration 
 
Proportional distribution of STEM disciplinary categories varied across the data 






















The Hurricane Katrina data set featured the lowest proportion of STEM items 
overall, at 52%. Levels of STEM items were higher in the earthquake data sets. 
69% of Haiti Earthquake items fell into this category, with CES items featuring the 
highest proportion of STEM items overall at 85% (Figure 11). STEM disciplines 
also appeared to predominate in national and international collaborations, and – 
to a lesser extent – in international publications (note that numbers of 
internationally authored publications in the Hurricane Katrina and Black Saturday 
Bushfires data sets are very low) (Figure 11). With the exception of the Haiti 
Earthquake data set, non-STEM levels were highest in items affiliated only to 
national organizations, and lowest in items affiliated to both international and 
national organizations. Almost all such collaborations in the CES data set fell into 
STEM disciplinary categories, as did 84% of the further 19% of CES items that had 
only international authors. 89% of items in the Haiti Earthquake data set were 
affiliated only with international organizations. Of these, 68% fell into STEM 
categories, as did 76% of the 10% of Haiti Earthquake items affiliated to both 
international and Haitian organizations.   
 
A chi-squared analysis on the number of STEM and non-STEM (non-STEM plus 
mixed STEM-non STEM) as a function of disasters revealed a significant effect, X2 
(3) = 98.28, p <.0001. Post-hoc tests (p < .01) revealed significant effects for each 
disaster except for Black Saturday Bushfires (for which the number of each type of 
publication did not differ from that expected). The number of STEM only 
publications was significantly lower than expected than expected after the Haiti 
earthquake and after Hurricane Katrina. The proportion of STEM publication was 
significantly higher and the proportion of non-STEM significantly lower than 
expected after the CES. 
 
A chi-squared analysis on the number of STEM and non-STEM (non-STEM plus 
mixed STEM-non STEM) as a function of source totaled across all data sets 
revealed a significant effect, X2 (2) = 68.6, p <.0001. Post-hoc tests (p < .01) 
revealed significant effects for each source of publications. The number of STEM 
only publications was significantly lower than expected in national only 
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publications but significantly higher than expected in the international only and 
mixed national/international publications. 
 
For each of the four data sets a separate chi-squared analysis was conducted on 
the number of STEM and non-STEM articles by international only, national only 
and national/international affiliation. For the Haiti Earthquake and Black Saturday 
Bushfires data sets the chi-squared was not significant, the number of publications 
in each cell was as expected. For both CES and Hurricane Katrina there was a 
significant effect, X2 (2) = 5.72, p <.05 and X2 (2) = 11.5, p <.001. Post-hoc tests for 
CES and Hurricane Katrina revealed in both cases a significant effect only for 
combined national/international publications. For both disasters the number of 
STEM articles was significantly higher than expected and the number of non-STEM 




The reported analysis looked at distributions of organizational affiliation type, the 
density of affiliation to organizations, national and international affiliations, and 
proportions of STEM and non-STEM disciplinary categories, to derive greater 
understanding of how the shape of the CES publication data set compared, in 
these areas, with those related to other contemporary disasters. 
 
2.4.1 Agency affiliation 
 
In the first instance, organizational affiliations indicated that proportional levels of 
research organizational and agency affiliation were broadly similar across all four 
data sets. Levels of agency involvement were higher than might be expected, 
given that these are peer reviewed research publications. The proportion of items 
in these data sets that featured affiliation with at least one agency ranged from 
sixteen to twenty-three percent, levels well above the (9%) level of agency 
affiliation recently identified in the broader disaster risk reduction research field 
(Gall et al. 2015). This suggests that the post-disaster environment may offer, and 
indeed stimulate, greater opportunities for agency involvement in research 
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activity. To the extent that agency involvement was consistently higher regardless 
of the location and type of the disaster suggests that this effect may be related to 
factors common to all post-disaster environments, such as time-compression and 
urgency.  
 
This elevated level of agency involvement is consistent with the work of Birkland 
(1998) and Busenberg (2008, 2010, 2011), who find that the increased urgency 
created by the focusing effect of disasters can increase opportunities for building 
the research/policy networks required if research is to become the basis of 
effective disaster risk management policy. As Gall et al. (2015) argue, agencies 
involved in response and recovery to major disaster events are particularly in need 
of such networks.  
 
The chi-squared analysis of data totaled across all four publication data sets 
showed more research only affiliations than expected for national only items, and 
fewer research only and more agency only affiliations for international/national 
publications. Pointing to collaboration with international organizations after 
disasters, these findings reflect the increased opportunities for integration in 
support of national response and recovery decision-making associated with 
international collaborations after disasters.  
 
International agency affiliation complicated this picture however. Agency affiliation 
in the Hurricane Katrina and Black Saturday Bushfires data sets was almost entirely 
national, but this was not the case in the earthquake disaster data sets. The largest 
discrepancy was found in the Haiti Earthquake data set, where only six percent of 
items were affiliated to national agencies, although one agency, the Bureau des 
Mines et de l'Energie d'Haïti was affiliated to 2% of all items, the largest 
proportion of items linked to a single national organization in this data set.  
 
Most discussion pertaining to the engagement of agencies and other stakeholders 
in research processes assumes that agency jurisdiction and research activity are 
based in the same location. This is evident in Gall et al.’s (2015) concern, for 
example, about the difficulties international researchers may face when it comes 
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to building networks with agencies and other stakeholders in the countries that 
are their research focus. These data sets suggest, however, that in itself agency 
affiliation did not necessarily index the engagement of agencies based within the 
researched, target country. Although indicative only, due to the small numbers of 
publications involved, international agency affiliations in these data sets serve as a 
useful reminder of the importance of including place when considering 
stakeholder engagement.  
 
It is important to reiterate that the extent to which national agencies were actually 
involved in research collaborations after disasters could not be extrapolated from 
these affiliation levels. National agency affiliations to research publications 
represent only a small proportion of collaborative research activity involving 
agencies after these disasters, since not all national agency involvement results in 
affiliation to research publications. It is also important to acknowledge the related 
point in terms of international agency involvement. Many of the international 
agencies affiliated to publications featuring only international authors in the Haiti 
Earthquake data set, for example, were hospitals or branches of the armed 
services. Most of these publications concerned aspects of activities in support of 
Haitian agencies and communities, and to this extent pointed to organizational 
collaboration on the ground that was not reflected in affiliations.  
 
2.4.2 International affiliation 
 
Levels of international affiliation were broadly consistent across the Hurricane 
Katrina and Black Saturday Bushfire data sets, at below fifteen percent, even 
though these data sets marked either end of the size range (at nine-hundred and 
seventy-eight and eighty-five items respectively). International affiliation levels 
were higher in the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence and Haiti Earthquake data 
sets. Half of all Canterbury Earthquake Sequence publications featured 
international affiliation, and ninety-nine percent of items in the Haiti Earthquake 
data set were affiliated with at least one international organization. There are 
several possible factors that could be at play in these higher levels. Population size 
and proportional disaster impacts are a likely contributing factor, given the 
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consistent levels between the Australian and the US data sets. Small island 
nations, Haiti and New Zealand were proportionally more heavily impacted by 
these disasters, as indicated by losses as percentage of GDP and deaths as a 
percentage of these overall populations. Low population numbers and higher 
impacts were more likely to mean greater need of support from international 
research communities. The other commonality between these two events is 
disaster type. The international earthquake research community has been found to 
be highly networked and active internationally, which may also have been a factor 
in higher levels of international involvement in the Haiti Earthquake and CES data 
sets (Liu et al. 2012).  
 
The variation between these two earthquake data sets indicates that the level of 
proportional impact on the country was a likely factor in both the extent of 
international affiliation, and levels of combined national and international 
affiliation. Mixed national and international affiliation occurred in thirty-two 
percent of items in the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence data set, but only ten 
percent of Haiti Earthquake data set items, with eighty-nine percent affiliated only 
to international organizations. Since the disaster type, earthquake magnitude, and 
proximity to a major city were broadly similar (Table 1), the catastrophic impact of 
the Haiti Earthquake is also a consequence of development status, as Crowley and 
Elliott (2012) suggest (see also World Bank 2010). Creating an acute need for 
international assistance of all kinds, the Haiti Earthquake disaster devastated 
national agencies, organizations and networks, as well as built infrastructure, 
severely aggravating already high levels of existing need (World Bank 2011). The 
level of disaster impact on Haitian agencies and research organizations is certain 
to have contributed to low levels of affiliation to Haitian organizations. Two further 
contributing factors are less directly linked to the disaster. French, rather than 
English, is spoken in Haiti. This increased the difficulties faced by Haitians wishing 
to publish in English, and also meant that Haitian research published in French fell 
outside the focus of these data sets on English language publications. The second 
factor is directly related to the drive for scientific credibility. Recent findings have 
confirmed complex quality assurance peer review systems are harder to negotiate 
for researchers from developing nations, who are less likely to have submitted 
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material accepted by peer review journals than those from developed nations; 
such researchers are also less likely to have access to research funding  (Gall et al. 
2015, Taskin 2010, Liu et al.  2012).  
 
The chi squared analyses of organization type as a factor of international affiliation 
across all four data sets found that national/international affiliated publications 
had higher than expected levels of agency/research affiliation. Whien analysed 
individually, the two smaller data  sets revealed no significant effects. The chi 
squared analysis of the Haiti Earthquake data set was consistent with the broader 
analysis, in that publications affiliated both nationally and internationally there 
were higher than expected numbers of research/agency affiliation. This was 
reversed in the Hurricane Katrina data set, where national/international 
publications featured lower than expected numbers of research/agency affiliation 
than expected.  
 
It is likely that the variation between individual data sets reflects the real 
differences between post-disaster publication fields. The contrasting findings 
concerning the two larger data sets, for example, can be related to the inverse 
proportionality of international and national affiliation. This, again, can be related 
to the respective positioning of Haiti and the US at either end of both 
proportional disaster impact and development spectra. The US produces the 
majority of research in the hazard and disaster risk management field (Gall et al. 
2015, NAS 2006). It follows that agencies would be more likely to engage national 
expertise after a disaster, which would limit agency engagement with international 
organizations. Conversely, since the majority of the comparatively small 
proportion of national organization involvement in the Haiti Earthquake data set 
occurred through collaboration with international organizations, it is likely that 
international/national collaborations would also feature higher than expected 
levels of agency/research collaborations.  
 
The same factors are likely to have influenced the ratio of 1.5 organizations to 1 
document in the Haiti Earthquake data set, which indicates a larger number of 
international organizations were involved in research activity in this devastated 
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post-disaster zone for every one item published. Again, the Hurricane Katrina data 
set appears at the other end of this spectrum; with the highest proportion of 
national-only affiliations (90%) and the lowest ratio of organizations to documents 
(0.7 organization per 1 item), this data set suggests that the publication field it 
represents was based on research activity involving the smallest number of 
organizations per item, and that this activity was focused through predominantly 
national organizations.  
 
2.4.3 Disciplinarity: STEM/non-STEM distribution 
 
The larger hazard and disaster risk management domain has been traditionally 
dominated by STEM disciplines (NSC 2006). All these data sets featured overall 
STEM levels above fifty percent, but varied above this level, and also in relation to 
national and international affiliation. The NSC (2006) synthesis study of social 
science engagement in disaster related research fields noted that on the basis of 
membership in professional bodies, it was possible the ratio of specialist disaster- 
related scientists to the physical sciences and engineering may be as disparate as 
1 to 20. Recent bibliometric findings concerning the disaster risk reduction 
publication field (rather than self-identified disaster specialisation) over the last 
decade suggested a more even ratio, although specialist earthquake publication 
fields remain dominated by physical science and engineering disciplines (Gall et 
al. 2015, Liu et al. 2012).  
 
The disparity between levels of STEM items across these disaster sets, however, 
does not point to disaster type as an overwhelming determinant of STEM to non-
STEM ratios. The chi-squared analyses indicated that the STEM to non-STEM ratio 
was as expected only in the Black Saturday Bushfires data set. Both the Haiti 
Earthquake and Hurricane Katrina data sets featured significantly lower than 
expected numbers of STEM items, in contrast to the Canterbury Earthquake 
Sequence data set, which featured a higher than expected number of STEM items. 
The number of STEM only items was significantly higher in the Canterbury 
Earthquake Sequence data set, which also featured a significantly lower level of 
non-STEM than expected. National/international affiliation items in both the 
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Canterbury Earthquake Sequence and Hurricane Katrina data sets had a larger 
number of STEM and smaller number of non-STEM levels than expected.  
 
The disparity across these data sets indicates that numbers of STEM items in the 
Canterbury Earthquake Sequence data set are high, suggesting that there are 
other factors at play in the distribution of STEM items, 
 
2.4.4 Capacity building opportunities 
 
Other recent findings have indicated that global disaster risk reduction and 
earthquake research fields are dominated by increasingly dense networks of 
researchers from developed countries, the US and Europe (Gall et al. 2015, Liu et 
al 2012). The link between levels of international involvement in these data sets 
and proportional disaster impacts is broadly consistent with the idea that the post-
disaster environment can have a magnifying effect on opportunities for national 
engagement in these global research networks, and so for building national 
capacity.  
 
Equally, however, post-disaster environments have been found to have a 
magnifying effect on existing inequities, largely due to time-compression 
(Olshansky et al. 2012). It is likely that the Haiti Earthquake disaster magnified 
difficulties already faced by locals when it came to publishing, and so increased 
the marginalization of already disadvantaged researchers and research 
organizations in this part of the world. Low rates of national affiliation, the large 
volume of research publications, and the high proportion of international affiliation 
in those publications, thus also point to the risks posed by the convergence of 
international researchers into post-disaster environments identified by the IAVCEI 
and the Working Group for Disaster Research Ethics (Newhall et al. 1999, 
Sumathipala et al. 2010). These risks are an effect of the intensification of domain 
drivers, as part of what Birkland (1998) has called the focusing effect of high 
profile disasters. Individuals and organisations are motivated on the one hand by 
the urgent need for support created by disaster impacts and the need to learn 
relevant lessons, and on the other by the importance of ensuring that post-
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disaster research is scientifically credible. Neither individuals nor organisations are 
in a position to manage or monitor the larger pressure they collectively assert. 
 
This pressure again draws attention to the larger set of questions that pertain to 
the relative distribution of disaster research burdens and benefits, as in the 
Belmont Code’s distributive justice principle. These considerations are likely to 
become increasingly urgent, due to the much greater human cost and 
infrastructure damage caused by disasters in rapidly developing, increasingly 
urban nations, and recent predictions that if this trend continues, such highly 
destructive events are likely to become both more frequent, and more 
devastating, in the short to medium term (Crowley and Elliott 2012). 
 
Evaluating the extent to which research can and does provide benefits in this 
context can be complex and difficult, and this difficulty is aggravated by the time-
compression and urgency characterizing the post-disaster environment 
(Sumathipala et al. 2010). It has been suggested, in view of this, that the principle 
of distributive justice can be most usefully interpreted as a capacity building 
requirement (Sumathipala et al. 2010). A small early example of this approach 
followed the Oklamoma Bombing, when the Disaster Research Study Group were 
empowered to require that all out of state researchers worked with a local 
research collaborator (Quick 1998, North 2002). The appeal of this idea is that it 
offers to turn a source of risk into a research opportunity for individuals and 
organizations after disasters, and work against the exclusionary effect the scientific 
drive for credibility is currently having on researchers and research organizations in 
developing nations.  
 
The most obvious and immediate indicator of such capacity building is authorship, 
and associated affiliations (Sumathipala et al. 2010). Of immediate benefit to 
researchers and research organizations, co-author affiliations in a peer-reviewed 
post-disaster research publication provide an indication of which individuals and 
organizations have shared that benefit. Requiring engagement in research and 
writing processes, authorship and organizational affiliations also give some 
indication of the extent to which the research in question has involved capacity 
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building in organizations and communities in the researched country, as well as 
that of the international researcher.  
 
2.4.5 The Canterbury Earthquake Sequence publication field 
 
These comparative findings are suggestive, as an indication of the Canterbury 
Earthquake Sequence publication field in context. They indicate that the post-
disaster environment may have had a generally stimulating effect on agency 
involvement in research publications. It is also likely that some features in the 
shape of this publication field are related to the high proportional impacts the 
CES had on New Zealand, due to the severity of the event in relation to this 
nation’s small size and low population level. These features include high levels of 
international involvement, and of national/international research collaborations.  
 
Another contributing factor here may be New Zealand’s tradition of advanced 
earthquake research (Liu et al. 2012; Crowley & Elliott 2012). Particularly strong in 
the engineering and physical sciences, this tradition has included extensive 
international collaboration and networking in the decades leading up to the 
Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (Center for Advanced Engineering 1997). This 
tradition may also be a factor in the higher than expected ratio of STEM to non-
STEM research items in the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence data-set.  
 
Finally, although all three fields concerned with disasters in developed countries 
featured higher levels of affiliation density to three national research 
organizations, these levels were highest in the  Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 
publication field. All three are NHRP member organisations. It is not possible to 
draw conclusions on the basis of this data alone. It is possible, however, to note 
that the high levels of affiliation to these three organisations are not inconsistent 
with the NHRP’s role coordinating research in support of Canterbury Earthquake 








Overall, these data sets indicated a consistently higher level of agency 
involvement in research publications than that of the wider disaster risk reduction 
publication field. This is consistent with the idea that such environments may offer 
increased opportunities for science/policy integration, and since these levels were 
similar across the data set, indicated that such opportunities are likely to be 
related to factors common to all post-disaster environments.  
 
The findings also indicated that proportional impact was a likely factor in the levels 
of international involvement in post-disaster research activity. These levels 
appeared higher in the countries with the higher proportional impacts, and 
highest in the Haiti Earthquake, where impacts were catastrophic. Since both small 
size and development status play a part in proportional disaster impacts (UNISDR 
2015), these findings suggest that international research pressure is an additional 






Research engagement after disasters:  
Research coordination during the New Zealand  




The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) defines 
disaster as the ‘serious disruption of the functioning of a community or society 
involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and 
impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope 
using its own resources’ (p.9 UNISDR 2009). The levels of uncertainty and 
unknowns created by this level of disruption make major natural disasters literally 
definitive of chaotic decision-making environments (Van de Walle & Turoff 2008, 
Schloss 2014). It follows that the immediate response to such events requires a 
degree of top down management to provide ‘emergency services and public 
assistance during or immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, reduce 
health impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of the 
people affected’ (p. 24 UNISDR 2009). Research conducted in disaster impacted 
regions has not been routinely included in the activities managed as part of 
emergency response operations, although there are a few precedents for 
restricting research access during such operations (Quick 1998, North et al. 2002,  
van Zijll de Jong et al. 2011). 
 
There is increasing evidence, however, that high profile disasters can generate 
surges in research activity, creating a range of scientific opportunities and risks. 
Birkland (1998) has established that the politicizing effect of US earthquake 
disasters has triggered increases in research funding and activity, greater 
likelihood of effective policy/science collaborations, and greater uptake of science 
by policymakers. Equally, however, the focusing effect of disasters has also been 
found to escalate research activity at the expense of scientific quality, when large 
volumes of often duplicative research are produced for largely opportunistic or 
political ends (Rodriguez et al. 2007, Black 2003, Birkland 2009). The convergence 
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of researchers into a disaster zone, moreover, has been identified as a significant 
additional burden on regions struggling to cope in the aftermath of disaster 
(Brown & Donini 2014,  Walton-Ellery & Rashid 2012, Sumathipala et al. 2010, 
Brun 2009, Gill et al. 2007, Sumathipala & Siribaddana 2005).  The Belmont 
Report (1979) provided three principles – informed consent, beneficence, and 
distributive justice – that continue to mark ethical limits beyond which researchers 
are not free to collect scientific data. Finding that increased research activity in 
disaster zones risks breaching both the beneficence and distributive justice 
principles, several ethicists have called for more active interventions to manage 
such activity, with a view to reducing this risk after disasters (Sumathipala & 
Siribaddana 2005, Citraningtyas et al. 2010, Sumathipala et al. 2010). 
 
In this chapter, research engagement after the 22nd February 2011 Mw 6.2 
Christchurch earthquake is used to explore the use of the NHRP to support the 
science/policy interface for response and recovery decision-making, and manage 
the mix of scientific opportunity and risk generated by this disaster event. Two 
weeks after the Christchurch Earthquake a national directive required that social 
scientists refrain from contacting impacted populations during the two-month 
state of national emergency. Indexing the issue of escalating pressure from 
international researchers after disasters, this directive also raises the question of 
managing such pressure in accordance with the principles provided by the 




The chapter is largely based on secondary data. This includes a range of NHRP 
and other government documentation in the public domain, including the Ministry 
of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) review of the emergency 
response and the Royal Commission of Enquiry into the Canterbury Earthquakes 
Report (Mclean et al. 2012). It draws on material from the National Crisis 
Management Center (NCMC) Log during the state of national emergency (22nd 
February – 30th April 2011), and the Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Economics (MBIE) review of the NHRP (Buwalda et al. 2014), as well as scientific 
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and grey literature concerning the Canterbury earthquake sequence and its 
impacts, as available8. The chapter is also informed by observational and other 
data collected by the candidate and members of her supervisory team. All were 
involved in aspects of the larger response operation to this event, with some 
representing the NHRP on the science desk in the Christchurch Response Center 
during the state of national emergency. Secondary data concerning the directive 
restricting research access to impacted populations included a number of emails 
and other personal communications. Due to sensitivities around this issue, these 
were not referenced individually, in order to protect the anonymity of those 
concerned. Note also that since this directive was not officially formulated, and so 
has no official title, it was termed the moratorium directive, for ease of reference, 




In recent decades increasingly complex and fragmented policy-making 
environment has driven growing reliance on non-state scientific, financial and 
other expertise for resources and cooperation, and an associated emphasis on the 
use of evidence as the basis of policy (Gluckman 2013, Skogstad 2003). Over the 
same period, calls for inter-disciplinary approaches which integrate end-users in all 
stages of the research process have become widespread in a range of domains 
(McNie 2007). A concomitant body of research has focused on integrative 
research/end-user initiatives, establishing that inevitable tensions between 
researchers and policy makers need to be negotiated, especially around the 
concepts of scientific credibility and political relevance (Cash & Moser 2000). In 
addition, such initiatives have been found to be equally reliant on the perception 
that knowledge-generating processes have been legitimate, or fair and balanced, 
in the treatment of diverging and conflicting stakeholder views and interests (Clark 
& Majone 1985, Cash et al. 2003). This balance can be difficult to maintain, as 
                                                       
8 The 1999 Fourth International Conference on Grey Literature in Washington, DC defines 
grey literature as: "That which is produced on all levels of government, academics, business 
and industry in print and electronic formats, but which is not controlled by commercial 
publishers." (www.greylit.org; accessed 1 August 2014) 
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cross-sector collaborations can create new issues that require on-going decision-
making about geographical, functional, structural and participatory parameters 
(Verweij et al. 2014). Decisions about these boundaries point back to the 
underlying judgments and expectations on which they are based, and can also 
create further issues as the relevant collaboration develops (Verweij et al. 2014).  
 
As yet, however, these ideas have not been widely applied in the hazard and 
disaster field, which also features limited research focused directly on the 
collaborative management of research activity after disasters. This lack of research 
focus is despite a longstanding recognition of the need for more integrated 
approaches to research and policy in the disaster risk management area. A key 
tenet in official United Nations disaster risk reduction policy for the last decade 
(ICSU  2008, UNISDR 2005, 2011), the drive to create an integrated DRR 
environment is the central plank of the 2015 Sendai Framework  (UNISDR 2015). 
 
3.2.1 New Zealand natural hazard and security management 
 
Informing most government approaches to hazard and disaster research funding 
(UNISDR 2005, Few & Barclay 2011), the drive for a more integrated national 
approach to researching and managing hazard and disaster risk in New Zealand 
has informed a series of legislative changes in New Zealand. The Resource 
Management Act (1991), the Crown Research Institutes (CRI) Act 1992 and the 
Earthquake Commission (EQC) Act 1993 all regulated the provision of hazards 
research in the national interest. In 2002 the Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management (CDEM) Act built on these and other legislative changes to shift 
national hazard management “from centralized, rules-based, response 
organizations towards more flexible arrangements based on principles, culture, 
mitigation and local knowledge” (p. 70, Helm 2009). Devolving responsibility for 
risk to local and regional levels, with the goal of building networks at, and 
between, those levels, this policy was explicitly focused on increasing the overall 
resilience of the larger complex system that includes both hazards and society 





3.2.2 The Natural Hazards Research Platform 
 
In 2007 the New Zealand research-funding environment was identified as the most 
highly competitive in the OECD (Smith 2009). Concern about the effects of this 
environment gave new force to initiatives aiming to develop hazard and disaster 
research clusters in the response structure (MCDEM 2009, Smith 2009), and 
informed the development of the Natural Hazards Research Platform (NHRP) 
(NHRP 2009A). Launched in 2009, the NHRP was a pilot platform, set up to trial 
the national research platform concept (NHRP 2009A). It was to work towards “a 
New Zealand society that is more resilient to natural hazards,” and so further the 
Crown vision already articulated in MCDEM legislation (p.5, NHRP 2009B). 
Designed to manage competitive behavior by providing a framework to integrate 
medium to long-term research and funding in areas of national interest, such 
platforms were expected to catalyse new, more collaborative networks between 
organizations, disciplines and agencies already involved in the relevant domain.  
 
The NHRP brought together research organizations with existing hazard and 
disaster research capacity, but distinct existing priorities. The National Institute of 
Weather and Atmospheric Research (NIWA) and the NHRP host organization, 
Geological and Nuclear Sciences (GNS Science), are Crown-owned companies 
required to conduct scientific research for the benefit of New Zealand (Sections 4 
and 5.1(a), CRI Act 1992). What was new about the platform was that it brought 
these CRIs together not only with Opus, a private research consultancy, but also 
with three of New Zealand’s eight universities, the Universities of Canterbury and 
Auckland and Massey University. In addition to integrating research activities 
across these different organizations, the NHRP was required to integrate relevant 
disciplines into five broad thematic areas. Two of these, risk management and 
social resilience, were to cut across and so integrate the three themes more 
traditionally associated with hazard and disaster management: geological hazards 





The NHRP was guided by principles that prioritised research issues raised in 
particular government agency strategies, the endorsement of research programs 
by end-users, including government agencies, and (where possible) the 
involvement of such end-users in all stages of the research design process (NHRP 
2009A). Other principles referred to national and international networking and 
coordination, the prioritization of integration across organizational, disciplinary 
and sector boundaries, and research of high quality (NHRP 2009A). The emphasis 
was to be on long-term research projects, and – through them – the development 
of an enduring and extensive network that would bring diverse research 
organizations and agencies together. 
 
As well, however, the NHRP was to be responsive to changing government 
priorities and evolving science needs. This principle included responsibility for 
assisting the nation to respond to significant hazard events, and for capitalizing on 
the learning opportunities such events create (NHRP 2009A). Responsibility for 
assisting the response had been subsumed in the existing responsibility of the 
host organization, GNS Science, to provide hazard and disaster advice to the 
Crown (GNS Science 2011). The NHRP strategy document specified this role 
explicitly, meaning that coordination of research activity during and after the 
2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence fell within the remit of the NHRP.  
 
3.2.3 The Canterbury earthquake sequence  
 
On 4 September 2010 the Mw 7.1 Darfield earthquake occurred 10 km deep and 
~35km west of Christchurch, New Zealand’s second largest city (pop. 390,3009). 
This was the first event in a sixteen-month sequence of earthquakes that trended 
eastwards across Christchurch, punctuated by a further three large events which 
caused significant additional damage (Bradley et al. 2014) . The second, and most 
damaging of these larger events occurred on 22 February 2011, when the Mw 6.2 
                                                       
9 Estimated as at June 2010. Source: Subnational Population Estimates: At 30 June 2010. 




Christchurch Earthquake led to 185 deaths and more than 6,500 injuries (Johnston 
et al. 2014). The Darfield earthquake had been coordinated at the regional level. 
The scale of the disaster caused by the Christchurch Earthquake, and the 
magnitude of the required response and recovery operations led to the 
declaration of the first state of national emergency in New Zealand, on the 23rd 
February 2011, which lasted until the activation of the Canterbury Earthquake 
Recovery Authority (CERA) on the 1st May 2011. A purpose-built central 
government agency of limited duration, CERA was tasked with managing the 
overall recovery strategy, and given a range of powers designed to reduce 
obstacles to recovery decision-making (Johnson & Mamula-Seadon 2014). This 
chapter uses Canterbury earthquake sequence when referring to the larger, 
cumulative earthquake disaster. It is largely focused, however, on the state of 
national emergency period that followed the Christchurch Earthquake. 
 
3.3 The Canterbury earthquake sequence: science coordination 
 
The Canterbury earthquake sequence created a range of new science 
requirements and opportunities. Although mandated to coordinate research in 
response to both, the NHRP was newly formed and lacked detailed protocols for 
response coordination (NHRP 2009B). As a result the development of the NHRP 
coordination effort over this period was largely organic, responding to 
developments in the wider environment. After the initial Darfield Earthquake local 
Christchurch scientists self-activated within hours, conducting assessments and 
gathering fault, seismic, liquefaction, building and infrastructure data across the 
city and surrounds. In support of the response, much of this activity was also for 
more basic research purposes (Quigley et al. 2012). Within days, it had developed 
into the series of broadly themed research operations that was to characterize the 
ongoing collaborative research effort coordinated by the NHRP during the 
Canterbury Earthquake Seqence. (Table 5: Appenix 2). 
 
The response operation to the Darfield earthquake was coordinated at the 
regional level by the CDEM Group based in Environment Canterbury, the 
Canterbury Regional Authority (Johnson & Mamula-Seadon 2014). For this reason, 
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the wider research effort was loosely coordinated through daily NHRP briefing 
sessions also held at Environment Canterbury. Attended by representatives from 
the NHRP, member organizations, key research operations, response agencies 
and others, this forum provided updates concerning the previous day’s research 
and ongoing research priorities and issues; representatives were then able to brief 
others. Raising awareness across the wider research effort, these daily sessions 
provided a crucial channel of two-way communication, both within the post-
disaster research collaboration and with responding agencies. 
 
The much greater devastation caused by the Mw 6.2 Christchurch earthquake on 
22 February 2011 prompted New Zealand’s first ever declaration of a state of 
national emergency, and – in a major deviation from existing MCDEM procedure – 
the co-location of district, regional and national response levels of operation on 
site, run by the National Controller from a single Christchurch Response Center. 
Also for the first time, this operations center explicitly included a Science Liaison 
function (McLean et al. 2012). This function was managed by the NHRP, which also 
staffed the Science Desk centrally positioned in the new Christchurch Response 
Center. Reflecting both the gains made after the Darfield earthquake, and the 
politicizing effect of this second, more destructive event, this explicit 
acknowledgement of the role of science in the response helped the NHRP cement 
the gains in end-user engagement made after the earlier event.  
 
As the organic development of the NHRP’s coordination role adapted to 
incorporate the new science liaison function, new challenges emerged. McLean et 
al. (2012) found that confusion arising out of the new structure, regional political 
tensions within the response operation, and a lack of appropriate information 
technology made communication difficult within the Christchurch Response 
Center. This meant many relied on face-to-face communication, which in turn 
required physically finding others located in the Christchurch Response Center 
(McLean et al. 2012). The NHRP’s ability to negotiate these issues was improved 
by its new location at the Science Desk, and by the NHRP manager’s participation 
at daily high-level Response Center briefings. These gains were somewhat offset, 
however, by the speed with which the new science function was introduced, which 
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meant there was no time to officially incorporate it into the modular CIMS 
structure, or add a science section to the Situation Report format informed by this 
structure (NCMC Log). The introduction of such a section would have improved 
the NHRP’s ability to communicate with the agencies involved in the response 
operation, since this was another significant channel of communication within the 
wider response operation (NCMC Log, McLean et al. 2012).  
 
A science section in the Situation Report would also have helped improve 
communication across the wider research operation coordinated by the NHRP. 
Although the engineering response operation held its own briefing sessions, as 
did some of the geotechnical research programs, the NHRP did not conduct daily 
research briefing sessions, as it had done after the Darfield Earthquake. This was 
largely due to the much greater scale and complexity of this second science effort. 
The loss of the wider daily science briefing session, however, removed the forum 
that, during the Darfield response, had fed into functional and structural NHRP 
decision-making, and informed response agencies, as well as raising awareness 
across disparate research programs. These communication issues were 
compounded by a structural issue, which arose out of the crossover between the 
new NHRP coordinating role, and the more familiar advisory and support 
responsibilities of its host organization GNS Science (Buwalda et al. 2014). 
Assumptions as to the demarcation of tasks and responsibilities between the 
Crown Research Institute and the larger consortium tended to default to GNS 
Science. Although the NHRP was officially responsible for science coordination, 
those representing this consortium were routinely understood by most agencies to 
be working for GNS Science, for example. Similarly, the Science Liaison desk was 
often described as the GNS desk. Later, this would be continued in an ongoing 
lack of reference to the NHRP in most official review documents, which like the 
NCMC Log, referred only to GNS Science in relation to science coordination in 
the CRC (e.g. Cooper et al. 2012, Mclean et al. 2012, OAG 2012). This meant that 






3.3.1 Research Participation Decisions After The Christchurch Earthquake 
 
A significant aspect of this role involved allocation of existing and additional 
research funding to earthquake-related projects. Allocation decisions made by the 
NHRP management group enabled a range of research activities that were not 
being directly coordinated by the NHRP, including engineering and geotechnical 
programs, and so extended the reach of its coordinating influence. The 
government provided an additional NZ$1 million in research funding after the 
Darfield earthquake, and a further NZ$3 million after the Christchurch earthquake 
(Berryman 2012). Some of this was allocated retrospectively as reimbursement for 
projects initiated immediately after these events, particularly those in support of 
the response operation, as well as for major new research programs. Calls for 
proposals (including retrospective applications) made funding conditional, 
however, on a letter, or letters, proving endorsement of the relevant research 
project by an agency or organization involved in the response and recovery 
operations in Christchurch. This requirement clarified a fundamental NHRP 
expectation: that research into these events should integrate the needs of end-
users, and so increase the uptake of research in policy decisions. In addition, it 
forced researchers to engage with agencies and organizations involved in the 
response, and so to this extent brought current and potential research activity to 
their attention, further opening the possibility of cross-sector collaboration.   
 
Decisions involving participation can also clarify less explicit underlying 
assumptions (Verweij et al. 2014). This NHRP requirement for evidence of agency 
endorsement effectively excluded researchers disinclined or unable to engage 
with response agencies from these funding rounds. Existing hazard and disaster 
researchers and teams were most able to fulfill the requirement, since they were 
likely to have already developed links with agencies and other researchers in this 
field. To some extent this reflected the original NHRP focus on the maintenance of 
existing hazard and disaster research capacity. Although this capacity was 
represented, at that time, by member organizations, it is clear that the NHRP’s 
coordinating role extended well beyond research activities involving these 
organizations. International research teams contributing to this collaborative effort 
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after both events included researchers from organizations such as Geotechnical 
Extreme Events Reconnaissance (GEER), the Earthquake Engineering Research 
Institute (EERI) and the Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering 
(TCLEE), a branch of the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). In addition, 
research funding decisions brought other local and national research providers 
into the larger coordinated science effort, including Lincoln, Victoria and Otago 
Universities, as well as a range of private geological and geotechnical science 
providers. This did not lead, however, to the expansion of NHRP membership in 
response to the new opportunities generated by the earthquakes (Buwalda et al. 
2014). 
 
The second implicit assumption that constrained the NHRP’s coordinating role 
concerned scope. Most of those involved understood that the scope of this role 
did not extend beyond the larger research effort funded and/or coordinated by 
the consortium. This assumption was shared well beyond those directly or 
indirectly involved with the NHRP. It was likely to have been informed on the one 
hand by widespread respect for research autonomy, and on the other, by the 
urgent, larger focus on response-related activities. 
 
In addition to the large, loosely networked research collaboration with agencies 
coordinated by the NHRP, however, the Canterbury earthquake sequence also 
attracted the attention of local and national researchers with little or no prior 
engagement in the field, and of international researchers excited by the research 
opportunities offered by these events. The pronounced geotechnical impacts of 
these earthquakes in a city where development had been required to meet high-
seismic building codes made these opportunities particularly attractive to hazard 
and disaster researchers. That this disaster zone was in a developed, English 
speaking nation with a well-networked research community may also have 
increased its appeal as a research destination. By the time the Christchurch 
Earthquake occurred, international research interest generated in the wake of the 
Darfield event was already well in excess of the hosting, collaborative capacity of 




The high profile generated by the more destructive Christchurch Earthquake 
appeared to immediately escalate this research interest. Senior local researchers 
were contacted within a day of this event by a number of international research 
teams seeking to arrange new data gathering visits within weeks. Consulted at 
that point, NHRP management confirmed that all science conducted in the region 
came under the aegis of the state of national emergency, and that for this reason 
the issue of research pressure on impacted communities was being discussed with 
the National Controller. Over the following week several senior CDEM personnel 
independently asked the National Controller to clarify the issue of international 
researcher visits, after persistent requests for research access from international 
researchers reluctant to accept advice, from these staff, to wait until the response 
period was over (NCMC Log). The National Controller consulted with other CDEM 
personnel, the international desk in the Christchurch Response Center, and the 
NHRP. During the same period, increasing numbers of uninvited international 
researchers were arriving daily at the Christchurch Response Center. Requesting 
support from response agencies to access the closed off central business district, 
most were interested in liquefaction and building structural performance data. The 
volume of these visitors caused problems not just for staff in the Christchurch 
Response Center, but also for the large numbers of engineers and others already 
engaged in research projects in collaboration with the response, which were also 
based in the Christchurch Response Center (Social Science Situation Report 2011, 
McLean et al. 2012). By Monday 7 March, almost two weeks after the Christchurch 
earthquake, visiting researcher numbers had reached one hundred per day, 
forcing the introduction of a new Christchurch Response Center access protocol 
designed to restrict their entry (Engineering Situation Report 2011). It should be 
noted that these numbers refer only to those researchers who made contact with 
the Christchurch Response Center; overall visiting researcher numbers are likely to 
have been much higher. 
 
3.3.2 Research Participation and the (Social Science) Moratorium Directive  
 
On the same day, the National Controller’s consultation over this issue culminated 
in a directive, issued under the state of emergency, requiring that all international 
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researchers should postpone data-gathering visits to the city until the state of 
national emergency was lifted, or until 1 May, whichever came earlier (NCMC Log). 
Social scientists, in particular, were to be held off until 1 of May. MCDEM did not 
have the resources required to host visiting researchers while engaged in the 
response, and the wider consensus opinion was that local communities should be 
given space before being interviewed by researchers. Geoscience and 
engineering fact-finding missions that did not include a community focus were to 
be the exception, as long as they were coordinated through NHRP, and so 
contributed to the science response (NCMC Log).  
 
This directive was necessary, in order to address the escalation of research interest 
in the days after the earthquake. It was made by the National Controller, using the 
powers available to him under the state of national emergency, and informed by 
networking and advice from within the New Zealand hazard and disaster research 
community, NHRP management, and within MCDEM. The directive was not, 
however, officially formulated, widely promulgated, or accessible on any official 
websites. It was communicated by the National Controller’s office to emergency 
management and other response personnel through the Coordinated Incident 
Management Structure (CIMS) structure. It did not feature prominently in the 
situation reports, which were an important communication mechanism within the 
wider response operation. This meant that although it was discussed with the 
international desk in the Christchurch Response Center (NCMC Log), it was not as 
widely disseminated as it could have been within the wider response operation.  
 
The decision was also communicated informally to NHRP management. Those 
staffing the science desk were responsible for explaining the directive to visiting 
researchers arriving at the Christchurch Response Center. With the benefit of 
hindsight, it is likely that the difficulties of this task would have been reduced if it 
had been possible to refer visiting researchers to an officially worded and 
authorised version of the directive, on a relevant government website. NHRP 
researchers were also required to disseminate this directive through local and 
international hazard and disaster networks. There was no obvious mechanism for 
communicating the moratorium decision to local and international hazard and 
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disaster scientific communities, however, and even less possibility of reaching the 
rapidly burgeoning local research community inspired by the earthquake to enter 
the hazard and disaster field for the first time. The moratorium decision was made 
early after the Christchurch earthquake, a day or so before contact and 
collaboration was established between the NHRP and the office of the Chief 
Science Adviser, with a view to demarcating science communication tasks (NCMC 
log). Since a large part of this role is science communication with the public 
(Gluckman 2014), the Chief Science Adviser might have been well placed to help 
publicize both the moratorium directive, and the rationale behind it. 
 
Later in March, local education organizations concerned about international 
research pressure contacted the University of Canterbury, and were informed 
about the moratorium directive by university management. Information about the 
moratorium was subsequently made available to pre-school, primary and 
secondary schools through the Ministry of Education. The NHRP collaborated with 
this Ministry to provide ethical guidelines for research conducted with education 
organizations after the moratorium was lifted, which included requiring all such 
research to have applied for and received ethics approval, and that all projects be 
registered with the Ministry.  
 
Under the state of national emergency, the National Controller was authorized to 
exercise powers of compulsion. The moratorium directive was voluntary, however, 
as far as members of the science community were concerned. As a directive, its 
primary force was in requiring responding agencies and researchers involved in 
the collaboration with the response to decline requests for access and assistance 
from visiting researchers who were not contributing to that collaboration. 
International media crews wishing to document the activities of international 
researchers were also declined access (Social Science Situation Report 2011). Note 
that although the directive applied to research activity in the Greater Christchurch 
region after the earthquake, it was only possible to deny access to the cordoned 
off CBD. While all visiting researchers attempting to engage with this local 
collaboration were asked to respect the directive, there was no way to ensure that 
they did so. There was also no way to communicate the directive to visiting 
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researchers that did not attempt to contact local research and response 
operations, or indeed, to assess numbers of visiting researchers overall. As a 
proportion of overall research activity in the city at the time, those that did make 
contact indicated that these numbers were very high. 
 
Those made aware of the moratorium were largely supportive, although some 
researchers were reluctant to accept the authority of the National Controller in this 




The NHRP’s ability to coordinate the larger research effort in collaboration with 
the response was constrained by several factors. The initial parameters evidenced 
in the contract and strategy documents created a focus on existing capacity, and 
failed to distinguish clearly between the roles of the larger consortium and its 
member organizations during emergency responses. The NHRP had not had time 
to develop when the Canterbury earthquake sequence began. It was trialing a 
new consortium approach to research funding and coordination, and so had no 
precedent to follow.  Despite these constraints, the NHRP played a significant role 
in the production of a coordinated range of scientific outputs of high quality 
(Buwalda et al. 2014), many of which fed directly into policy and practice decisions 
(Table 5: Appendix 2). The inclusion of a new science liaison function in the 
Christchurch Response Center, like the provision for the NHRP to coordinate 
emergency research support in future events in the new, draft CDEM plan 
(MCDEM 2014) testified to the new levels of collaboration with agencies achieved 
during and after these earthquakes. As a pilot consortium, despite significant 
constraints, the NHRP demonstrated that it is possible to bring a large section of 
the hazard and disaster research community into collaboration with the response 
operation. It also established that such consortiums have the potential to 
coordinate research activity after major disaster events in such a way as to increase 
the uptake of research opportunities, including the opportunity to engage end-
users, and the provision of scientific evidence as the basis of decision-making, 





On-going decision-making about the structural, functional, geographic and 
participatory boundaries of collaborations of this kind have been found to create 
new issues as the collaboration unfolds (Verweij et al. 2014). Looking more closely 
at such decisions concerning the larger collaboration between the response 
operation and the NHRP helps to clarify some of the issues arising out of the 
management of research activity after disasters. Many of these issues are best 
illustrated by the moratorium directive, which can be seen as a flash point. Driven 
by rapid developments after the disaster, this directive was the result of 
assumptions and swift decision-making concerning the distribution of tasks 
between the response operation and NHRP, the scope of NHRP function and 
responsibility, and participation in research activity into the disaster and its 
impacts. The directive is also important because it indexes the research pressure 
that Birkland and others have identified as a secondary effect of the high profile 
generated by major disasters (Birkland 2009, Rodriquez et al. 2007, Citraningtyas 
et al. 2010, Sumathipala et al. 2010, Newhall et al. 1999, Brown & Donini 2014, 
Gill et al. 2007). In addition to (scientific) risks to research quality, this pressure 
carries more immediate risks of particular concern to the response operation. As in 
the Christchurch Response Center, the volume of arriving researchers can 
compromise the ability of such operations – already overwhelmed by the disaster 
– to provide basic services to the impacted population (McLean et al. 2012). As 
well, the convergence of researchers into a disaster zone collectively risks creating 
a cumulative research burden on already stressed, impacted communities 
disproportionate to any benefits they may gain, in contravention of the Belmont 
Report’s (1979) distributive justice principle (Brown & Donini 2014, Sumathipala et 
al. 2010, Citraningtyas et al. 2010). These immediate risks meant that the rapid 
escalation of research pressure after the Christchurch earthquake required active 
management, and rapid decision-making. Since increased research interest and 
pressure is a consequence of major disasters, this kind of increase in research 
activity will always require some form of active management if these risks are to be 
addressed (Newhall et al. 1999, Sumathipala et al. 2010, Brown & Donini 2014, 







3.4.1 The moratorium directive, visiting researchers and social scientists 
 
As a necessary intervention designed to reduce these risks after the Christchurch 
Earthquake, however, the moratorium directive introduced a new research 
participation restriction that affected research activity in the impacted region. This 
restriction also marked a participation boundary in the larger collaboration 
between the response operation and activities coordinated by the NHRP. 
Participation boundary decisions of this kind carry the risk of creating the 
perception that the interests of a particular group have been ignored (Verweij et 
al. 2014). It has been well established that such perceptions risk bringing the 
legitimacy of the relevant collaborative activity into question, and so can put the 
larger collaborative enterprise at risk (Cash et al. 2003, McNie 2007, Parker & 
Crona 2012). 
 
Possibly due to sensitivity around these and other issues, the moratorium directive 
was not officially formulated, or promulgated through the media. The speed with 
which this decision was forced by rapidly unfolding developments in the high-
pressure post-disaster environment is also likely to be a factor here. As entered in 
the NCMC log, the National Controller’s directive allowed only visiting researchers 
who joined programs coordinated by the NHRP to engage in research activity in 
the Greater Christchurch region, which was directly impacted by the disaster. This 
was in effect already the case. The vast majority of researchers arriving at the 
Christchurch Response Center were geotechnical and structural engineers, who 
were being declined access to red zones and support from the response and/or 
other researchers unless required by existing collaborative research projects. 
Overall, far more visiting engineers requested and were declined research access 
during this period than visiting social scientists. However because this log entry 
also specified holding off social scientists in particular, and because there was no 
official formulation to refer to, the directive was widely perceived and described 
as the social science moratorium. While the bluntness of this description was 
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effective in reducing immediate pressure on impacted populations, it was not 
strictly accurate. All visiting researchers not involved in local collaborations were 
subject to the directive, irrespective of discipline. And many agencies were 
conducting or engaging with social science initiatives that were gathering data to 
inform response decision-making; most, although not all, did not involve direct 
contact with impacted communities (such as statistical studies of existing data 
streams, literature searches and modeling of likely demographic effects, for 
example).  
 
Restricting research contact with impacted populations during disaster response 
after disasters will always carry the risk of alienating the sectors of the research 
community that rely on such contact. In retrospect, however, phrasing this 
directive as a social science moratorium exacerbated this risk, by appearing to 
exclude an entire branch of science. To the extent that this indicated that the 
requirements of this section of the research community were not being 
considered, it also risked compromising the legitimacy of the larger collaboration. 
In hindsight, it is likely that these risks could have been reduced if this directive 
had been expressed as a collaboration requirement, in terms of its rationale 
(limiting the research burden on impacted populations) and effect (facilitating 
access to all researchers involved in the larger research effort being coordinated in 
collaboration with the response effort). This phrasing would still have required 
responders and researchers to refuse access to visiting researchers not required 
by this effort, but without appearing to single out social science. Phrasing the 
directive in terms of participation, rather than exclusion, would also have directed 
interested researchers to participation options, while clarifying the rationale would 
have been likely to have increased perceptions of the legitimacy of the 
coordinated research effort (Cash et al. 2003, McNie 2007, Parker & Crona 2012). 
 
3.4.2 Structural boundary decisions (and the science/policy interface)  
 
Senior researchers and CDEM staff had requested clear direction from the 
National Controller concerning visiting international researchers. Such a directive 
was only possible under the powers granted to this office under the state of 
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national emergency. Lending the authority of that office to a directive of this kind 
had other advantages. Making it easier for responders to decline access to visiting 
researchers, this authority also to some extent shielded local and national 
researchers from negative fall-out from sectors of the research community 
following the directive. A significant disadvantage, however, was that the directive 
was in effect a participation decision that directly affected the interests of the 
research community, and it appeared to have been made only by senior 
emergency managers (and so a government agency).  
 
Effectively placing a moratorium on all research activity not part of this 
collaborative effort, this government directive risked alienating newly interested 
members of the local New Zealand research community, as well as sectors of 
national and international hazard and disaster research communities. Again, with 
the benefit of hindsight this risk might have been better managed with a joint 
directive, issued officially by the National Controller and the NHRP, making 
research activity conditional on collaboration with the response and specifying 
minimal contact with impacted populations. Direct responsibility for this directive, 
even when shared with this much more powerful entity, may have increased the 
exposure of the NHRP and member organizations to fall-out from research 
communities. But as a large research consortium, including several major national 
universities and Crown Research Institutes, the NHRP had the potential to spread 
this risk across institutions, and in this way reduce it. The official involvement of 
the NHRP as an equal partner in the moratorium decision would have clarified the 
breadth of support for the collaboration requirement across New Zealand research 
organizations. Ensuring that government agencies were not perceived to be 
making uninformed political decisions about research participation, this kind of 
joint directive would also have demonstrated that the research collaboration with 
the response coordinated by the NHRP reached to the highest levels. These 
potential benefits would have been greater, however, if the NHRP had been free 
to move rapidly to include new member organizations, and had also been more 
able to generate a much higher, more official profile over this period, both 




As a CDEM directive, the moratorium decision also clarified structural assumptions 
at the time concerning the distribution of responsibility for research activity in the 
disaster zone. Within hazard and disaster research networks, and across 
responding agencies, the NHRP was understood to be responsible for – and 
largely limited to – coordinating activities either actively driven and/or funded 
through this consortium. Research activity outside this larger collaboration thus fell 
under the aegis of the response, along with other activities in the disaster zone. 
Reflecting cultural expectations concerning research autonomy, these assumptions 
were also informed by the urgency and magnitude of the task facing the response, 
which tended to narrow the focus of all concerned onto the collaborative effort. 
They were in any case implicit in the consortium’s initial parameters: the NHRP 
was set up to sustain and increase existing hazard and disaster networks, and so 
national capacity, not to actively manage the larger surge in research interest and 
activity that follows major disasters.  
 
Newly interested local researchers, however, did not always share these 
assumptions. While private providers of psychosocial support to businesses and 
other organizations were in demand after the disaster, for example, those that 
attempted to ensure their activities were coordinated with and contributed to the 
larger response effort were unsuccessful (pers. com. J. Black, organizational 
psychologist). There were other instances in which local researchers, upon hearing 
of the NHRP, assumed this consortium was responsible for immediately acting to 
engage all local scientists interested in research after the disaster (many of these 
subsequently contributed to the research effort coordinated and funded by the 
NHRP). While opportunism is a factor in increased local research interest after 
disasters (Rodriguez et al. 2007, Birkland 2009), the desire to contribute research 
skills and time to the response and to the local community is at least as significant 
a motivating factor. As well as marking another instance of perceived exclusion, 
then, the initial disappointment created by mismatched assumptions about the 
scope of the NHRP’s role underlines the peculiar relevance research into a disaster 
event carries for those researchers living in the impacted region. This issue arises 
out of the intersection of the boundaries defining the participatory and 
geographical extent of the coordinated post-disaster research effort. Although a 
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factor in NHRP research participation and funding decisions, it remained implicit, 
and did not appear in calls for research proposals, or other NHRP documents.  
 
3.4.3 Transparency and communication (and the science/community interface) 
 
Two broad themes can be seen running through the issues that arose out of 
decisions involving the geographical, functional, structural and participatory 
boundaries of the post-disaster research effort coordinated by the NHRP. Firstly, 
these issues all involved risks arising out of the perception that individuals or 
groups were being unfairly excluded by the relevant boundary decisions, which in 
turn posed risks to the legitimacy of the wider research effort. Secondly, these 
risks were all highlighted and exacerbated by communication and awareness 
issues. Difficulties formulating and promulgating the moratorium directive, for 
example, led to poor dissemination and impact with possible alienation of some 
research groups. Since the consultation process informing this and other decision-
making remained behind the scenes, like the wider networks that informed NHRP 
activity, the directive was open to being misinterpreted as a government 
intervention that curtailed academic freedoms, while NHRP activity risked being 
misconstrued as that of a single member agency. And finally, misunderstandings 
about the scope of the NHRP’s coordinating role contributed to feelings of 
disappointment and unfair exclusion in sectors of the wider research community 
living in the disaster zone 
 
It follows that if communication issues and lack of awareness exacerbated these 
issues, improvements in these areas are likely to mitigate them. It has been 
established in the wider literature concerning complex cross-sector collaborations 
in high pressure environments that both communication and transparency 
contribute to perceptions of legitimate process, even among groups who have 
been excluded (Cash et al. 2003, McNie 2007, Cummings & Kiesler 2007, Parker & 
Crona 2012). Measures to improve the transparency of research coordination 
processes, and that of collaborative engagements with the response operation 
would have increased awareness of the NHRP’s role, and significantly diminished 
confusion around decision-making criteria for research funding and participation. 
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Formalizing this information, and providing it in an accessible format on an open 
platform from the outset may have made the subsequent moratorium directive 
unnecessary. By diminishing the associated risk of alienating sectors of the 
research community, this would also have limited potential compromise to the 
legitimacy of the wider collaborative operation.  
 
The widespread dissemination of decision-making criteria for research 
participation is arguably even more important when it comes to addressing the 
risks research pressure can pose to the response operation, and impacted 
populations. In the first instance, observance of the moratorium relied on 
dissemination to relevant researchers, who were more likely to adhere to it if the 
rationales for decisions made concerning research participation, and the exclusion 
of a proportion of interested researchers were clearly articulated.  
 
No matter how widely voluntary measures are disseminated to researchers, 
however, there will always be those disinclined, for a variety of reasons, to accept 
the criteria for participation, and correspondingly reluctant to refrain from activity 
that does not meet those criteria. For this reason directives like that issued after 
the Christchurch Earthquake need to be communicated to those groups most 
likely to come under direct pressure as a result of increased research activity. 
Researchers, and the organizations they represent, can wield considerable 
authority. During the Canterbury earthquake sequence, a number of individuals 
and agencies sought clarification from local researchers, research organizations 
and the NHRP after being contacted by international researchers. Many were 
unaware not only of the moratorium directive, but also of their rights to refuse to 
consent to research participation detailed in the Belmont Report (1979). Concerns 
expressed included the expectation that research participation might be required 
of them, or of vulnerable populations in their charge, stress at the prospect of 
refusing researcher requests, and anxiety about the repercussions of refusals. 
These groups welcomed the moratorium directive, as it empowered agencies, 
researchers and potential research participants who so wished to decline requests 




The empowering effect of this directive was only available, however, to those 
potential research participants who were aware of it. To effectively reduce the risk 
of research pressure exacerbating the other stressors affecting impacted 
populations, research participation criteria and the participant rights provided in 
the Belmont Report need to be as widely disseminated as possible, through a 
variety of public channels. Given that some regions were without power for a 
considerable period, these channels should always include communication 
measures that do not rely on electricity, like door knocking and leaflet drops, 
which McLean et al. (2012) found to have been an effective means of 
communication after the Christchurch Earthquake. At the other end of the 
spectrum, including interactive and crowd-sourcing platforms wherever possible 
would allow generation of wider debate about the issue. Allowing those feeling 
pressured by research participation requests to contribute to and seek clarification 
from those coordinating research activities in the disaster zone, such platforms 
would also provide pathways for those wishing to take part in research activities 
(as either researchers or participants). Conversely, interactive data from agencies, 
researchers and potential and actual participants would also have the potential to 
help clarify the extent and nature of research activity in the impacted region, 
making it possible to develop new management measures in response to this 
developing picture.  
 




The following broad recommendations for research coordination during and after 
disasters can be extrapolated from this analysis. 
 
3.5.1.1 The use of an existing, permanent research coordination organization  
 
Research coordination after hazard events will be most effective if it is conducted 
by a permanent collaborative entity, with existing, closely related usual research 
coordination functions that facilitate the ongoing development of relevant 
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national research and end-user networks, and of networking skills. If such a 
consortium is not already in place, establishing it should be the first step.  
 
3.5.1.2 Recommendations before disasters  
 
Planning: The research consortium responsible for post-disaster research 
coordination should work with agencies responsible for emergency management 
to develop a detailed, collaborative disaster research coordination plan. The 
research plan should be fully integrated into the relevant response management 
structure. Resources should be allocated to research management activities. The 
research consortium should made explicitly responsible for a distinct science 
function in the response structure, and provision should be made requiring 
consortium representatives to engage in regular emergency response training at 
local, regional and national levels with response agencies and other relevant 
organizations.  
 
The research coordination plan should make provision for measures designed to 
facilitate a focus on - and the coordination of - as much research activity as 
possible in the relevant impacted region after hazard events. The aim should be to 
anticipate and plan to manage a surge in research interest that is roughly parallel 
to the profile of the relevant hazard event. Objectives should include mitigating 
the risks posed by this increased research activity, while also taking advantage of 
the possibilities it offers in terms of contribution to the wider effort, and the 
development of local research capacity and international research networks.  
 
3.5.1.2 Recommendations after disasters  
 
Integration With Response: Research coordination should be fully integrated with, 
and conducted in collaboration with the response operation.  
 
Proactive Communication: As soon as possible after the event those responsible 
for research and emergency management should issue joint statements detailing 
research coordination responsibilities, processes, participation pathways, research 
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participant rights (to require proof of ethics approval, and to refuse consent) and 
measures to mitigate the risks associated with research pressure (such as 
collaboration and/or registration requirements). These statements should be 
officially formulated, and provide clear, accessibly phrased information. Relevant 
agencies should be included in ensuring that this information is as widely 
promulgated as possible – available on relevant open access websites, and 
included in media releases, leaflet drops, public meetings, interactive platforms 
and other communication channels used by the response operation.  
 
Transparency: If possible, all research coordination decisions should be accessible 
on an up to date, monitored and appropriately resourced open website. Material 
provided should continue to include all broad decisions about research 
participation and the demarcation of tasks as they are made, as well as more 
specific information including research funding decisions, and relevant current and 
completed research projects and outputs in the impacted region.  
 
Monitoring: All information gathered (from interactive websites, registration 
requirements, and agencies as well as through research funding decisions) should 
be used to monitor the wider research effort, with a view to responding to 
evolving research trends in order to maintain research quality, respond to 
emerging requirements and opportunities, and mitigate the risks associated with 
research pressure. 
 
Building Local Capacity: Consideration should be given to involving highly 
qualified researchers from the impacted region with new interest in the hazard and 
disaster field, as much as possible, in order to develop local and national research 




Research activity after the Christchurch earthquake bears out findings from other 
disasters concerning the convergence of researchers into the disaster zone, and 
significant escalation of research activity. Within this increase in overall research 
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activity, research needs and opportunities were revealed in this post-disaster 
environment to be in tension with the risks posed to research quality by this 
increase, and to local agencies and populations. Active management of these 
tensions was necessary in order to address needs and maximize opportunities, 
while also reducing negative impacts on the larger response operation, local 
populations and research quality. However such management necessarily involved 
decisions about participation in research activity, which carried secondary risks 
associated with perceptions that groups had been excluded from participation. 
When not addressed, such perceptions have the potential to significantly 
compromise the legitimacy and the longer term validity of the larger research 
enterprise, and so can threaten gains made when it comes to addressing research 
needs and taking up opportunities created by the disaster. This allows us to 
conclude with five broad points about research coordination after disasters – all 
follow from the larger contention that such coordination is necessary. 
 
In the first instance, research organizations are unlikely to be able to coordinate 
research activity in disaster zones without the involvement of disaster response 
agencies and organizations. This involvement is critical in order to address the 
research needs created by the disaster effectively, which often requires the 
engagement of these end-users. It is also required to minimize negative impacts 
of research activity on the wider response operation, and to facilitate researcher 
access to disaster zones. Conversely, response agencies are neither sufficiently 
qualified nor networked to effectively manage post-disaster research activity 
without support from the research community. To the extent that they are 
perceived to be doing so, they risk creating the perception that decision-making 
has ignored scientific considerations, and that the scientific community has been 
excluded from contributing to decisions that affect it directly. The first point, then, 
is that the risks and opportunities associated with post-disaster research activity 
can only be managed effectively to the extent that they are jointly managed, 
through as full and equal a collaboration as possible between the response 
operation and research communities.  
 
This kind of joint, collaborative management of research activity will rely in turn, 
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however, on the range and relevance of the networks represented by both 
response and research operations, and which are thereby able to feed into 
decision-making in the chaotic and high pressure post-disaster environment. The 
New Zealand CIMS system is a purpose-built project management structure 
designed to effect this after disaster events by bringing together (and connecting 
back into) relevant government and other networks, at local, regional and national 
levels. The NHRP was barely established when this disaster struck. The extent to 
which it was able to organically develop a similar representative and networking 
function relied heavily on its ability as a national consortium to represent the 
research organizations demonstrating the greatest collective existing hazard and 
disaster research capacity at the time of the Canterbury earthquake sequence. 
Although not prepared for the post-disaster environment, the NHRP structure 
made it possible to bring this range of organizations together to effect collective 
decision-making about the coordination of research activity, by linking back 
through them into wider hazard and disaster research networks. Thus the second 
broad point we can draw from the Christchurch experience concerns the 
advantages of using a research consortium or platform structure to coordinate 
research activity after disasters. The more such a consortium draws on and 
represents the interests of wider research communities, the greater its capacity to 
ensure high quality research outcomes, and the less likely it is to create the 
perception that the interests of particular groups or organizations are being 
excluded as a result of decision-making about participation.  
 
Thirdly, the corollary of this logic can be applied to the scope of research 
coordination after disasters. The wider this scope is, the less likely it is to generate 
perceptions of exclusion, even when a significant proportion of researchers 
wishing to participate are not able to do so. Including all research activity in the 
impacted region would also increase the possibility of monitoring the amount and 
nature of research activity in the impacted region, and so of managing it 
effectively.  
 
The fourth point concerns the profile of the coordinating research consortium. The 
NHRP management group included internationally networked senior scientists 
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who represented – and relied on – expertise from all six member organizations. 
This group was responsible for all major NHRP decision-making concerning the 
coordination of research activity during and after the Canterbury earthquake 
sequence, including structural decisions about the demarcation of tasks and 
responsibilities, functional decisions concerning the scope and nature of research 
programs, and broad participatory decisions concerning engagement in research 
into this disaster and its aftermath. The extent to which collaborative research 
activity after the Christchurch Earthquake was informed by this larger decision-
making body remained behind the scenes, however, due to the widespread 
collective assumption that attributed NHRP activity to GNS science. This 
attribution significantly limited the consortium’s ability to demonstrate the extent 
to which it in fact represented and was informed by the wider New Zealand (and 
international) hazard and disaster research community. To the extent that it 
increased the perception that a single organization was making decisions that 
influenced a range of sectors and organizations, it risked creating the impression 
that some of those directly affected by these decisions were excluded from both 
research management decision-making, and participation in research activities. 
The fourth point that emerges from the Christchurch earthquake experience 
relates to the extent to which research coordination arrangements are widely 
disseminated, transparent, and understood to at least some degree by all 
involved.  
 
The fifth point to be drawn from the experience of research engagement after the 
Christchurch earthquake comes back again to the situation of the NHRP at the 
onset of the CES. Barely established, this consortium had not had time to develop 
extensive research networks, or generate a profile within researcher and end-user 
communities. As a pilot platform, it had no precedent to follow; with no 
resourcing for management, and without protocols and guidelines concerning 
coordinating research activity after disaster events, the NHRP was forced to evolve 
organically in response to this challenging environment. This situation can also be 
used, however, to make the obvious reverse point. Consortium status, 
collaborative decision-making relationships and structures, and links into wider 
networks were already in place when the NHRP was required to respond to this 
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disaster event. There is no doubt this played a major part in this consortium’s 
considerable achievements after the disaster, which relied heavily on its ability to 
bring a wide range of expertise into decision-making around research 
coordination and into research programs and activities. It was also a major factor 
in the NHRP’s ability to network across agencies at local and national levels to 
coordinate this research effort in collaboration with the response operation. The 
fifth point, then, which we can draw from the coordination of research during and 
after the Canterbury earthquake sequence, builds on the second. The advantages 
of using a consortium or platform structure to coordinate such research activity, in 
other words, will be significantly increased if this is an existing, well-established 
structure, with a relevant permanent research coordination function. The extent to 
which such a structure is able to fulfill its research coordination potential after 
disasters is likely to rely on the extent to which it is already engaged in the 
collaborative relationships – both within research communities, and with agencies 
and other relevant organizations – that become so crucial after disasters.  
 
Finally, it is important to end by reiterating the point that has already been made 
in relation to other disasters, concerning the intense research pressure that follows 
such events, and the effects of this pressure on local research and emergency 
management communities, and on impacted populations. This pressure was 
considerable and difficult to manage after the Christchurch Earthquake, which, 
although a major disaster by New Zealand standards, was not a catastrophic 
event. After a catastrophic disaster, requesting that ambitious, senior researchers 
from prestigious institutions and organizations respect the need to defer data 
gathering visits becomes an infinitely more demanding task, and this level of 
difficulty increases exponentially again for researchers and response agencies in 
developing countries, due to North/South power relations (Sumathipala et al. 
2010, Brown & Donini 2014, Citraningtyas et al. 2010). Increased awareness and 
discussion of this issue among hazard and disaster research communities is 
essential to ensure that visiting research teams respect moral and ethical research 
principles, and recognize the importance of being guided by the needs of local 
response operations, researchers and impacted populations when conducting 






Chapter 4:  
Changing demand for science support  
after the 2011 Christchurch Earthquake: a case    




Literally definitive of chaotic decision-making environments (Van de Walle & Turoff 
2008, Schloss 2014), major disasters disrupt social, institutional, environmental 
and geographical domains, creating extreme timeframes, high levels of urgency 
and rapid and differential changes in decision-making environments (Olshansky et 
al. 2012). Specialized institutional arrangements are commonly used to manage 
the increase in complexity created by this disruption. Facilitating emergency 
response, specialized management arrangements have also been found to be 
necessary to expedite medium to longer term recovery after major disasters 
(Johnson & Mamula-Seadon 2014). 
 
Research activity has not been routinely included in activities managed as part of 
emergency response and recovery operations, although there are some 
precedents for restricting research access during such operations (Black 2003, 
Quick 1998, North et al. 2002,  van Zijll de Jong et al. 2011, Beaven et al. 2015). 
The ommission of research activity is surprising, since assessment and other 
research activities usually make major contributions to post disaster decision-
making at the operational level, and in view of evidence that major disaster events 
can stimulate increased research interest (Gall et al. 2015, Liu et al. 2012, Taskin et 
al. 2010, Li et al. 2009), and collaborative activity between policy and research 
domains (Birkland 1998, Busenberg 2000B). This is consistent withi Olshansky et 
al.’s (2012) finding that the sudden and unusual loss of capital services caused by 
such disasters creates a surge in demand for capital services, and an associated 
spike in demand for decision-making, information flows, financing and institutional 
formation (Chang et al. 2012, Johnson & Mamula-Seadon 2013). As urban 
development activities compress in both time and space, the post-disaster 
environment becomes “just real life, in all its complexities, on fast forward” (p. 
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177, Olshansky et al. 2012). Yet since processes of physical construction, social 
capital formation and institution building compress unequally (Olshansky et al. 
2012), this environment differs in new ways, throwing new light on such processes. 
It follows that an improved understanding of arrangements used to manage 
support for the science/policy interface for decision-making after disasters will 
yield findings of value not only for those involved in responding to future 
disasters, but also for those involved in establishing organizational structures used 
to manage the science/policy interface in support of disaster risk reduction 
decision-making in relation to the urban development processes.  
 
Recent work focused on the use of specialized arrangements to manage complex, 
multi-domain science/policy interfaces associated with large planning projects has 
established that decisions concerning the parameters of these arrangements 
influence the way they evolve (Verweij et al. 2014, van Meerkerk et al. 2012). 
There has been little research to date, however, into the use of such arrangements 
in support of the science/policy interface for decision-making after disasters, or 
the influence of the post-disaster environment on the development of such 
arrangements (exceptions include Birkland [1998] and Busenberg [2011]). This 
chapter is focused on the evolution of the Psychosocial Recovery Advisory Group 
(the Advisory Group). This small, short-term science advisory body was established 
in the aftermath of the 22nd February 2011 Mw 6.2 Christchurch, New Zealand 
earthquake by the larger research-coordinating consortium, the NHRP (Mooney et 
al. 2011). Linking the emergence and progress of the Advisory Group to changes 
in the extent and nature of demand for disaster-specific psychosocial knowledge 
after this event, the chapter aims to clarify the short to medium term influence of 
this event on both the science/policy interface and the disaster-related science 
domain in New Zealand. It is focused on the decision-making processes that gave 
rise to this group and guided its activities. This focus also allows a comparison to 
be made between the capacity of this small group and that of its larger, parent 
body, the NHRP, to adapt to the changing post-disaster environment. A further 
aim is thus to contribute to the emerging body of work establishing the influence 
of organizational parameters on adaptive capacity, by demonstrating the utility of 




It is important to note that this focus meant that issues of individual or 
organizational performance or responsibility fell outside scope. Neither does the 
chapter contain a comprehensive account or assessment of the Advisory Group 
and its activities, much less a critical review. It was based almost entirely on 
secondary data drawn from a substantial Advisory Group archive. Since Advisory 
Group tasks were carried out largely through email communications managed by 
the administrator, the archive includes email debates, edits to documents, and 
email requests and outcomes provided from and to Advisory Group clients, as 
well as a selection of other reference documents. The main advantage of this 
approach was the access it afforded to snapshoot indications of thinking around 
decision-making as it occurred, since the material was generated over time, as 
part of Advisory Group activities. Reliance on the archive also minimized demands 
(for time, and focus) from those involved in this group.  
 
4.2. Case study context 
 
4.2.1.The Canterbury earthquake sequence  
 
The Advisory Group was established in the aftermath of the 22 February 2011 Mw 
6.2 Christchurch Earthquake, as part of the wider science/policy interface that 
evolved during the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence. After the 
Christchurch Earthquake, this interface was focused through three large 
collaborative arrangements. The Christchurch Response Center was established 
on the 24th February 2011, and deviated from existing New Zealand response 
plans by bringing central, regional and local levels of government response 
agencies together into a new collaborative structure, based in a single 
geographical site in the center of the impacted city (McLean et al. 2012). On the 
1st of May 2011, the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) took over 
responsibility for recovery strategy from the CRC operation. Established on the 
19th April under legislation passed on the 14th of that month through the 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act (CER) 2011, CERA was a purpose-designed 
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initiative, and reported directly to the Minister for the Recovery. This new central 
government authority was based in Christchurch, rather than in Wellington, the 
seat of government, and so brought central and local levels of government 
agencies together to oversee strategy and operations from within the disaster-
impacted city  (Johnson & Mamula-Seadon 2014).  
 
New Zealand’s NHRP was the third of these large collaborative arrangements. 
Responsible for coordinating collaborative research support for the government 
after major events, it was the official science interface within the Christchurch 
Response Center, and subsequently CERA (NHRP 2009A).  
 
4.2.2 The scope of the NHRP 
 
Launched in 2009, the NHRP was a pilot platform, set up to trial the national 
research platform concept by managing a complex issue across multiple domain 
boundaries (NHRP 2009A). Structured to bring together and integrate research 
organizations with existing natural hazard and disaster research capacity but 
distinct existing priorities, this arrangement was also tasked with integrating 
relevant disciplines into five broad thematic areas (Figure 5, p 33 above). The 
NHRP Strategic Advisory Group integrated the research arms of this structure with 
agency and other relevant end-users, in keeping with guiding principles that 
prioritised research issues raised in particular government agency strategies, the 
endorsement of research programs by end-users, including government agencies, 
and (where possible) the involvement of such end-users in all stages of the 
research design process (NHRP 2009A).  
 
This background, together with continuing administrative and governmental 
spheres of responsibility dictated that the NHRP aligned with a particular and 
narrowly defined group of government agencies, those awarded responsibility 
“for reduction, readiness, response and recovery from natural hazard events" in 
New Zealand natural hazard management and security policy and legislation (p. 3, 
NHRP 2009B).  Set up to further the Crown vision already articulated in that 
context, the NHRP was to work towards “a New Zealand society that is more 
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resilient to natural hazards” – “specifically earthquakes, landslides, volcanic 
eruptions, tsunami, floods, severe winds, snow, [and] coastal erosion” (p. 3-5, 
NHRP 2009B, CDEM Act 2002). Other manmade (industrial, biotechnical and 
terrorist) sources of hazard and risk were specified as outside NHRP scope (NHRP 
2009B). Sources of health hazard and risk (such as pandemic risk) were deemed so 
far outside this scope that they were not mentioned at all in strategy documents.  
 
This limitation on scope corresponded to the larger administrative distinctions that 
awarded responsibility for distinct hazard categories to discrete agency groupings, 
and in this way facilitated the NHRP’s ability to interface with those agencies 
responsible for natural hazard and risk management. The narrowness of this scope 
was potentially inconsistent, however, with that of the NHRP’s crosscutting 
themes, risk evaluation modeling and social resilience. In addition to cutting 
across the other, more traditional natural hazard disciplinary categories included in 
the NHRP, these themes extended into areas beyond the consortium’s official 
scope. Societal resilience, in particular, included psychosocial resilience, which 
reached into the realm of individual and public health. Research and knowledge 
concerning medicine and public health fell under the aegis of New Zealand’s 
Health Research Committee, which reported to the Ministry of Health. It was thus 
the domain of a completely different agency grouping, including this department, 
regional health boards and local general practitioner organizations, among others. 
During the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence this grouping activated its own 
emergency management arrangements, which amounted to a parallel and 
interlinked structure with response and recovery operations, at national, regional 
and local levels (McLean et al. 2012).  
 
The inconsistency between the NHRP’s societal resilience theme and the NHRP’s 
official scope came to the forefront after the Christchurch Earthquake, when NHRP 
researchers with psychosocial expertise were approached by agencies requesting 
disaster-specific advice. Designed to bring existing hazard and disaster research 
expertise into a closer relationship with relevant agencies, this then-newly 
established body made the decision at that point to negotiate the potential 
inconsistency with the NHRP’s official scope by addressing this agency need by 
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establishing the Advisory Group. This specialized psychosocial recovery advisory 
body remained semi-discrete, and operated in parallel with other NHRP activities.  
 
4.2.3. The formation of the Advisory Group 
 
The Advisory Group was established by and through the NHRP in early March 
2011, almost two months before the establishment of CERA. Minimal funding 
through two small grants (one from a Wellington agency and the other from the 
NHRP) covered basic administration costs until mid-2012, when Advisory Group 
activity in effect ceased. Since scope issues complicated explicit links with the 
NHRP operation, this group was based in the Joint Center for Disaster Research 
(the Center). This center is a collaborative venture between two NHRP member 
organizations, Massey University and GNS Science, which is the Crown Research 
Institute responsible for a range of hazards related research in New Zealand. Prior 
to the earthquake sequence the Center had undertaken most New Zealand 
research in the area of psychosocial disaster resilience. The Center director had 
been appointed as the NHRP social science theme leader in 2009, and another 
senior academic based in the Center also had a history of intensive consultation 
with NZ agencies (including the Ministry of Health) in relation to pandemic 
planning and other policy related to psychosocial risk, resilience and recovery.  
 
Active on the borders of a range of organizational structures in the science/policy 
interface concerned with disaster risk reduction before the earthquake disaster, 
both these scientists were thus already boundary spanners. Boundary spanning 
has been defined as the development of multiple connections across 
organizational and domain boundaries to build trust and improve coordination 
around decision-making and implementation in governance networks concerned 
with complex public issues (van Meerkerk & Edelenbos 2014, Parker & Crona 
2012). The networks developed by these Center scientists before the earthquake 
sequence (including NHRP activities) made them an early point of contact for 
agencies requiring psychosocial advice after the Christchurch Earthquake. 
Instrumental in in the establishment of the Advisory Group, both engaged 
simultaneously in Advisory Group activities and in other aspects of the 
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Figure 12: Overlapping coordinating structures used to support the science/policy interface 
after the CES disaster.
 
collaborative research response coordinated by the NHRP. The Advisory Group 
was thus a specialized, semi-discrete component in the much larger suite of 
advisory and other research activities coordinated by the NHRP as part of its 























The speed with which this group emerged and began to function after the 
Christchurch Earthquake thus illustrates the capacity of boundary-spanning 
individuals to draw on existing research and policy networks to set up advisory 
groups of this kind in such short order after a major event. It thereby also 
underlined the role played by NHRP in developing these pre-existing cross-sector 
networks before the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence, and so facilitating these 
early boundary-spanning roles. Most of all, however, the rapid emergence and 
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activity of this advisory group reflects the time compression and associated 
urgency that characterised this post-disaster disaster environment. It is clear from 
the chronological distribution of tasks that the greatest agency demand for 
Advisory Group services coincided with the state of national emergency (see 
Table 6: Appendix 3). From inception on the 11th March 2011 until the 15th of April 
2011, the day after the CER Act was passed, the Advisory Group received and had 
largely processed nine of a total thirteen agency requests for scientific advice (see 
Table 6: Appendix 3). By July 2012, however, when the Advisory Group was 
effectively discontinued, it had only received four further agency requests for 
scientific advice. This indicated a rapid fall off in agency demand for its services as 
responsibility for recovery strategy shifted from central agencies in Wellington to 
the new central government authority based in Christchurch (see Table 6: 
Appendix 3). A closer look at the parameters that dictated this advisory group’s 
engagement with its wider environment helps to clarify the relationship between 
these parameters and the rapidly changing decision-making environment, and the 
role of this interaction in both the rapid operationalization of this group, and 




4.3.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
The analysis that follows relies on a constructivist approach developed in the 
resource management context. There it has been applied to planning project 
management arrangements established to manage the additional complexity 
caused created when existing boundaries are being redrawn in already highly 
complex multi-domain environments (Verweij et al. 2014, Van Meerkerk et al. 
2013). Recent studies in this area have established that decisions made about the 
boundaries or parameters of such arrangements can introduce new issues into the 
complex environments they have been designed to manage (Verweij et al. 2014, 
van Meerkerk & Edelenbos 2014, van Meerkerk et al. 2013).10  The extent to which 
                                                       
10  Note that this is more usually termed ‘boundary decision-making’ in the relevant 
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judgments and decisions made about project parameters are exclusive or inclusive 
has been found to influence organizational capacity to adapt in response to such 
issues, and also to issues associated with changes in decision-making 
environments (van Meerkerk et al. 2013). The establishment of the Advisory 
Group, for example, can be considered an adaptive response to issues created by 
the exclusion of health-related research in the official NHRP scope. Limiting NHRP 
scope to the hazards listed in the strategy document, this parameter was narrower 
than the NHRP social resilience theme. On the other hand, however, this exclusive 
scope had the advantage of facilitating NHRP engagement with those agencies 
responsible for managing natural hazard risk.   
 
Verweij et al (2014) identify four categories of parameter that can have 
determinative effects of this kind; those that delimit participation, function or 
scope, structure and geographic territory (including focus and location). This 
chapter also considers funding as a limiting parameter. Distinguishing the 
Advisory Group from the wider post-disaster environment, these interconnected 
parameters influenced the nature and extent of Advisory Group engagement with 
agency demand after the disaster. Judgments and decisions concerning 
participation determined which individuals and organizations were involved in the 
Advisory Group, how they were involved, and how the Advisory Group dealt with 
the involvement of others involved in response and recovery operations (Ashmos 
et al. 2000, Edelenbos & Klijn 2006). Participation decisions relied on, and also 
informed, decisions concerned with the Advisory Group’s function, or substantive 
scope (van Meerkerk & Edelenbos 2014). Since this was the provision of 
specialized psychosocial disaster recovery advice to relevant government 
agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and others, Advisory Group 
members were required to be qualified accordingly (PRAG 2011). Conversely, 
Advisory Group function continued to be both defined and limited by the 
combined qualifications and capacity of members, and so by participation 
                                                                                                                                            
literature (Verweij et al. 2014; Van Meerkerk & Edelenbos 2014; Van Meerkerk et al. 2013). 
In this chapter however the term ‘boundary’ is reserved for the boundaries of larger 
(external) domains, to avoid confusion between the latter and the delimiting parameters of 
post-disaster management arrangements like the Advisory Group, the Christchurch 
Response Center and CERA. 
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parameters. Ongoing structural judgments and decisions concerned with the 
demarcation of tasks and responsibilities (Ashmos et al. 2000, Verweij et al. 2014) 
informed and continued to be informed by both participation and substantive 
considerations. Territorial decisions, involving both the geographical focus of 
Advisory Group activities, and the geographical location in Wellington gained 
greater and changing relevance in relation to both participation and scope as time 
went on. 
 
This chapter is concerned with a single case study, focused on a small scientific 
advisory group’s decision-making concerning the extent and nature of its role 
after a major disaster. The use of a specific case means that findings cannot be 
used as the basis of generalized empirical knowledge; case studies can, however, 
provide a more detailed understanding of a phenomenon of interest (Stake 1995). 
Clarifying how decision-making and judgments concerning the parameters of this 
advisory group and its activities can be related to the capacity to adapt in 
response to rapid changes in the post-disaster environment, this case study also 
provides insights into shifts in agency demand for science engagement and 
changes in the natural hazard and disaster research domain as emergency 




The chapter is based on data drawn largely from secondary documentation 
generated as part of Advisory Group activities, which were conceived and 
managed by members as a series of tasks carried out largely through email 
communications managed by the administrator. The bulk of this data is a large 
archive containing more than two hundred and fifty emails – between Advisory 
Group members as well as to and from clients – and other relevant documents, 
including responses to client requests, Terms of Reference, meeting agendas and 
minutes, shared references, and funding documentation. The archive was 
compiled by the Advisory Group administrator in 2011 and 2012, and held by the 
Advisory Group Chair. Access to this archive was granted after obtaining consent 
from PRAG members and clients for its use for the purposes of this research 
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project only. Observational data from members of the supervisory team involved 
in Advisory Group activities also informed the analysis. 
 
In preparation for analysis emails and other documents were organised on the 
basis of task and for each task items were organized in a time sequence. Twenty 
tasks were identified. Of these, thirteen were initiated in response to direct 
agency request, four were self-initiated, and the remaining three consisted of a 
request for rapid commentary from a private organization, and New Zealand 
Psychological Society invitations to present and publish overviews of psychosocial 
recovery (Table 1). The analysis was concerned with decision-making concerning 
Advisory Group parameters. For this reason, it drew more heavily on material 
relating directly to such decision-making (particularly the Terms of Reference 
tasks). Relevant material was also drawn from emails and other documentation 
concerning the thirteen tasks initiated as a result of agency requests between 




4.4.1 Decision-making concerning initial Advisory Group parameters 
 
The Advisory Group became active just over two weeks after the Christchurch 
Earthquake, and so at a time in which post-disaster time-compression was still very 
high. Advisory Group parameters thus to a large extent fell back upon and made 
explicit pre-disaster advisory and networking arrangements, reflecting its rapid 
formation as a pragmatic response to the fact that psychosocial recovery fell 
across – and therefore partially outside – NHRP scope. Emerging out of existing 
relationships developed through the NHRP, and positioned in the Center, the 
Advisory Group was able to provide advice from those already recognised, in 
government circles, as leaders in the field of psychosocial recovery. The decision 
to base the Advisory Group in the Center was also consistent with the founding 
NHRP emphasis on existing disaster research expertise. Prior to the onset of the 
Canterbury earthquake sequence, the majority of New Zealand’s research capacity 
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in disaster-specific psychology and psychosocial resilience was conducted in this 
Center.  
 
The need for timely policy-relevant information has been found to be in 
fundamental tension with time-consuming consensus-building processes under 
normal conditions (Sarkki et al. 2014, Parker & Crona 2012, Hackett 1997, 
Fordham 2007). It follows that the reliance on existing networks made explicit 
through the Advisory Group is likely to be particularly symptomatic of post-
disaster time-compression, which immediately after the disaster limited both the 
development of new networks across this science/policy interface, and the 
gathering of in-depth scientific evidence drawn from the disaster that had just 
occurred. Early Advisory Group tasks indicate that, with minimal time to develop 
response and recovery strategies and operations, and under pressure from those 
wishing to engage in the response operation, national level agencies required 
existing knowledge, derived from other disasters, rapidly delivered in an 
accessible form. This equated to a need for support from disaster-specific 
research specialisations. Early agency requests are consistent with this. Four of the 
six agency requests made in March 2011 were for specialist advice on aspects of 
the involvement (or proposed involvement) of local and international volunteers or 
contractors in the response operation. The other two were a request for rapid 
specialist commentary on a psychosocial recovery strategy and national planning 
framework in late March, and the initial request, from the Ministry of Social 
Development, for Terms of Reference outlining the purpose and structure of the 
Advisory Group  (Mooney et al. 2011). 
 
Completed in the first two weeks of Advisory Group activity in parallel with other 
March tasks, the Terms of Reference document and associated emails outline 
parameters that strongly reflected agency need at this point after the disaster.  
 
4.4.1.1 Function  – substantive scope (what was the function): 
 
Early discussions and documents concerning Advisory Group function are 
consistent with a traditional model of scientific advice provision, in which advice 
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concerning a specific issue is requested from specialist experts. The initial Terms 
of Reference (finalized on the 24th of March 2011) referred to the provision of 
independent “academic or clinical” judgment or advice, focused on psychosocial 
support and recovery. Referring specifically to “commentary on particular policy 
recommendations” in this context, this early document included an outline of the 
areas in which advice might be provided: psychosocial interventions, risk 
communication, implications of changes to the built environment, review of data 
and research on offer to clients, and community resilience (p.1, PRAG 2011).  
 
Advisory Group tasks clarify that agency requests almost all fell well inside the 
initial scope set out in the Terms of Reference (Table 6: Appendix 3); nine of a 
total of 13 agency requests required rapid commentary. Of this nine, three 
required feedback on broader recovery policy strategic documents, while a further 
three involved commentary on proposed government interventions that fell 
broadly into the community resilience category. Three early requests were for 
commentary on international requests for funding and access to engage in 
response or recovery activities. Two further agency requests were for varieties of 
literature and research review. This was also the focus of self-initiated tasks, 
particularly those involving the extended development of the Terms of Reference 
and the supplementary psychosocial annex document summarizing current 
findings in this area.  The request for a presentation and paper on psychosocial 
recovery from the Psychological Association also fell into the literature and 
research review category (Table 6: Appendix 3).  
 
The remaining two agency requests fell outside this initial scope, and also in effect 
framed this early phase of Advisory Group activity in time. The first request for the 
founding Terms of reference preceded that scope; initiated after a Ministry for 
Social Development request on March 11th 2011, this document was delivered to 
the Ministry on March 24th. The tenth request concerned the development of an 
existing Ministry of Social Development project concerning the identification of 
reliable recovery measures (Mooney et al 2011). The last request from a 
Wellington-based agency, this task was initiated less than a week before the CER 
Act on April 14th made it clear that monitoring and other recovery responsibilities 
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would become the preserve of the new Christchurch-based CERA later the same 
month.  
 
Although in effect rendered moot by this development, Advisory Group 
discussions of this tenth request continued into May, revolving largely around the 
implications of the scope extension that would be required to engage in such a 
project. Some members were enthusiastic about extending the group’s scope to 
include a much wider, holistic interpretation of psychosocial recovery, able to 
incorporate – and more comprehensively explore – the interface between mental 
health interventions and community recovery. Concerns expressed by others 
included the Advisory Group’s financial and time constraints, and were also 
focused on the risk that such an extension had the potential to aggravate a 
perceived tension (in the existing scope) between knowledge and interventions 
concerned with individual psychological recovery and a wider emphasis on 
community recovery. This was described (in email discussions and in meeting 
minutes) as the risk of the scope becoming so divergent as to make the Advisory 
Group unworkable.  
 
4.4.1.2 Participation parameters – (who were members): 
 
Early in March 2011, the newly appointed administrator sent emails to an initial 
five founding members; by the time the first Terms of Reference document was 
finalized and provided to government agencies, there were six founding 
members. Initial formulations limited membership to those with recognised 
expertise in psychosocial dimensions of post-disaster recovery (Terms of 
Reference 2011). All founding members were qualified in the field of psychology 
and had either practiced and or published extensively in this discipline. In 
addition, these initial criteria required members to have disaster-specific 
disciplinary expertise.  
 
The Terms of Reference referred to agencies, NGOs and others involved in 
recovery operations as Advisory Group clients, rather than categorizing them as 
Advisory Group members. It also indicated that where applicable the Advisory 
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Group would draw from the broader pool of expertise offered by wider research, 
clinical and practice communities. 
 
The workload associated with the initial nine tasks was considerable, and two 
further members, a senior academic and a practitioner with psychology 
qualifiations and relevant experience in the agency sector, joined the Advisory 
Group in early April. In effect, the addition of these new members extended the 
initial membership criteria to include disaster-specific sociological planning and 
practical expertise relating to community resilience. A third member invited to join 
the group later in April was a senior psychology academic with little disaster-
specific expertise prior to the Canterbury earthquake sequence. In effect, this 
extended the membership criteria to include psychological qualifications per se; in 
June of the same year, two more psychologically qualified members with no 
disaster-related experience prior to the Canterbury earthquake sequence joined 
the team, bringing the total membership up to eleven. The expansion of the early 
membership criteria can be represented in a matrix (Figure 13) 
 
 
Categories of Expertise 
 
Disaster specialisation 
(prior to CES) 
 
No disaster specialisation  
(prior to CES) 
   
Psychology:  
psychosocial individual  (& 
community) resilience 




   
Planning/sociology:  
psychosocial (individual &) 





(no added members) 
   
 
Figure 13: Changes in Advisory Group membership criteria as a matrix. 
 
Discussions were initiated in early April by new members, in the context of the 
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request concerning recovery measures, concerned with the possibility of including 
a much wider range of sociological and other scientific expertise, as well as 
agency and other stakeholders as members, rather than clients. These, however, 
were resolved with reference to agency demand for comparatively narrowly 
specialized psychosocial advice, on the one hand, and on the other in relation to 
the risk of duplication with other NHRP activities. These debates about 
membership criteria revolved, like those concerning scope, around the need to 
balance the importance of providing scientifically credible advice concerning 
recovery needs at both individual (psychological) and community (sociological) 
levels, against the risk that extensions of membership criteria might render the 
Terms of Reference, associated documentation and the Advisory Group itself so 
divergent as to be unmanageable.  
  
4.4.1.3 Structure (how did the Advisory Group function) 
 
The Advisory Group was structured with the Chair as the primary liaison point with 
agencies. Requests were passed from the Chair to the administrator, who 
distributed the request and managed subsequent iterations of the response 
document via group emailing with and between members, supplemented by 
fortnightly meetings for those who could attend. Once the collated advice 
document had incorporated a consensus of advice from  members, it was 
provided by the administrator to the Chair for final comment and approval, who 
then passed the final document on to the agency (note that as the Advisory Group 
developed, advice requests and outcomes documents were sometimes 
exchanged directly between agency representatives and the Advisory Group 
administrator, although the Chair was kept in that loop).  
 
 








  Member 
  Member 








This structure was a pragmatic and effective response to the immediate pressures 
created by this early disaster response environment (Figure 14). Since the Chair 
was already networked with a range of government agencies, he was likely to be 
the first point of contact for agencies requesting advice in any case. The Advisory 
Group structure thus ensured that agencies were able to interface directly with 
someone they already knew, so reducing demands on their time, while maximizing 
the collaborative opportunities arising out of these relationships. It also managed 
the steep increase in demand for psychosocial recovery advice from Wellington 
agencies immediately following the Christchurch event by distributing the 
resulting workload across a number of similarly qualified experts. The structure 
also reflected the minimal funding provided for Advisory Group activities. Only 
the administrator and one other Advisory Group member were funded (both on a 
part time basis). Other Advisory Group members (including the Chair) provided 
input free of charge. This structure thus placed the largest workload on the 
administrator position. The distribution of the bulk of discussion and writing work 
across a range of members reduced the work required of any one member, and 
kept work for the chair to a minimum by removing him from the majority of the 
discussions.  
 
The narrowness of this structure, which minimized contact between the agencies 
requesting advice and the members who developed it, and also cut down email 
contact between members and the Chair thus was well suited to the early agency 
need for the rapid provision of existing disaster-related knowledge, in an 
accessible form, through networks that predated the event. 
 
4.4.1.4 Territory (geographical focus and location)  
 
Advisory Group terms of reference clarify the geographical focus, since the 
recovery advice was to be related specifically to the recent sequence of 
earthquakes in Christchurch. Although not explicitly mentioned in the body of this 
document, the Advisory Group’s location was indicated in the preamble to the 
Terms of Reference, which placed it in the Center, in Wellington. Since this city is 
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the seat of New Zealand government, this location had been a significant factor in 
the development of collaborative NHRP networks and research programs 
involving national agencies, and facilitated the boundary spanning activities of its 
senior scientists; it also meant that the Center was already recognised by 
Wellington agencies as a center specializing in psychosocial disaster resilience. 
 
Ensuring the Advisory Group was well placed to engage with national agencies in 
Wellington, this location left it less well positioned in relation to the focus on 
recovery from a Christchurch disaster. Even in the early stages of activity, non-
Advisory Group Canterbury earthquake sequence related advisory and research 
tasks required that several members spent considerable amounts of time 
physically present in Christchurch. Minutes from early April meetings, for example, 
include reports from members concerning attendance at a selection of the rapidly 
proliferating activities (including psychosocial wellbeing planning sessions, 
community meetings, and research and other forums) being conducted in the 
impacted city at the time. Concerns were expressed in these meetings about the 
need to significantly increase Advisory Group involvement in these and other 
response activities, by further increasing the physical presence of members in the 
impacted city. Since all Advisory Group members were still based in (or linked to) 
Wellington rather than Christchurch, this presented ongoing logistical challenges, 
including the need to arrange and fund flights and accommodation for what 
amounted, for some members, to ongoing commuting arrangements. The 
recruitment, later in 2011, of new Advisory Group members drawn from 
Christchurch organizations represented an attempt to address this geographical 
issue. Agency demand for Advisory Group advice, however, fell off almost 
immediately after the passing of the CER Act on the 14th April 2011.  
 
4.4.2  The Advisory Group and the NHRP in the changing post-disaster  
environment 
 
The Advisory Group arose out of separating psychosocial recovery out from the 
larger NHRP research operation as a component problem effectively considered in 
isolation, with advice subsequently incorporated by policy and decision-makers 
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into other problem fields (Axelrod & Cohen 1999, cited in van Meerkerk et al. 
2013). It has been established that this kind of approach usually requires narrow or 
exclusive parameters, and predominates in projects established to minimize and 
thereby manage complexity in longer-term environmental and urban planning 
contexts (van Meerkerk & Edelenbos 2014, Axelrod & Cohen 1999, cited in van 
Meerkerk et al. 2013). A pragmatic response to the issues created by the NHRP 
scope limitation concerning health issues, the narrowly focused Advisory Group 
was thereby fit for purpose. It is to be expected that a group formed in the 
immediate aftermath of a major disaster should establish parameters aimed at 
reducing the increase in complexity that is definitional of chaotic decision-making 
environments, particularly since they were so well suited to the needs of its main 
Wellington-based agency client during the early response phase. These 
parameters, in other words, ensured that the Advisory Group was able to render 
existing psychosocial disaster advice networks explicit, in order to provide existing 
commentary and knowledge in an accessible form from scientific experts with 
existing disaster specialisation.  
 
It has been established, however, that over the medium to long term narrow 
parameters designed to minimize and so manage complexity can hinder ability to 
adapt to changes in the wider environment (van Meerkerk & Edelenbos 2014, Van 
Meerkerk et al 2013, Verweij et al. 2014). The dramatic drop off in agency 
requests for Advisory Group services after the CER Act was passed on April 14th 
2011 indicates that one of the more significant changes affecting this post-disaster 
environment was the establishment of CERA in Christchurch. Existing CDEM plans 
had allowed for the top tier of agencies involved in response and recovery to 
manage both strategy and operations from Wellington (Johnson & Mamula-
Seadon 2014, McLean et al. 2012). Such an arrangement may have ameliorated 
the abruptness of this decline in demand for Advisory Group services.  
 
4.4.2.1 Changes in demand for science support 
 
The topic area that most clearly exemplifies the changing demand for science 
support from agencies in the early recovery period is recovery monitoring. This 
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was first raised as the Ministry of Social Development’s early request concerning 
the development of reliable social recovery measures (Mooney et al. 2011). In 
hindsight this appears to have been the first indication of what rapidly emerged as 
a shift in the focus and type of science support required by agencies beginning to 
engage in the recovery. This request was initiated  at a time when this ministry was 
the lead social recovery agency (Gluckman 2011). A week later the CER Act 2011 
awarded this responsibility instead to CERA, which meant the Advisory Group’s 
collaboration with the Ministry of Social Development in this area concluded, in 
mid-May, in discussions concerning the wording of the recovery monitoring 
section in this agency’s Recovery Strategy.  
 
It was inevitable that agencies involved in the social recovery operation would turn 
their attention to the need for reliable ways to measure recovery progress. In the 
months after the Christchurch Earthquake several discrete parallel initiatives had 
already begun to emerge in this area. The role of the Advisory Group in these was 
limited to minimal and indirect influence at the very earliest stages of each 
initiative. To understand why this role was limited, it is useful to briefly summarise 
the way these initiatives developed in parallel through 2011 and 2012.  
 
As the new lead social recovery agency, CERA strongly drove the development of 
the social component in its own wider recovery monitoring and implementation 
framework (http://cera.govt.nz/recovery-strategy/overview/monitoring-reporting-
and-review) throughout 2011, launching it early in 2012. The resulting program is 
well documented in the public domain. It includes both the Canterbury Wellbeing 
Index (http://cera.govt.nz/recovery-strategy/social/canterbury-wellbeing-index), 
which gathers big data from relevant existing agency data streams to monitor 
recovery progress, and the ongoing CERA Wellbeing Survey 
(http://cera.govt.nz/wellbeing-survey), which supplements the Index with self-
reported data gathered six-monthly from Greater Christchurch residents since 
April 2012 (Morgan et al. 2015).  
 
The Advisory Group’s involvement in the wide consultation networking used by 
CERA to drive the development of this program in 2011-2012 was minimal, 
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occurring largely at a second remove, through the two scientists who were not 
engaged in these networks as Advisory Group members, but rather through the 
NHRP. Officially mandated to coordinate science in support of the recovery 
operation, the NHRP was invited to take part (as one of many stakeholders) in the 
intensive series of workshops through which CERA identified the most relevant 
existing data streams for inclusion in the Canterbury Wellbeing Index; it was also 
involved in this capacity as a collaborative partner in the CERA Wellbeing Survey 
project, which it also co-funded (Morgan et al. 2015).  
 
The Canterbury District Health Board was similarly involved in the development of 
the CERA program, supplying data for compilation into the Canterbury Wellbeing 
Index, and partnering in the CERA Wellbeing Survey project. Although drawing 
from the data and findings of this program to inform its decision-making, this 
agency was also developing a monitoring program focused on the health domain. 
To this end it commissioned an early literature review of existing knowledge in this 
area. Completed in 2011, this review was entitled ‘Designing indicators for 
measuring recovery from disasters’ (Bidwell 2011), and shared with CERA during 
the developmet of the Index. A related recovery monitoring and implementation 
program was launched in the health field early in 2013 to supplement and function 
alongside CERA’s social recovery monitoring program. Funded by the Ministry of 
Health and CERA, and entitled ‘All Right? – Is Canterbury All Right?’ this high 
profile public program is also well documented in the public domain. In addition 
to ongoing monitoring research activity, it includes the range of recovery projects 
and social media campaigns detailed on the “All Right?” website 
(http://www.allright.org.nz/;www.healthychristchurch.org.nz/priority-areas/ 
wellbeing-and-community-resilience/all-right-wellbeing-campaign.aspx). Led by 
the New Zealand Mental Health Foundation and the District Health Board under 
the Healthy Christchurch banner (http://www.healthychristchurch.org.nz), the 
program cites the Greater Christchurch Psychosocial Committee, and the Chief 
Science Adviser’s 2011 psychosocial briefing paper on its website as original 
catalysts (http://www.allright.org.nz/). The cited committee is one of the 
collaborative forums hosted by CERA as part of its Wellbeing program. The 
briefing paper was a synopsis of existing findings in the field compiled by the 
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Chief Science Adviser early in 2011 (Gluckman 2011); support from the Advisory 
Group for this synopsis was the ninth Advisory Group task (Mooney et al. 2011). 
The Advisory Group Chair was also a founding member of the All Right? Advisory 
Group.  
 
The website acknowledges Ministry of Social Development support for the All 
Right? program. Although not the lead social recovery agency, this agency 
continued to be very active in the recovery operation. At the same time, in order 
to develop a national social recovery-monitoring framework in preparation for 
engagement in future disasters, this ministry initiated a new round of discussions 
later in 2011. Although conducted with their existing contact, the Advisory Group 
Chair, these discussions did not include prospective Advisory Group involvement. 
Instead, the outcome was a distinct, ongoing medium to long-term research 
project, commissioned and funded by the Ministry of Social Development to 
develop a national recovery-monitoring framework. This project is collaborative, 
based in Christchurch, and draws heavily on both the CERA and Ministry of Health 
recovery monitoring and implementation frameworks and associated data (Pers. 
Com. S. Johal 2015).  
 
Two points can be made about these three social recovery-monitoring initiatives. 
Firstly, Advisory Group influence on all three appeared to consist on the one hand 
of carry-over from activity conducted during the late response phase, and on the 
other, to have occurred at a second remove, as part of the ambiguity arising out 
of the on-going boundary spanning activities of the two scientists who originally 
established this group, and went on to engage in these new projects in different 
capacities.  
 
Secondly, despite the many differences between these three initiatives, all 
manifest similar key characteristics concerning the science/policy interface. All 
gather, and are based on, data concerning recovery from the Canterbury 
earthquake sequence, and so are focused on developing knowledge of this 
disaster from evidence gathered in its aftermath. All are large programs, and 
include ongoing research projects as components in larger, ongoing agency-
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driven multi-stakeholder collaborative programs. All include the implementation 
of research outcomes in recovery planning and other decision-making. Finally, 
these projects are interlinked, largely because they were developed as part of – 
and through – the new round of consensus building involved in the emergence of 
new recovery networks in Canterbury. As the social recovery gained momentum, 
these new networking arrangements connected into, expanded, incorporated and 
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members	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  driven	  by	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• researchers	  active	  in	  
Christchurch	  
 






4.4.2.2 Adaptive capacity and parameter width 
 
The consistency of this shift away from the requirements that characterized the 
first phase of agency demand for science support is particularly clear when 
compared with Advisory Group parameters established in the immediate 
aftermath of the Christchurch Earthquake (Table 3). The initial scope allowed for 
the provision of expert commentary and reviews of existing knowledge derived 
from previous disasters; these recovery programs however were focused on the 
development of new knowledge based on new evidence concerning this disaster. 
The PRAG’s initial participation criteria required members with both 
academic/clinical psychological qualifications and existing disaster specialisations. 
Participation parameters in these later recovery monitoring projects were much 
wider, including a range of stakeholder representatives and disciplines. Pre-
existing disaster specialisation – although still necessary – became less critical as 
the focus turned increasingly to research and data gathering related to this 
disaster. Finally, the base of the Advisory Group in the Center had made explicit 
existing disaster-related science/policy networks in Wellington, the seat of central 
Government. Subsequent monitoring initiatives, by contrast, involved the new 
round of consensus building in Canterbury as new recovery networks developed in 
the impacted city (Table 3).  
 
This change across so many aspects of the disaster-related science/policy 
interface effectively put all this group’s parameters under pressure. Email 
exchanges and meeting minutes make it clear that, when the Ministry of Social 
Development first raised the issue of recovery measures in early April, it was 
immediately apparent to members that engagement in such a project was out of 
scope. The parameters set out in the Terms of Reference effectively limited the 
Advisory Group to providing commentaries and reviews of existing knowledge. 
Scope extension discussions covered the possibility of including a much wider, 
holistic interpretation of psychosocial recovery and the requisite extension of 
membership criteria to include research leaders from a much wider range of 
disciplinary fields. These discussions also considered an associated extension of 
structure to facilitate the establishment of a psychosocial recovery hub function, 
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which would bring together the parallel strands of related research and policy 
activity that were rapidly emerging in the wake of the disaster. The existing 
structure however meant that these discussions remained, like Advisory Group 
tasks, in-house, rather than involving broader research and recovery environments.  
They also gave rise to concerns about unmanageable divergence in both scope 
and membership. In non-disaster contexts, it has been observed that narrow 
parameters designed to minimize and so manage complexity can be persistent, 
often becoming particularly tenacious in the face of emerging environmental 
factors that have the potential to destabilize them (Van Meekerk et al. 2013). This 
is far from a criticism of members, who were contributing to agency support tasks 
on a largely or completely voluntary basis, while under greatly increased work and 
time pressure due to engagement in other Canterbury earthquake sequence 
related projects. On the contrary, the wider evidence suggests that concerns of 
this kind are so common as to be a systemic effect. Narrow parameters, in other 
words, exert an influence that leads members of the relevant to defend them, 
irrespective of individual member traits.  
 
The likely effect of these parameters on clients is more straightforward, and 
consistent with the requests that were in fact directed to the Advisory Group. 
Other than those concerning the Terms of Reference and recovery measures, all 
agency requests were for varieties of expert commentary or literature review. The 
consistency with the Terms of Reference leaves open the possibility that, once in 
place, this document may have influenced the kind of services requested from the 
Advisory Group. Agencies, in short, were likely to have understood from the 
Terms of Reference document that this was the type of service provided. It is 
notable that the four CERA requests made to the Advisory Group all fell into this 
category, and occurred over the period when this agency was actively engaged in 
developing several large collaborative research programs, including the Wellbeing 
Survey project, in collaboration with the NHRP. The last of these CERA requests 
concerned the possible inclusion of an established wellbeing scale in the 
Wellbeing Survey questionnaire. Directed to the Advisory Group Chair as a 
request for rapid commentary, this was distributed to members for input, and the 




Material relating to this request was included in the Advisory Group archive as the 
group’s last task. By contrast, earlier material forwarded through to the Advisory 
Group by members involved in support of the CERA Wellbeing Survey had all 
been archived as part of the task initiated, on April 5th 2011, on the basis of the 
original Ministry of Social Development request concerning reliable recovery 
measures. The categorization of this material thus reflects a degree of disconnect. 
The focus on the project – the development of indicators – appeared to have 
obscured the distinction beween these as distinct projects, conducted by two 
different agencies. This, in turn, indicated a lack of integration between Advisory 
Group and NHRP activities as the year had progressed. A certain amount of 
distance had been necessary, due to the scope restriction that had required that 
the Advisory Group be established in the first place. As the recovery began to 
take shape, however, and the NHRP moved from supporting the response to 
supporting the recovery, this level of disconnect increased, to the point that it also 
appeared to have created a blurring around the nature and extent of the Advisory 
Group’s role in NHRP activity. To some extent, this likely arose out of the 
ambiguity created by the fact that some were involved in both groups. It may also 
have been an effect of intense workloads and time-poverty. Efforts were made by 
those involved in both groups to ensure that Advisory Group members remained 
aware of NHRP activity – and were invited to contribute commentary where 
appropriate. The pace of activity and change, and volume of information involved, 
however, made this increasingly difficult. This difficulty was exacerbated by the 
Advisory Group’s geographical location, and limited function and structure.  
 
4.4.2.3 NHRP and Advisory Group integration issues 
 
The Advisory Group’s narrow membership, scope and structure were not the only 
limitations on its capacity to adapt to this rapidly changing environment. The 
nature and extent of parameter change required to facilitate their engagement in 
the developing recovery in Canterbury would also have required significant 
additional funding, and a more distributed geographical locus, including a base in 
Christchurch. This expansion of parameters across the scale, however, would have 
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replicated aspects of the much wider membership, structural, geographical and 
funding parameters that defined the NHRP social science theme. It was already 
mandated to allocate funding to collaborative social science research projects in 
support of agency recovery strategy and operations, and to drive integration with 
other disciplinary areas. As a national platform, the NHRP was better positioned 
geographically, with a membership that included Christchurch and Wellington 
organizations. Its broader and more flexible parameters were also better able to 
encompass collaborative activity with agency and other stakeholders in projects 
driven by agencies. This NHRP capacity enabled and was facilitated by the 
boundary spanning activities of the senior scientists involved in both the 
establishment and activities of the Advisory Group, and in other and subsequent 
NHRP activities in support of the response and recovery. Their roles in both 
bodies are thus broadly consistent with the growing body of work that finds that 
boundary spanning individuals who develop and maintain connections across 
domain boundaries can build trust, and improve coordination around decision 
making and implementation in governance networks concerned with complex 
public issues (Parker & Crona 2012, Van Meerkerk et al. 2013, Van Meerkerk & 
Edelenbos 2014).  
 
In view of the above, integration of the Advisory Group into the NHRP might seem 
to have been a logical option. For two reasons, however, this was never really 
considered. Firstly, the scope issues associated with the overlap with health-
related research remained, contributing, for example, to very similar NHRP and 
Health Research Council Canterbury earthquake sequence related research 
funding rounds in 2012 (Beaven et al. 2015). That such a narrowly focused group 
was required underlines the need to revisit the rationale for so strictly dividing the 
disaster-related domain into administrative and research areas according to the 
source of hazard. There would seem to be several valid grounds for a degree of 
relaxation around this stricture. Many of the psychosocial and other effects and 
consequences of disasters caused by natural, human and health hazards are 
similar. To divide them according to the source of the hazard would seem to run 
counter to what Helm (2009) identifies as the recent shift in New Zealand’s larger 
strategic security focus away from the hazard source onto developing the 
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resilience of the wider source-community system. In the post-disaster context, 
moreover, the maintenance of this divide in the research domain would seem to 
be inconsistent with the provision for horizontal linkages at every level between 
the response agency hierarchy responsible for natural hazard risk management 
(aligned with the NHRP) and that responsible for managing and responding to 
health hazards (aligned with the HRC). These linkages have been put in place to 
facilitate response and recovery operations (McLean et al. 2012). It would seem 
appropriate to extend similar provisions for horizontal linkages between the 
research funding and coordination bodies linked with these agency groupings, at 
least in the post-disaster context. 
 
A second and more immediate reason for not explicitly incorporating the Advisory 
Group into the NHRP was that, since demand for its services had tailed off, there 
was no urgent need to do so. Although termed a recovery advisory group, this 
initiative had been established as an adaptive measure to manage the spike in 
agency demand for psychosocial advice in the early phases of the response to the 
Christchurch Earthquake, and this had been managed effectively. Many Advisory 
Group members were increasingly involved in NHRP social science theme 
initiatives in support of recovery agencies in any case, including those whose 
boundary-spanning activities across the disaster-related science/policy interface 
had been instrumental in the initial establishment of this group. The core 
membership was drawn from an existing research network that remains active, as 
does the Center.  
 
In any case, the parameters that had ensured the Advisory Group was well placed 
to respond to the early agency need for science support became restrictive as the 
recovery gained traction, largely because so many aspects of this need appeared 
undergo a reversal during this transition. In the early aftermath of this event, the 
time compression effect appeared so extreme that it had a limiting, even 
backward-looking effect, in that response agencies were forced to rely heavily on 
disaster-related knowledge, science/policy networks and specialist capacity that 
predated the relevant disaster event. As agencies moved into the recovery phase, 
however, the direction of this effect appeared to completely reverse, creating a 
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range of accelerated new forward-looking opportunities. The initial reliance on 
pre-existing networks, capacity knowledge and disasters rapidly gave way to a 
focus on new knowledge and evidence concerning this new disaster, the 
development of new recovery networks across science/policy and other domain 
boundaries, and building new disaster-related research, policy and other capacity.  
 
Following the evolution of the Advisory Group against the backdrop of NHRP 
activities through this period of rapidly changing agency demand underlines the 
important of adaptive capacity in the post-disaster environment. Immediately after 
the earthquake, agency demand for psychosocial recovery advice coupled with 
the NHRP scope restriction concerning health research emerged as an issue. This 
large organization’s adaptive response was to rapidly establish a discrete parallel 
advisory body focused on managing this agency demand. Although this solved 
the immediate issue, it required the establishment of a narrowly focused body, 
restricted in both size and funding capability. The Advisory Group’s purpose, the 
speed with which it was established and the need to ensure it did not replicate 
other ongoing NHRP activities all contributed to these restrictive initial 
parameters. As response transitioned rapidly into recovery, and agencies began to 
require research support to develop knowledge concerning this disaster event, 
the parameters created to address the earlier scope issue meant that this initiative 
was not a good fit with the science/policy interface emerging around the recovery. 
 
The findings of this case study are thus broadly consistent with the wider body of 
literature that finds that narrow organizational parameters tend to have a limiting 
effect on the capacity to adapt in the face of new emerging issues (Verweij et al. 
2014). The utility of this framework as an analytic tool lies in the way it turns the 
focus onto parameters that more usually operate in the background. The 
emphasis on the mediating effects of such parameters on the relevant 
organization’s ability to engage with its environment helps to clarify the role these 
systemic, structural effects can and do play in the development of organizations. 
In this case, the narrowness of Advisory Group parameters effectively ensured 
from the outset that it would remain a short-term advisory initiative, due to the 





The establishment of the group in such short order, on the other hand, 
exemplified the capacity of the much larger NHRP to respond adaptively to the 
onset of this major earthquake disaster, and the issue that emerged when agency 
demand exceeded one of its own organizational parameters. This analysis thus 
also points to the value of ensuring that large national arrangements are in place 
to manage the science/policy interface for decision-making in the disaster risk 
reduction area before the onset of disasters. Such events create an environment of 
accelerated change and increased complexity across domains, and particularly in 
those domains already engaged in this area. Designed and networked to manage 
research support across this interface and across the country, and with access to 
considerable research and funding capacity, this consortium was able and 




It is likely that the agency demand for and reliance on pre-existing disaster-related 
knowledge, science/policy networks and specialist capacity identified after the 
Christchurch Earthquake happens after most disasters. The sudden onset of 
accelerated capital depletion and associated spike in time-compression have been 
found to be fundamentally characteristic of post-disaster environments (Olshansky 
et al. 2012). The demand for rapid timely advice has been found to be in tension, 
in any case, with time-consuming consensus-building activities, and so with those 
required in the development of new knowledge, policy, networks and specialist 
capacity (Sarkkie et al. 2014). It is thus logical on both counts that heavy reliance 
on pre-existing knowledge, networks and specialist expertise is necessary during 
the response period. The parallel progress of the Advisory Group and the NHRP 
through the transition from response to early recovery indicated that this reliance 
can reverse rapidly, as capital depletion gives way to the acceleration of capital 
replacement effected through and as disaster recovery. This is to suggest that 
time-dependent processes required for consensus building and lengthy data 
gathering and analysis are susceptible to the early post-disaster environment, 
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while escalating consensus-building is a crucial component in the suite of 
accelerated processes of institutional and capital replacement as the recovery 
gathers momentum, and that new recovery networks, knowledge, programs and 
capacity are part of the new social and institutional capital produced through 
those processes.  
 
Three points follow. Firstly, the evolution of the Advisory Group indicates that 
arrangements that support the science/policy interface for response and recovery 
decision-making and implementation will rely heavily in the early response phase 
on disaster-related networks, knowledge and specialist capacity that predated the 
event. In the early aftermath, then, meeting agency demand for science support 
will be possible to the extent that such networks and specialist capacity are 
already in place. As response transitions into recovery, however, and the focus 
shifts more or less rapidly to the development of new knowledge from the new 
disaster, and of new disaster-related networks and capacity, it is the adaptive 
capacity of such arrangements that will dictate the extent to which they are able to 
meet agency science support requirements, and so maximize the range of 
accelerated opportunities for collaboration across the science/policy and other 
domain boundaries.  
 
Secondly, the restrictive effects of narrow organizational parameters, which in 
other studies emerge over months and years of operation (Verweij et al. 2014, 
Edelenbos & Klijn 2006), appeared to be accelerated by the speed of change in 
this time-compressed post-disaster environment. The de-coupling of psychosocial 
recovery advice from the larger social science stream of work coordinated by the 
NHRP in support of response and recovery agencies, for example, was 
necessitated almost immediately after the disaster event by the effect of a scope 
limitation outside the larger organization’s control. Similarly, the limiting effect of 
the Advisory Group’s parameters began to be apparent only a month after 
establishment. This points to the need for unusually flexible parameters in 
organizations required to be active in response and recovery to disasters.  
 
Finally, both the previous points underline the need for establishing organizations 
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to manage the science/policy boundary in support of disaster-related decision-
making and action before disaster events occur. If the post-disaster environment is 
“just real life, in all its complexities, on fast-forward,” (p. 177, Olshansky et al. 
2014), it follows that existing disaster risk reduction arrangements will be best 
placed to adapt to the increased complexity and rate of change that follow 
disasters. Equally, this case study underlines the importance of paying attention, 
when establishing such arrangements, to creating the inclusive, flexible 
organizational parameters that have been found to maximize adaptive capacity. 
The establishment of the Advisory Group after the Christchurch Earthquake was 
required by the scope that precluded the NHRP from involvement in health 
related research. It thus points to the need for a systematic cross-agency cross-
sectoral approach to disaster risk reduction, focused in particular on increasing the 
flexibility of the parameters of all organizations required to be active after major 
hazard events, including those in the research domain. Aiming for the adaptive 
capacity required in the post-disaster environment will also pay dividends before 





Chapter 5:  
 
The role of boundary organization after a disaster:  
New Zealand’s Natural Hazards Research Platform  




Where the Advisory Group was established to provide research support to 
agencies from inside the science domain, the much larger NHRP was positioned 
much further across the science/policy boundary. Required to bring senior 
research and policy representatives together to integrate medium to long-term 
research and funding, this consortium was also tasked with developing new, more 
collaborative networks between the organizations, disciplines and agencies 
already engaged in this arena. Decision-making goals included the allocation of 
government funding in order to progress the delivery of specific Intermediate 
Outcomes and so ‘support the achievement of government endorsed strategies,’ 
and also the development of research capability and networks to produce outputs 
of the ‘highest scientific quality’ (NHRP 2009A, 2009B).  
 
For Guston, three criteria are definitive of boundary organizations: providing 
opportunities and incentives for the creation of boundary objects, such 
organizations involve participation from both scientific and policy domains, and 
are situated at the intersection of these domains, with ‘distinct lines of 
accountability to each’ (p. 401, Guston 2001). The boundary organisation concept 
was not used in the design or establishment of the NHRP. Since it meets all 
Guston’s criteria to at least some extent, however, this consortium is open to 
analysis as a boundary organisation.  
 
The analysis that follows has twin aims. It sets out to build a nuanced picture of 
the extent to which participation and accountability mechanisms situated the 
NHRP in relationship to research and policy goals domains. At the same time, it 
assesses the utility of the boundary organisation concept in the hazard and 
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disaster management context, focusing in particular on the use of such an 
organization after this disaster, and the impacts of the post-disaster environment 
on this boundary organisatoin. Within twelve months of the advent of the NHRP, 
New Zealand experienced the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence, the 
largest natural disaster in seventy years. Barely established, the NHRP was 
required to coordinate the rapid collection and provision of a substantial body of 
hazard and disaster science to inform disaster response and recovery activities. It 
has been well established that major disasters significantly compress the time 
available for policy and other decision-making (Johnson & Mamula-Seadon 2014, 
Johnson & Olshansky 2013, Olshansky et al. 2012, Fordham 2007, Drabek 2007). 
The need for timely policy-relevant information has been found to be in 
fundamental tension with the consensus building required to achieve both 
scientific credibility, and legitimacy (Sarkki et al., 2014; Parker & Crona, 2012; 
Hackett, 1997; Fordham, 2007). Assessing the utility of the boundary organization 
concept in this context thus also provides insights into the NHRP’s negotiation of 
this tension.  
 
The chapter is largely based on secondary data. This includes a range of NHRP 
and other government documentation in the public domain, including the Ministry 
of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) review of the emergency 
response (Mclean et al. 2012), and the Royal Commission of Enquiry into the 
Canterbury Earthquakes Report (Cooper, Carter, & Fenwick 2012), material from 
the National Crisis Management Center (NCMC) Log during the state of national 
emergency (22nd February – 30th April 2011), and the Ministry of Business, 
Innovation and Economics (MBIE) review of the NHRP (Buwalda et al. 2014), as 
well as scientific and grey literature (www.greylit.org) concerning the CES and its 
impacts, as available. The chapter also draws on observational and other data 
collected by the candidate and her supervisors. All were involved in aspects of the 
larger response operation to this event, with some (including the candidate) 
representing the NHRP on the science desk in the Christchurch Response Center 







5.2:1 The boundary organization concept 
 
The boundary organization concept is informed by complex systems theory, 
ecology, and related constructivist understandings of the distinction between 
science and non-science domains as a boundary between complex discursive 
systems (Jasanoff 1990, Guston 2001, Berkes 2009). Diverse disciplinary origins 
have also given rise to other closely related concepts, including ‘science/policy 
interface’ (Van den Hoven 2007, Sarkki et al. 2014),  ‘boundary management,’ or 
‘systems for the translation of knowledge into action,’ (Cash et al. 2003, 
Weichselgartner & Kaspersen 2012), and the umbrella term ‘transdisciplinarity’ for 
this family of concepts (Regeer & Bunders 2007). For the purposes of clarity this 
chapter uses the term boundary organization, since this term is often used in 
relation to science/policy collaboration arrangements. All share a focus on the 
boundaries between knowledge domains, and understand these boundaries to be 
in an ongoing state of development through the combination of social and 
historical circumstance and strategic behaviour described as boundary work 
(Guston 2001, Jasanoff 1990).  
 
Since cross-over between domains is inevitable, is increasing, and carries 
significant opportunities and risks, evidence-based management of domain 
boundaries has the potential to increase opportunities, while also addressing the 
risks. Conceptualised as the agency that bridges the science/non-science 
boundary, the boundary organization in effect spans and incorporates the hybrid 
crossover boundary zone (Guston 2001, Drimie et al. 2014). Providing a forum that 
enables the co-production of socially robust knowledge by actors from different 
domains, such organizations usually involve specialised roles for managing the 
tension between domain drivers that arise around domain boundaries (Guston 
2001, Regeer & Bunders 2009). Accountable to principals in both domains, 
boundary organizations aim to manage the instability characterising this interface 
by balancing domain drivers (Cash et al. 2003) and so functioning for the benefit 
of both, or all, domains (Guston 2001). Thus the rule driving the collaboration 
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across the boundary itself is the drive for legitimacy. Involving fairness and 
balance, legitimacy is enhanced by transparency, inclusiveness, and consideration 
of the values and interests of all stakeholders (Cash et al. 2003, Cash & Moser 
2000, Clark & Majone 1985, Sarkki et al. 2014, Guston 2001).  
 
Although balance remains an ideal goal, however, such organizations do not 
achieve stability, but rather enable a collaborative knowledge creation process 
that unfold unpredictably across tensions within the hybrid boundary zone. 
Boundary organizations must necessarily remain in a dynamic, fluid state, 
continually adapting to the divergent, changing and sometimes fundamentally 
incommensurate interests of a range of stakeholders who hold unequal and 
changing levels of decision-making influence (Parker & Crona, 2012). In addition 
to managing tensions across the boundary between larger science and policy 
domains, such organizations must also manage the effects of domain drivers 
around boundaries internal to the organization, as well as those which define it 
against the wider environment (Parker & Crona 2012, Verweij et al. 2014).  
 
Parker and Crona’s (2012) case study concerned a boundary organisation 
established to work closely with resource managers and policymakers to produce 
research and enhance long- term decision-making about water resources. They 
found that funding agencies, organizations and the academic community 
continued have greater influence over boundary organization decision-making 
than potential end-users in the policy community (Parker & Crona 2012). They also 
noted that despite strong pressure to do so, and continual focus on improvements 
in the area, this boundary organization made little progress when it came to 
interdisciplinary integration, again largely reflecting the influence of the academic 
community (Parker & Crona 2012).  
 
5.2.2 The boundary organization concept: hazard and disaster management 
 
Response and recovery structures and processes developed over the last twenty 
years to address the disruptive impact that disasters have in the policy and 
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decision-making domain can be seen as boundary management arrangments. 
They are designed to ensure that, after disasters, a range of relevant policy and 
cross-sector networks are activated and brought to bear on the accelerated 
decision-making required in the post-disaster environment (Drabek, 2007; 
Johnson & Mamula-Seddon 2014). The modular Coordinating Incident 
Management System (CIMS), for example, was introduced in New Zealand as a 
nested framework, feeding from local through regional or group level to the 
national level (MCDEM, 2009) (Figure 3, p 31 above). Providing the decision-
making structure to be used after hazard events, CIMS brings a range of relevant 
agencies together with providers of lifelines, welfare and emergency services. 
 
CIMS was introduced as part of a decentralizing, deliberative and integrated 
national approach to both managing and researching natural hazard and disaster 
risk (Johnson & Mamula-Seddon 2014, Helm 1996, 2009, Smith 2009). Devolving 
responsibility for risk to local and regional levels, with the goal of increasing both 
horizontal and vertical networking at (and between) those levels, this approach 
was and still is explicitly aimed at increasing the overall resilience of the larger 
complex system that includes both natural hazards and society (Helm 1996, 2009, 
Smith 2009).  
 
5.2.3 The Natural Hazards Research Platform 
 
The Natural Hazards Research Platform was established in 2009 – to further the 
same larger policy goal: ‘a New Zealand society that is more resilient to natural 
hazards’ (p.5, NHRP 2009B). The immediate catalyst for this initiative, however, 
was not recognition of the need for an equivalent organization to address the 
accelerated research decision-making and production required after disasters, but 
rather a 2007 international ranking of the New Zealand research environment as 
the most competitive in the OECD (Smith 2009). The NHRP was to be the first in a 
series of National Research Platforms in several areas of national significance, 
planned to counter the negative effects of this competitive climate by ensuring 
longer term research funding, and by fostering a less competitive, more stable, 




At inception the NHRP included the six major research organizations responsible 
for the majority of nationally funded hazard and disaster research in 2009. The 
National Institute of Weather and Atmospheric Research (NIWA) and the NHRP 
host organization, Geological and Nuclear Sciences (GNS Science) are Crown-
owned companies required to conduct scientific research for the benefit of New 
Zealand (Sections 4 and 5.1(a), CRI Act, 1992). What was new about the NHRP was 
that it brought these CRIs together not only with Opus, a private research 
consultancy, but also with three of New Zealand’s eight universities, the 
Universities of Canterbury and Auckland and Massey University. Arbiters of 
academic quality, tertiary institutions are also responsible for building national 
research capacity through teaching and research programs.  
 
In addition to integrating research activities across these organizations, the NHRP 
was also required to integrate relevant disciplines into five broad thematic areas. 
Risk evaluation models are a type of boundary object; the risk and resilience 
themes were to cut across and so integrate the three themes with a much longer 
traditional association with hazard and disaster management: geological hazards 
models, weather and flood prediction and resilient buildings and infrastructure 
(Figure 5, p 33 above). A Technical Advisory Group provided scientific peer 
review. The main mechanism for strategic integration across the science/policy 
boundary was the Strategic Advisory Group, which brought representatives of 
relevant agencies and other end-users together at least twice a year to provide 
support and guidance concerning strategic research funding decisions made by 
the NHRP. (Figure 4, p 32 above). Operational integration with agency end-users 
was to occur on a consultation basis, at both Management Group and Theme 
level. 
 
5.2.3.1 Structure – demarcation of tasks and responsibilities 
 
The NHRP governance structure was hierarchical, with host, anchor and funding 





Below this, the Platform Management Group was constituted of senior 
representatives of NHRP research organizations. Ultimate decision-making 
responsibility for the demarcation of broader research funding priorities rested 
with this management group, under the oversight of the Anchor CEO Group 
(NHRP 2009A, 2009B). Chaired by the Platform Manager (required to be an 
eminent scientist employed by the host CRI), the Platform Management Group did 
not include policy or other stakeholder representatives, although it did receive 
advice (at least twice a year) from the Strategic Advisory Group. Research theme 
leaders reported to, and were advised by the Platform Management Group. A 
Technical Advisory Group comprising international science and technical expertise 
contributed to scientific quality control at both Management Group and Theme 
Leader level. Individual contestable research programs were externally peer 
reviewed, and sub-contracts devolved responsibility for the detail of such 
programs to relevant lead research organization(s) (NHRP 2009B).  
 
The NHRP’s decision-making structure thus indicated that at the outset, research 
organizations and research funders had more power to influence decision-making 
than policy and end-users, concerning both broader strategic research funding 
priorities, and individual research programs. Within this more powerful research 
bloc, moreover, the CRI host organization had more influence than other member 
organizations.  
 
5.2.3.2 Function – substantive scope  
 
This structural effect contrasts, however, with the emphasis in the six principles 
provided in the NHRP interim strategy to guide decision-making (NHRP 2009A). 
When mapped onto the spectrum of boundary tensions, these decision-making 
goals cluster at the policy end of this continuum (Figure 15). Four of the six 
specified NHRP principles sit at the policy end of this spectrum, reflecting a 
government emphasis on a more active, strategic approach to management and 
research in this area of national interest, in order to increase evidence-based 
policy. These principles indicated that end-users should be engaged not only in 
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deciding broad research direction, but also wherever possible, in all stages of the 
research process (including decision-making). This is consistent with the high level 
recognition of the need to strategically manage collaboration across the 
science/policy boundary in the national interest that led to the establishment of 
the NHRP. Even those principles requiring the NHRP to work with end-users to 
provide policy-relevant outcomes, however, are solely concerned with the 
production of research. Founding documents do not include balancing provisions 




Figure 15: NHRP research principles aligned with the spectrum of boundary tensions 
(adapted from Sarkie et al. 2014 and Parker and Crona 2012) 
 
Contractual arrangements similarly reflect the predominance of research domain 
drivers. The NHRP partnership agreement is signed by the research funding 
agency and research organizations (all situated in the research domain), and 
focused on managing research outputs and tensions between research 
organizations (NHRP 2009B). Similarly the multi-party Foundation Contract 
specifies contractual obligations between NHRP host and anchor organizations 
and the funding agency, while funding for research programs was sub-contracted 
to member organizations by the NHRP (NHRP 2009A). At each contractual level, 
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all contractual partners were based in the research domain, and contractual 
obligations concerned research quality and productivity (measured in relation to 
peer reviewed publications). 
 
Thus although required, by its decision-making principles, to focus on the co-
production of policy-relevant research with representatives from the policy 
domain, at inception the structure and function of this new boundary organization 
dictated that the NHRP remained almost entirely driven by research domain 
drivers, leaving it awkwardly situated across the tension spectrum characterizing 
the science/policy boundary.  
 
5.2.3.3  Disaster response 
 
This larger tension between domain drivers is reproduced at more detailed levels. 
The principle requiring the NHRP to provide research advice and support to 
government after major hazard events, for example, as a short-term rapid research 
response principle is situated at the applied end of the tension spectrum. When 
considered in detail, however, it also maps across the larger spectrum. Specifying 
that research should be responsive to rapid changes in both policy and research 
environments, it requires research support for government response efforts, and 
also that the NHRP maximises the research opportunities created by hazard events  
(Figure 15). 
 
The policy/science tensions arising around the responsive research principle can 
be related to the differing roles of member organizations. As CRIs, NIWA and 
GNS Science had existing responsibility for providing science advice to policy 
makers, and after major hazard events. As arbiters of research quality, universities 
are necessarily engaged with changes arising out of evolving research 
environments, and are also responsible for maximising research opportunities 
wherever possible. Prior to the NHRP, there had been few formal mechanisms to 
coordinate science/research information/service provision into national, regional 
or local CDEM frameworks. Arrangements tended to be hazard and or region 
specific (as in regional volcano advisory groups, and regional and national tsunami 
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advisory groups).  
 
The potential advantage of the NHRP arrangement was that for the first time it 
created an official avenue for widespread research collaboration in support of 
emergency response and recovery operations, which included academic and 
private organizations as well as CRIs. Linked back into organizational, disciplinary 
and international research networks, as well as connected into agencies, this new 
structure provided a mechanism to bring the resources of these networks to bear 
on the accelerated decision-making and research activity required after disasters. 
At the same time, it also opened the way for mobilising widespread, coordinated 
hazard and disaster research in order to address the research opportunities 
created by disasters, as discussed in Chapter 3 above.  
 
The potential advantages offered by the newly established NHRP were put to the 
test almost immediately, when coordination of research activity during and after 
the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence fell within the remit of this 
boundary organization. 
 
5.2.5 Science response to the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 
 
On 4 September 2010 the Mw 7.1 Darfield earthquake occurred, 10 km deep and 
~35km west of Christchurch, New Zealand’s second largest city (pop. 390,300 as 
at June 2010 http://www.stats.govt.nz/). This was the first in a sixteen-month 
sequence of earthquakes that trended eastwards across Christchurch, punctuated 
by a further three large earthquake events which caused significant additional 
damage (Bradley et al. 2014)  
 
The NHRP was mandated to coordinate the science response to the Canterbury 
Earthquake Sequence, and also required by the responsive research principle to 
support the government response effort and to maximize research opportunities. 
Barely established, however, it had had little time to build its profile and develop 
networks, and founding documents lacked detailed guidance or protocols. As a 
result the NHRP coordination effort over this period developed organically, 
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adapting in response to developments in the wider environment, including agency 
demand. After the initial Darfield Earthquake local Christchurch scientists self-
activated within hours, conducting assessments and gathering fault, seismic, 
liquefaction, building and infrastructure data across the city and surrounds. Within 
days, this activity had developed into the series of broadly themed research 
operations that was to characterize the ongoing collaborative research effort 
coordinated by the NHRP throughout the Canterbury earthquake sequence (Table 
5, Appendix 2).  
 
While much NHRP-funded research activity into the earthquakes continued to take 
advantage of opportunities for basic research (eg Quigley et al. 2012), the 
overwhelming emphasis was on supporting the needs of responding agencies, 
and impacted communities. After the Darfield earthquake, research activity was 
loosely coordinated out of the regional emergency coordination center at 
Environment Canterbury (ECAN), through daily NHRP briefing sessions attended 
by representatives from member organizations, key research operations, response 
agencies and others. Raising awareness across the wider research effort, these 
daily sessions provided a crucial channel of communication, both within the post-
disaster research collaboration and with responding agencies. After the 
Christchurch earthquake, this first informal base in the response coordination 
center was formalized in on-site Christchurch Response Center, which for the first 
time included a science function arm in the planning branch of the CIMS structure. 
Although this new position improved face-to-face communication with response 
operations and research programs being coordinated out of this center, this 
improvement was at the expense of daily NHRP briefing sessions, which were not 
conducted out of the CRC, largely due to the greater scale of the response.  
 
The NHRP was also involved in facilitating research projects out of the 
Christchurch Response Center that included a range of sophisticated boundary 
objects. Lidar and liquefaction GIS databases, for example, brought together a 
range of detailed data concerning land movement and liquefaction following the 
earthquakes. Interactively produced, and ultimately informing land-zoning and 
other planning decisions, these boundary objects also facilitated the interactive 
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production of a range of maps and other accessible representations translating 
research findings into outcomes benefitting both agency end-users and 
researchers throughout response and recovery operations (Table 5, Appendix 2). 
A range of public meetings, workshops and seminars, including an ongoing NHRP 
seminar series, provided more opportunities for the translation of both existing 
scientific knowledge and new research findings concerning the Canterbury 
Earthquake Sequence into accessible terms, and for audience interaction. These 
were attended by local and national policy and decision-makers, by practitioners 
and members of impacted local communities, as well as researchers wishing to 
come up to speed with the current state of knowledge at the time. Accessible to a 
greater or lesser degree from both sides of the science/policy boundary, these 
boundary objects helped both in the translation of science data and knowledge 
into accessible terms, while also facilitating the communication of policy and 
community needs. 
 
The reach of the NHRP’s coordinating influence was extended by its responsibility 
for funding a wider range of earthquake-related research. Existing NHRP funding 
for this purpose was boosted after the Darfield earthquake by an additional NZ$1 
million of government research funding (Berryman 2012). A further NZ$3 million 
per year, for four years, was provided after the Christchurch earthquake to address 
Canterbury Earthquake Sequence impacts and identify lessons that could be 
applied to other centers (Berryman 2012, Buwalda et al. 2014). The continued 
focus on agency engagement was evident in calls for short and medium term 
earthquake-related research proposals, which made funding conditional on 
evidence of endorsement of the relevant proposal by an agency or organization 
involved in response or recovery operations. This applied to retrospective funding 
applications for research conducted immediately after the major events, as well 
those proposing new projects. By requiring researchers to engage with agencies 
and organizations involved in the response, this requirement also brought current 
and potential research activity to the attention of these agencies, further opening 








Despite initial constraints, it is clear that this large consortium of research 
organizations and agencies was able to bring a new level of research networking 
capacity to bear on collaborative decision-making with response and recovery 
operations. Review documents confirm the NHRP played a major role in the 
production of a coordinated range of earthquake-related scientific outputs of high 
quality (McLean et al. 2012, Buwalda et al. 2014), many of which fed directly into 
policy and practice decisions (Table 5: Appendix 3). The inclusion of a new science 
liaison function in the Christchurch Response Center, and the more recent 
provision in the new, draft CDEM plan for the NHRP to coordinate emergency 
research support after future events (MCDEM 2014) also testify to the 
unprecedented levels of collaboration with response agencies achieved during 
and after these earthquakes. As a pilot, then, the NHRP demonstrated that it is 
possible to use a boundary organization to bring a large section of the hazard and 
disaster research community into collaboration with the response operation 
(Buwalda et al. 2014). To this extent it functioned as the research equivalent of 
response and recovery structures (such as CIMS and CERA), which also bring the 
resources of multiple agencies into post-disaster decision-making and activities 
(Drabek 2007, Johnston & Mamula-Seddon 2014). As well, this research effort 
established that such boundary organizations have the potential to coordinate 
research activity after major disaster events in such a way as to convert the 
urgency created by the hazard event to increase the uptake of research 
opportunities, including the opportunity to engage end-users, and the provision 
of scientific evidence as the basis of decision-making (Buwalda et al. 2014).  
 
Findings from other disaster events indicate that demand for rapid research 
provision can require trade-offs in relation to research quality assessment and 
verification processes, meaning that rapid research provision of this kind can occur 
at the expense of scientific credibility (Sarkki et al. 2014, Parker & Crona 2012, 
Hackett 1997, Birkland 2009, Black 2003). There is evidence, however, that rather 
than compromising quality and productivity, the pressure to respond to this 
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earthquake disaster had a positive effect in relation to both Canterbury 
Earthquake Sequence related research, and the larger NHRP research effort 
(Buwalda et al. 2014, McLean et al. 2012). All contracted annual quality and 
productivity standards were met or exceeded over the first four years of NHRP 
operation, and the introduction of this organization was found to have resulted in 
a significant improvement in overall national hazard and disaster research quality 
and productivity over this period (Buwalda et al. 2014). Like the existence of 
contractual research quality standards, this performance is consistent with the 
strong research grounding and focus of the NHRP, its component research 
organizations, and the funding agency.  
 
There is no doubt that the pressure to respond to the Canterbury Earthquake 
Sequence resulted in increased operational integration between disciplines and 
organizations, as well as with end-users. This represented a significant re-
balancing of NHRP focus and activity at the operational level, as it produced 
research of high quality that was also relevant to the needs of operational 
agencies. But there is also some evidence that the NHRP’s strong grounding in 
the research sector left it exposed to the effects of the trade-off, identified by 
Sarkki et al. (2014), between the demand for rapid research provision and the 
consensus building required to establish the legitimacy of cross-boundary 
collaborations, and that this may have been at the expense of integration at 
several levels.  
 
5.3.1 Legitimacy & organizational integration 
  
In the post-disaster environment, the NHRP provided for the first time a national 
integrating mechanism capable of drawing on a range of academic, CRI and 
private research organizations, and reaching back into organizational, disciplinary 
and international research networks, in order to bring the considerable resources 
of these networks to bear on the accelerated decision-making and research 
activity required after disasters. But while the effectiveness of this mechanism can 
be discerned in the quality and range of CES-related research activity, the number 
of organizations involved, and the uptake of research findings in policy and 
 
 146 
decision-making, this integration effort remained largely behind the scenes.  
 
This was due in part to the lack of provision in founding documents for the specific 
distribution of responsibilities and demarcation of tasks between organizations 
after hazard events. There were also no strategies, protocols or processes for 
managing the implicit tensions between organizations, and between their 
traditional spheres of responsibility. In the absence of formalised guidance, those 
involved in both the NHRP and the response operation shared the assumption 
that the NHRP director, who was also the chair of the NHRP Management Group, 
would lead and be the “face” of the effort coordinated through decision-making 
by the Management Group, theme leaders and others involved in this 
collaboration. The NHRP director’s authority as an eminent scientist, and 
considerable experience providing earthquake advice on behalf of GNS before 
the advent of the NHRP further qualified him for this role.  
 
As the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence unfolded, however, this experience, and 
the fact that this director continued to be based inside GNS science appeared to 
aggravate the effect of the structural crossover between the new NHRP role and 
the traditional, and so more familiar advisory and support responsibilities of its 
host organization (discussed in Chapter 3 above). After the Christchurch 
earthquake, the NHRP director and other GNS staff relocated into the 
Christchurch Response Center, to facilitate a clear conduit for seismology and land 
damage information, and engage with the other research programs being run out 
of this Emergency Operations Center. This made it more difficult for some of the 
programs that were not being run out of the Christchurch Response Center to 
engage with the NHRP operation. At the same time, assumptions as to the 
demarcation of tasks and responsibilities between the CRI and the larger 
consortium defaulted increasingly to GNS Science (Buwalda et al. 2014). 
Researchers representing the NHRP at the Science Liason desk were understood 
to be working for GNS Science on the GNS Science desk. Subsequent higher level 
official review documents, including the MCDEM review and the Royal 
Commission of Enquiry, referred to GNS Science only in relation to science and 
research coordination in the CRC (e.g. Cooper et al. 2012, Mclean et al. 2012, 
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OAG 2012).  
 
Almost completely invisible in this official sphere, the larger NHRP coordination 
effort appeared to have been eclipsed by the traditional role of its host 
organization. This was not the case in fact – the NHRP retained official 
responsibility for the science coordination effort, during this period, and decisions 
made by the Management Group resulted in the extensive involvement of 
member organizations and their networks in both NHRP decision-making, and the 
range of research programs that made up this effort. The lack of visibility, 
however, created the perception of a major imbalance between platform 
organizations, leaving the NHRP exposed to the perception that its funding and 
operational research activities were being conducted during this period by, and 
for the benefit of, a single member organization. It has been well established that 
the perception that the interests of one group have been privileged at the 
expense of others risks bringing the legitimacy of the relevant collaborative 
activity into question, so putting the larger collaborative enterprise at risk (Cash et 
al. 2003, McNie 2007, Parker & Crona 2012). Thus the invisibility of the NHRP after 
the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence inhibited its ability to integrate both 
member organizations, and recruit new partners, working against gains in 
organizational integration created by the urgency of this event.  
 
The reversion of the NHRP ‘brand’ to that of member organizations has been 
identified as an issue that continues to inhibit this boundary organization’s ability 
to build relationships with end-users, as well as stakeholders (Buwalda et al. 2014), 
suggesting that this post-disaster effect continued to have a major impact on the 
overall development of NHRP management and strategy. 
 
5.3.2 Legitimacy and thematic (disciplinary) integration 
 
The 2014 review of the NHRP noted limited progress in the area of disciplinary or 
thematic integration (Buwalda et al. 2014), which is related to NHRP’s difficulty 
integrating partner organizations. At inception, the NHRP research focus was 
structured into broad themes, in an attempt to bring organizations and disciplines 
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together within themes, so fostering integration (Figure 4, p 32). Loosely 
corresponding with larger disciplinary formations, the three larger more traditional 
themes were also broadly aligned with the interests of member organizations. 
Geological perils was led by GNS, weather related perils by NIWA, and the 
resilient buildings and infrastructure program was largely driven through 
engineering programs at Canterbury and Auckland Universities (Buwalda et al. 
2014).  
 
The sub-contractual funding of major thematic research programs to individual 
organizations reinforced the tendency of these first three themes to continue to 
evolve in parallel. Risk and societal resilience were subsequently added as 
crosscutting themes. In the absence of formal integrating mechanisms, and due to 
the sub-contractual approach to awarding research funding, however, there were 
few opportunities for these themes (led by GNS) to function in a crosscutting, 
integrating capacity. Evidence from environmental management and climate 
change research organizations indicates that formalized disciplinary integration 
mechanisms, including universal incentive and accountability regimes, are more 
likely to create stable inter-disciplinary practices and cultures than informal 
mechanisms and charismatic leadership (Lengwiler 2006).  
 
The lack of formal integration mechanisms in the NHRP meant that the research 
response loosely coordinated by the NHRP after the Darfield earthquake rapidly 
evolved into the parallel geological, socio-economic and engineering research 
programs included in the new science arm of the Christchurch Response Center  
structure (McLean et al. 2012) While the development of these programs was 
organic, this thematic structure was consistent with that of the NHRP. And 
although the majority of this research activity was funded through the NHRP, who 
also provided science advice to agencies within the Christchurch Response 
Center, the coordination of these programs fell into three distinct and largely 
discrete research streams, coordinated by and through relevant member 
organizations. Only the geological and socio-economic research programs were 
operationally coordinated out of the Christchurch Response Center by NHRP 
theme leaders; both were also GNS scientists. Structural engineering assessment 
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and data collecting programs were run as a parallel but entirely stand alone 
operation (McLean et al. 2012), coordinated by engineers from the Universities of 
Auckland and Canterbury in collaboration with the Department of Building and 
housing (NCMC Log 2011). Scientists from the regional and city council response 
operations (respectively) were jointly responsible for coordinating the wider 
geotechnical research program in collaboration with member organizations and 
other private research providers. This included investigations of rock-fall and slope 
stability, as well as liquefaction and related ground and foundation damage. 
Although employed by responding agencies, rather than NHRP member 
organizations, these scientists were also based at the science desk in the 
Christchurch Response Center.  
 
The response operation was similarly structured into discrete agencies with 
distinct responsibilities for building and housing, infrastructure and lifelines, land 
planning, and social services. Mapping onto this response operation, the 
streamed research effort thus reflected not only the NHRP thematic structure, but 
also the salience of demand-driven research and information created by the post-
disaster environment.  
 
Individual time constraints have been found to be a significant barrier to inter-
disciplinarity, as well as other types of integration, during business as usual 
conditions (Bruneel et al. 2010, Parker & Crona 2012, Sarkki et al. 2014). In the 
absence of formal integration mechanisms, under increased time pressure, and in 
response to urgent agency demand, the NHRP consortium structure appeared to 
have fallen back on the resources of member organizations, and so decoupled 
into discrete and largely mono-thematic organizational operations. The impact of 
the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence on the NHRP at this early and formative 
stage in its development is thus likely to have been a significant factor in what 







5.3.3 Legitimacy & higher-level integration 
 
Although meeting or exceeding research quality and productivity standards 
during its first four years of operation, the NHRP continued to manifest a largely 
operational focus on providing research in response to agency demand (Buwalda 
et al. 2014). Buwalda et al. (2014) found that this focus worked at the expense of 
higher-level strategic integration, and was also hazard-centric, inhibiting the 
development of a research strategy focused on the resilient outcomes required by 
the Crown policy strategy (Buwalda et al. 2014). From a boundary management 
perspective, these findings are consistent with the structural imbalance that 
positioned this organization largely in the research domain, and the disaster effect 
that aggravated rather than ameliorated the effects of that imbalance.  
 
At inception, the NHRP was charged with strategically managing the national 
hazard and disaster research investment in conjunction with the agencies and 
other end-users, but lacked effective structural and functional mechanisms to 
achieve this task. Founding documents also limited the scope of NHRP activities 
to the research sphere, making no reference to or provision for NHRP involvement 
in the co-production of policy strategy. Almost immediately the impact of the 
earthquake disaster catalyzed an overwhelming operational focus, driving the 
collaborative operational decision-making with response and recovery agencies 
evidenced in the range of scientific outputs that fed into earthquake-related policy 
and other decision-making (Table 1), and the first time inclusions of science as a 
function in the CIMS structure, and of the NHRP in more recent CDEM response 
plans (CDEM draft plan 2014).  
 
The main incentive and accountability mechanism driving NHRP activity during 
this four-year period allowed it to maintain high quality levels, despite this 
operational focus, but lacked a balancing emphasis on the co-production of 
research and policy strategies focused on resilient outcomes. Resilient research 
outcomes are determined by the extent to which research activities and outputs 
are relevant to the goal of Crown policy strategy: a New Zealand society that is 
more resilient to natural hazards. By contrast, a hazards focus aligns with distinct 
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research disciplines: geological hazards (volcanoes, earthquakes, landslides, 
rockfalls), climatological and coastal hazards (cyclones, tornadoes, excessive 
snowfalls, tsunami), and the hazard-centric engineering branches (earthquake 
engineering, fire engineering, hydrological engineering, geotechnical 
engineering). In effect NHRP contractual requirements prioritized research quality 
over thematic integration. Research productivity and quality standards were 
measured with reference to disciplinary peer review quality assessment processes, 
and the quantity and impact status of peer reviewed publications (Buwalda et al. 
2014). Rather than simply reflecting an oversight, on the part of NHRP leadership 
or management, the tenacity of this boundary organization’s thematic structure 
was strongly reinforced by contractual obligations, which thereby worked against 
the development of a research strategy focused on resilient outcomes.  
 
There is evidence that the post-disaster environment may have cemented these 
constraints, further inhibiting this boundary organization’s ability to develop 
higher-level strategic alliances in the policy sector. The increased relevance of 
hazard and disaster research created by the earthquake disaster led to a number 
of calls for Canterbury Earthquake Sequence-related research proposals in 2012 
funding rounds. These included calls for proposals from agencies with no prior 
record of funding research in this area, such as the Health Research Council. The 
NHRP interim strategy document tasked the consortium with contributing to the 
coordination of hazard and disaster research funding across government agencies 
(NHRP 2009B). Thus the 2012 funding round represented an opportunity for the 
NHRP to coordinate research funding across government agencies, as per its 
mandate, and thereby engage with new potential end-user agencies at the 
strategic level. Coordination across agencies on this occasion could also have 
increased integration at both disciplinary organizational levels, by bringing a new 
range of researchers and agencies together, and so consolidating larger 
collaborative research programs.  
 
Although the NHRP director was well-networked at high levels within agencies 
with a history of involvement in hazard and disaster management, the NHRP 
lacked explicit formal mechanisms for this kind of high-level coordination activity 
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with other funding agencies. There were also no mechanisms for encouraging 
other agencies to consult with the NHRP when funding disaster-related research 
policy engagement. This, together with the narrowing of NHRP focus onto 
operational engagement with end-users, the invisibility of the NHRP brand and 
the involvement of funding agencies not previously involved in the hazard and 
disaster management arena appeared to contribute to a breakdown of 
communication at this higher level between agencies and the NHRP concerning 
2012 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence research funding initiatives. Several non-
NHRP funding rounds calling for Canterbury Earthquake Sequence-related 
research proposals occurred and were awarded without consultation with the 
NHRP. In the social science area, this led to a number of new, more or less parallel 
funded projects focused on Community Resilience, alongside an existing longer 
term NHRP community resilience research program.  
 
The restructuring of the NHRP’s parent funding agency was also a factor here. At 
the time of these Canterbury Earthquake Sequence-related 2012 research funding 
rounds, the NHRP’s original contractual partner, the Foundation for Research 
Science and Technology, had been restructured twice. This foundation’s policy 
and investment functions had been taken over by the newly created Ministry of 
Science and Innovation three weeks before the Christchurch earthquake, on 1 
February 2011 (www.msi.govt.nz). Eighteen months later, in July 2012, further 
restructuring included the transfer of Ministry of Science and Innovation’s policy 
and investment functions to the larger Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment (www.mbie.govt.nz).  The Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment was one of the agencies that issued a call for Canterbury Earthquake 
Sequence related social science research proposals, and subsequently awarded 
them, without consultation with the NHRP. Loss of institutional knowledge and key 
points of NHRP contact within the agency, and the enormous challenges of the 
Canterbury Earthquake Sequence may have contributed to what appear to have 
been a breakdown of communication, indicating that the NHRP had not been able 





Again, this is to suggest that the effects of the time-compressed post-disaster 
environment on the NHRP may have aggravated pre-existing structural limitations 
on its capacity to network at higher strategic levels. This capacity would have been 
greater if, rather than being set up as a Natural Hazards Research Platform, this 
organization had been designed as a Natural Hazards Platform, with equivalent 
emphasis on – and engagement with – both research and policy sectors. 
 
5.4 Conclusions  
 
The boundary organization concept provides a schematic template that makes it 
possible to build a nuanced picture of the way domain driver interactions 
combined with the effects of the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence to shape the 
development of the NHRP over its first four years. This closing section draws from 
this picture to illustrate three broad aspects of the utility of this concept that arise 
from its grounding in complexity theory, before ending with some concluding 
comments about anticipating the influence of disasters on research/policy 
collaborations when designing boundary organizations in this area. 
 
The first aspect of this concept that makes it useful in the hazard and disaster 
context is the continuing emphasis on the importance of balance. Driving 
collaboration between domains, the goal of legitimacy is enhanced by balance 
between research and policy domains; more balanced participation, functional 
and structural elements contribute to more balance in the influence of the rules 
that govern activity within each domain. Perfect balance is of course not 
achievable – legitimacy is an ideal, like credibility and relevance. Retaining a focus 
on aiming for this balance helps to clarify the imbalances that can inhibit cross-
boundary collaborations. When NHRP scope (function) and the demarcation of 
tasks and responsibilities (structure) were mapped over cross-boundary tensions 
between domain drivers, for example, neither function nor scope were balanced 
in relation to domain drivers, being instead counter-weighted. Decision-making 
principles and stand-alone references in contract and strategy documents 
emphasized the co-production – with agency end-users – of research strategy and 
activity that delivered policy-relevant outcomes (NHRP 2009A). This emphasis was 
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undermined by the structural emphasis on scientific credibility apparent in the 
design of contractual and participation arrangements, and decision-making roles 
and responsibilities. Effectively dictating the focus and operating parameters of 
this organization, these structural elements ensured that the NHRP focus remained 
restricted to producing high quality research, maintaining research capacity, and 
managing a collaboration between research providers and a research-funding 
agency. This strong grounding in the research sector is required of a successful 
boundary organization. The NHRP, however, lacked the balancing grounding in 
the policy sector required to ensure that collaborative processes and outcomes 
are as relevant as they are scientifically credible.  
 
As a design tool, then, this concept is useful because it requires that awareness of 
domain drivers informs decisions defining the parameters of the boundary 
organization, with a view to achieving and maintaining that larger balance 
between research and policy domains. To make it possible for an organization like 
the NHRP to effect the co-production of research strategy and outcomes focused 
on both scientific quality and policy-relevant outcomes, decisions concerning 
changes to participation, function and structure would need to be made to 
achieve this balance. Equally, this points to another boundary organization 
concept requirement – such decisions also need to be internally consistent, or 
balanced, so that organizational parameters are mutually reinforcing with respect 
to this larger balance. In the case of the NHRP, moves toward this balance would 
have required increased engagement from the policy domain in every area. 
 
This leads to the second point, concerning the breadth of perspective enabled by 
the boundary organization concept. The emphasis on balancing domain drivers 
and interests requires that the relevant collaborative arrangement is assessed in 
relation to these wider domains, and so in relation to wider social, political and 
cultural contexts. When used to assess the NHRP, this concept extended the focus 
of the assessment to include dimensions of the policy domain currently outside 
this boundary organization’s parameters. Requiring that NHRP performance was 
measured in relation to research quality and productivity as assessed in the 
research domain, research funding agency engagement in this boundary 
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organization largely reinforced the dominance of this research domain driver. This 
emphasis on domain drivers thus clarified the extent to which the NHRP remained 
focused on, positioned and driven from within the research domain, and so brings 
the missing range of engagement from the policy domain squarely into frame. Re-
balancing the position and focus of this boundary organization would need to be 
driven from high levels in the policy sector, require a distinct line of accountability 
to that sector, and would require engagement from a range of end-user agencies, 
at all operational and strategic levels, and at all stages of development. This thus 
also points to the need to ensure equivalent input from research and (end-user) 
policy domains at the design stage of new boundary organization initiatives in this 
topic area. Requiring that as much work is done within the policy domain as occurs 
in the research domain at this design stage would also have the advantage of 
bringing research and policy representatives together to collaboratively develop 
participation, functional and structural parameters, in this way beginning the 
ongoing collaboration to be effected by the boundary organization.  
 
Thirdly, the boundary organization framework is useful because it is capable of 
analyzing the effects of domain drivers at a range of different levels, because such 
complex system effects (Song et al. 2005) create self-similar patterns at smaller 
and larger scales. This affords a multi-layered perspective that others have applied 
simultaneously at local, national or global level for example (Djalante 2012, Cash 
et al. 2000). At the same time it allows the contracted focus (as in this thesis) 
required for the assessment or design of detailed interactions between 
organizations, or within a single organisation, between themes or within them, and 
so on. The rule requiring that those in the research domain strive for research 
quality, for example, applies at all levels within this domain, although the detail of 
the way it is defined and understood can vary greatly between the social and 
physical sciences, between organizations, from one discipline to the next, and 
between researchers in the same discipline. Since this is also the case with the rule 
requiring that those in the policy domain strive for relevance, the fundamental 
tension between these drivers influences all levels of interaction across boundaries 
(Sarkki et al. 2014, Van den Hoven 2006, 2007, Cash et al. 2003). This scale-free 
quality made it possible to trace the tensions manifest in the NHRP’s initial 
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parameters at disciplinary, thematic and organizational levels, as well as across the 
boundary between research and policy domains. Facilitating a layered perspective 
of NHRP integration initiatives, this applicability across levels also clarified 
interdependencies between levels. The NHRP was tasked with integrating 
organizations and disciplines, but a lack of formal mechanisms to effect this task 
was exacerbated by a loose correspondence between thematic areas and 
organizational specialisations. Similarly, funding contracts between the NHRP and 
member organizations concerning specific research programs did not specify, 
require or incentivize integration, and there was no structural provision for 
integrated NHRP decision-making in this area (since theme leaders were 
responsible for research programs). This structural resistance to integration was 
further compounded, at the higher level, by a funding agency focus on contractual 
performance standards concerned with research quality and productivity, 
measured according to assessment criteria dominated by mono-disciplinary 
journals and review processes, rather than on performance standards concerned 
with integration. As each level is manifestly driven by concern for research quality, 
the cumulative effect is at the expense of the integration required for the 
production of socially robust knowledge that is politically relevant as well as 
scientifically credible. The application of this concept across scales makes it useful 
when designing or modifying science/policy collaborations. It underlines the need 
for robust organizational and methodological mechanisms to facilitate integration 
at all levels, again with a view to not only increasing integration, but to ensure that 
integration efforts remain as balanced as possible. Requiring and incentivizing 
integrated decision-making and methodological agreement within and between 
themes and organizations, and ensuring that accountability is equally distributed 
has been linked in related topic domains to stable, stringent forms of inter-
disciplinarity (Lengwiler 2006).  
 
Finally, the boundary organization concept is useful when it comes to the effects 
of disasters on science/policy collaborations in this space. It serves as a useful 
counterweight to the blame attribution common after high profile disasters 
(Birkland 1998, Paton 2014). Destructive of resilience at both individual and 
community levels (Mooney et al. 2011), blame attribution can prevent evidence-
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based disaster risk reduction policy by forestalling rigorous investigation of the 
systemic factors that contributed to the relevant disaster (Birkland 2009). The 
boundary organization concept is focused on effects, patterns and trends, rather 
than individual or organizational performance, and has explanatory force 
concerning the urgency and time-compression that drives blame attribution, and 
other monocausal disaster explanations (Birkland 2009). Increasing the power of 
response agencies to influence research and policy decision-making, this urgency 
fuelled the intensity and range of operational research collaboration with agencies 
coordinated by the NHRP in response to the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence. 
Channeling the resources of the wider consortium to generate research activity 
and outputs that were of high quality and were relevant to the operational needs 
of response and recovery agencies, the NHRP indicated that boundary 
organizations can be used to integrate national research capacity to provide the 
accelerated decision-making and support required by agencies after major hazard 
events. The development of the NHRP over this period also confirmed that this 
strong operational performance was not at the expense of research quality, in 
either Canterbury Earthquake Sequence-related or overall NHRP outputs, since all 
research quality and productivity standards were met or exceeded over this 
period. There were indications, however, that the operational integration achieved 
in response to the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence came at the expense of 
integration at thematic, organizational and sector level. Although time-pressure is 
part of the drive for relevance dominant in the policy domain, the time-
compression created by this disaster appeared to aggravate the drag of research 
domain drivers on the NHRP. This effect is consistent with the pre-existing 
weighting of this organization towards the research domain. Corresponding to a 
drift away from integration across organizational and thematic boundaries during 
this period, the aggravation of this pre-existing weighting is consistent with the 
trade-off between post-disaster time-compression and the consensus building 
required to develop integration across disciplinary and sector domain boundaries.  
 
Boundary organizations in this topic area are likely to be required to response to 
major hazard events. Three points can be made concerning the design of such 
boundary organizations. Firstly, a longer run up before the advent of a major 
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hazard event would have given the NHRP more time for the consensus-building 
required to establish robust, integrated networks between organizations and with 
agency end-users. More established networks would have been likely to increase 
the ability to withstand the negative impact of time-compression on integrating 
activities across domain boundaries, in part through increasing the collective 
resources brought to bear on post-disaster research coordination. Thus pre-
existing boundary organizations, with established integrative networks, are likely 
to be best placed to coordinate research after major hazard events, and in the 
process to minimize negative impacts on both research quality, and integration 
across disciplinary, organizational and sector boundaries. 
 
Secondly, the design of boundary organizations set up to integrate research and 
policy in the hazard and disaster risk reduction area should anticipate the effects 
of disasters on organizational structure and operation, and include mechanisms to 
actively manage these effects after disasters. The NHRP’s ability to maintain 
research quality and productivity despite this pressure indicated that high level 
accountability and contractual requirements in the research domain can mitigate 
the effect of disasters on research quality. This success contrasts, however, with 
the susceptibility of this organization to the impact of time compression on 
integrating activity across all domain boundaries, and the associated difficulty 
producing research strategy and outcomes focused on achieving resilience. 
Emphasising the need for a wider range of formalized incentive and accountability 
measures in general, this contrast draws attention to the lack of equivalent 
contractual and accountability measures requiring that this organization achieve 
the integration and focus required by policy domain drivers. Including such 
measures – at all levels – when designing boundary organizations in this area 
would significantly improve capacity to resist the effects of post-disaster time-
compression on integration.  
 
Thirdly, however, it is clear that the incentive and accountability measures that 
helped mitigate the effect of time-compression on the quality of the research 
produced by the NHRP were successful because this organization was strongly 
grounded in the research domain. It follows that equivalent measures designed to 
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mitigate this effect on the integration and relevance required by policy drivers will 
be successful to the extent that boundary organizations in this space are equally 
strongly grounded in the policy domain. Since the time-compressed environment 
aggravated pre-existing imbalances in NHRP structure and operation, it is likely 
that designs that effectively balance the influence of policy and research sectors 
should increase the resilience of the relevant organization to the risks thrown up in 
the post-disaster environment.  
 
This chapter, like the NHRP itself, is largely concerned with integration within the 
research domain, and between research and policy sectors. There is considerable 
scope for future research applying this concept in the hazard and disaster area, to 
policy sector engagement in boundary organizations, to the assessment, design 
and implementation of boundary organizations involving multiple stakeholder 
domains (including business and NGO sectors, and local communities), and when 
comparing similar boundary organizations from different global regions. Finally, 
given the extensive application of this concept in the global sustainability and 
climate change contexts, its application in the disaster risk reduction context also 










Chapter 6:  
Conclusions 
 
This doctoral project consisted of a larger case study, made up of several smaller 
studies, each concerned with a different time frame. Together they built a layered 
picture of the evolution of the NHRP within the larger context of the research 
response to the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence. The use of this national 
coordination mechanism made this an unusual post-disaster research 
environment, and the analysis indicated that this approach was effective in 
sustaining research quality while also providing science support for response and 
recovery agencies.  
 
The explanatory force of this framework’s focus on systemic effects, and 
particularly domain drivers, clarified in the first instance just how difficult it was for 
this organization to continue to “promote cooperation within the scientific and 
technological communities and facilitate a science-policy interface for effective 
decision-making in disaster risk management,” a Sendai Framework priority area 
for action (UNISDR 2015, p. 13). Secondly, the framework provided valuable 
insights into why this task became so difficult over time. The strength of domain 
drivers working against cross-boundary activity and networking was evident in 
decision-making about coordination and organizational parameters, and in the 
ongoing drag back towards pre-existing component domains, organizations and 
networks, which contributed to the invisibility of the cross-boundary initiatives, 
and over time had a fragmenting influence on the larger grouping. Thirdly, the 
framework provides insights into the balancing, incentivizing and accountability 
measures required to reduce the difficulty of this task by alleviating the 
fragmenting force of these drivers.  
 
The preceding chapters have each concluded by drawing attention to the value of 
the lessons provided through these insights offer to those planning, designing 
and implementing research coordination efforts after disasters. As well, although 
predominantly drawn from the operation of a boundary organization in a post-
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disaster environment, many of these lessons were also found to be more widely 
applicable to disaster risk management coordination efforts across domain 
boundaries. A key finding has been that the early establishment of the NHRP in 
usual conditions was a major factor in this boundary organization’s ability to 
facilitate research coordination in support of response and recovery decision-
making after this disaster, without compromising research quality. It had already 
been set up as a coordination mechanism, designed to network the science 
community in such a way as to bring the resources it offered to bear on national 
policy, strategy and decision-making, and so on the management of national 
disaster risk in more usual times. Olshansky et al. (2012) propose that disasters 
greatly accelerate, rather than fundamentally alter, the contemporary decision-
making environments involved in urban development activities. This has been a 
consistent theme in this doctoral project, informed by the conceptual focus on 
systemic effects. Applied at both detailed and wider levels to the issues, risks and 
opportunities that emerged in this New Zealand post-disaster decision-making 
environment, this focus on systemic effects has clarified the differentially 
magnifying effect of this environment on tensions that are generated by domain 
drivers in all contemporary decision-making environments. In addition to drawing 
from Olshansky et al. (2012), these findings provide further evidence for the idea 
that they propose: that post-disaster environments differ from others largely 
because disasters create a surge in the extent and speed of existing contemporary 
change processes, which creates what they call post-disaster time-compression. 
Olshansky et al. (2012) suggest that since this is the case, it may be that existing 
urban development and planning approaches can be usefully adapted for 
application in the post-disaster context. The boundary management framework is 
widely used in urban development and planning contexts. As applied as in this 
thesis, it is equally useful as an analytic tool in the post disaster context. Two 
further closing points about this utility serve to link this project’s findings into the 
larger, global context.  
 
Firstly, the use of a framework applicable in both post-disaster and general or 
usual settings helped to clarify the extent and nature of the changes associated 
with time compression, while also underlining the continuities between both 
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environments. The project found, for example, that time-compression created an 
urgent need for specialized management and coordinating arrangements to 
manage the increase in complexity of the post-disaster environment. Bearing out 
the literature calling for the coordination of post-disaster research in particular, 
these findings also reinforced the need to ensure that such coordination is part of 
the larger integrated effort that brings resources from a wide range of domains 
and sectors to bear on post-disaster decision-making. The establishment of the 
NHRP in order to carry out this function in the years before the disaster, however, 
underlines the continuity between these environments – although aggravated by 
disasters, the requirement for coordinated support for the science-policy interface 
for disaster-related decision-making is far from unique to the post-disaster 
environment.  
 
This brings into question current conceptual and administrative distinctions 
between domains specializing in disaster risk reduction in usual times, and those 
more directly related to disaster events. This division has a long history, and 
remains internationally current, informing, for example, the arrangement of the 
priority action areas in the Sendai Framework. Areas 1, 2 and 3 are concerned with 
understanding risk, risk management and resilience (respectively) in usual times, 
while Area 4 is concerned with disaster events (including preparedness, and 
response and recovery). The findings of this project suggest, however, that this 
conceptual and administrative structure (and the agency, disciplinary and practical 
specialist divisions associated with it) risks obscuring the continuities between 
these aspects of disaster risk reduction. Using a conceptual framework with 
explanatory force that includes all aspects of the large, highly complex set of 
issues involved in disaster risk reduction reduces this risk, while findings 
concerning tensions between specialist domains lend weight to questions 
concerning the value of dividing the disaster risk reduction issue on the basis of 
direct and immediate relation to disaster events.  
 
A second advantage concerns the relevance of findings concerning processes that 
have been magnified or rendered more visible in the post-disaster environment to 
other environments. This project began with reference to the gathering pace at 
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which decision-making environments are becoming globalized, and consequent 
rise in reliance on non-government sectors for policy and decision-making 
support. Manifestly an effort to coordinate and manage such support, the NHRP is 
one of many emerging initiatives set up in an effort to maximise opportunities to 
address complex issues with significant consequences, while minimising the risks 
associated with decision-making processes that are not subject to democratic 
process. Already positioned to attempt this task, the NHRP was thus well placed 
to respond to the sudden increase in need for support after disaster, underlining 
the extent to which the post-disaster support requirement was a magnified version 
of that involved in more usual social change processes. It follows that the time-
compressed post-disaster environments can clarify the trends, patterns, risks and 
opportunities that are occurring at a slower rate as part of capital depletion and 
creation processes in the larger global system. Compressed in time, post-disaster 
environments can thus offer insights that relate to decision-making environments 
coming under increasing pressure to engage with the complex emerging 
challenges – including climate change, biodiversity loss, as well as disaster risk – 
that have been linked to accelerating globalisation.  
 
This project found that time-dependent processes were vulnerable to post-
disaster time compression immediately after disaster events, suggesting that the 
inhibition of these activities is closely related to the wave of accelerated capital 
depletion and spike in demand for resources immediately following the event. The 
need for science support after the Christchurch Earthquake created a heavy 
reliance on pre-existing knowledge, networks and specialist expertise. As the 
initial wave of capital depletion began to transition into the acceleration of capital 
creation effected through and as disaster recovery, escalating consensus-building 
emerged as a crucial component in the suite of accelerated processes through 
which this occurs. New recovery networks, knowledge, programs and capacity 
were part of the new social capital and institutional formation beginning to 
emerge through those processes. This was not replacement of existing 
knowledge, networks and capital, however, since these facilitated, and in some 
cases formed the foundation, of those produced through the new round of 
consensus building. As a magnified glimpse of accelerated contemporary change 
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processes, these findings point to the importance of retaining a focus on the value 
of maintaining, as much as possible, existing structures, knowledge and capacity. 
These are likely to play an important part in the accelerated consensus building 
involved in the production of new kinds of capital. As an indication of a likely near 
future, the findings of this project suggest that policy and other domains and 
sectors are likely to be increasingly interdependent, contributing to policy and 
other decision-making through an increasingly networked decision-making 
environment.  
 
This is certainly the direction driven by current initiatives. The UNISDR Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction is a pertinent and influential recent 
example. One of its founding governance principles states that disaster risk 
reduction depends on the creation of just such a networked decision-making 
environment:  
 
disaster risk reduction depends on coordination mechanisms within and 
across sectors, and with relevant stakeholders at all levels, and it requires 
the full engagement of all State institutions of an executive and legislative 
nature at national and local levels and a clear articulation of 
responsibilities across public and private stakeholders, including business 
and academia, to ensure mutual outreach, partnership, complementarity 
in roles and accountability and follow up (p.8 UNISDR 2015). 
 
Finally, then, three comments on the implications the findings of this project have 
concerning this principle. 
 
The first concerns the magnitude of the task involved in establishing a disaster risk 
reduction platform on the scale envisaged in this principle. New Zealand has a 
history of exposure to disaster events, and a strong culture of hazard and disaster 
risk management. This is reflected in the large proportion of action items listed at 
the national level that are already part of this country’s national suite of disaster 
risk management measures. The most pertinent example is the NHRP itself, 
established as part through a government effort to  ’promote and improve 
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dialogue and cooperation among scientific and technological communities, other 
relevant stakeholders and policymakers in order to facilitate a science-policy 
interface for effective decision-making in disaster risk management” (UNISDR 
2015, p. 11). It is sobering, then, that the fragmenting effect of domain drivers 
over time, and the associated persistence of existing structures, networks and 
assumptions made this New Zealand pilot platform’s coordination effort extremely 
difficult, despite the fact that it was operating in a developed country with a 
strong culture of hazard and disaster risk management, and networks in both 
research and policy domains. The findings of this doctoral project indicate that the 
much greater scale of the task outlined in the governance principle (above) would 
require great commitment and resourcing across all the domains and sectors 
involved. Success would also depend on the extent to which attention was paid to 
establishing measures designed to balance such commitment and engagement 
across the domains and sectors in question, and also through the design, 
establishment and implementation phases of the proposed arrangement. 
Conversely, however, the wide scale and inclusive scope of this principle are 
entirely consistent with this project’s findings concerning what would be required 
to address the difficulties faced by the NHRP. The NHRP’s position in the research 
domain, and associated lack of direct policy engagement in organizational 
decision-making processes contributed to difficulties contributing to policy 
strategy, and in producing research outputs that were relevant as well as credible. 
These difficulties would have been considerably reduced by the full engagement 
of all State institutions of an executive and legislative nature at national and local 
levels called for above. Similarly the references to the clear articulation of 
responsibilities and accountability and follow up point to measures that would 
address some of the legitimacy issues associated with the NHRP’s difficulty to 
establish and maintain a profile.   
The short life span of the Advisory Group emphasized the advantage conferred by 
the NHRP’s greater scale, more inclusive parameters and the funding and 
authority conferred by its official role, when it came to adapting in response to 
agency demand. The increase in scale, inclusive parameters and finding and 
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authority between the NHRP and the proposed national disaster risk reduction is 
of a similar order of magnitude. This is to suggest that, although daunting, the 
magnitude of the coordinating operation suggested in this principle, including the 
extent of government engagement and the inclusion a much greater range of 
sectors and stakeholders, may ultimately make the task of implementing and 
maintaining such a platform less difficult over time.  
I want to conclude with some final comments about the value of the boundary 
management’s focus on systemic effects. It serves to draw attention to drivers so 
fundamental, and intuitively obvious, that they work in the background, as the 
founding assumptions that drive activities at all levels in the domain. It is obvious 
that activities in the science domain are driven by the need to ensure scientific 
credibility, and that activities in the policy domain are required to be politically 
relevant. The value of this framework is that it clarifies the less obvious effects of 
these drivers as they inform incentive regimes and individual behaviours, and the 
tensions that inevitably arise when they come into conflict around domain 
boundaries. The focus on systemic effects offers to defuse these tensions, in part 
by clarifying the extent to which they are not caused by individuals, or even the 
activities of a sector, but are instead the complex effects of simple rules. This 
framework thus offers a useful counterbalance to blame attribution, and helps to 
clarify highly sensitive issues.  
As well, however, the framework has a defusing effect because these drivers are 
so fundamental. Both are necessary, which is what emerges when attention is 
turned to the issues that have made cross-boundary collaborations so difficult. 
Boundary organizations like the NHRP are required to ensure that processes and 
outputs are both scientifically credible and relevant to policy strategy and agency 
need. Out of this need emerges the drive for balance – while it is a goal, like the 
other two drivers, it is also a functional requirement for cross-boundary activity. A 
lack of balance between domain influences, or stakeholders, will inevitably dicate 
that that the relevant initiative will be less effective at achieving both relevance 
and credibility, and this will put the legitimacy of the intiative at risk.  
It has been well established that the blurring of the boundaries dividing policy and 
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other domains has been driven by globalisation, and that it carries a range of new 
risks and opportunities. The pressure for integration has been situated at the 
policy end of the spectrum of tensions between the science and policy domains 
(Parker & Crona 2012), and in addition to posing risks to the democratic process, 
such expansions of the boundary zone between policy and science can carry 
significant risks to scientific credibility (Jasanoff 2011A, B). This project has been 
concerned, however, with the opportunities associated with this shift towards 
more integration across the science/policy boundary, and across sectors. It 
appears that much of this opportunity arises because the drive for balance and 
inclusion is a fundamental recquisite cross-boundary activity. That the legitimacy 
drive should be emerging as a functional effect of the globalisation of decision-






Appendix 1:  Table 4: Disciplinary categories provided as meta-data in WoS 
publication data sets, coded as STEM or non-STEM, and including 
comparative percentages of total data-set items. 
 
STEM or non Disciplinary field
CES HE BS HK
non Anthropology <1 1
non Anthropology;  Sociology <1
non Archaeology <1
non Area Studies 1
non Business 1
non Business, Finance 1
non Business; Communication 1 1
non Business; Management 2 1 1 <1
non Business; Planning & Development 1
non Communication 2 8 2
non Criminology & Penology 1 <1
non Cultural Studies <1 <1
non Ecology 1 <1 2 2
non Economics 1 2
non Education & Educational Research 1 2 1 1
non Environmental Studies; Geography 1 1 1
non Environmental Studies; Management <1 1 1
non Environmental Studies 3 <1 6 <1
non Ethnic Studies 2 1
non Family Studies <1 <1
non Folklore <1
non Geography, human 3 2 3 <1
non Health Policy & Services 1 2 3 4
non History 1 1
non Hospitality, Leisure, Sport & Tourism 2 <1
non Humanities, Multidisciplinary <1 <1
non Industrial Relations & Labor 1
non Information Science & Library Science <1 1 <1
non International Relations 2 <1
non Law 1
non Literature 1 <1
non Music <1
non Nursing <1 2 2 2
non Planning & Development <1 3 1
non Political Science 1 3
non Psychology 2 2 1 7
non Public Administration <1 1 4
non Rehabilitation 1 <1
non Religion <1
non Social Sciences <1 1
non Social Work <1 <1 1
non Sociology 1 2
non Theatre 1







non Urban Studies 1
non Women's Studies <1
STEM Agronomy; Water Resources <!
STEM Allergy; Immunology <1
STEM Anesthesiology <1
STEM Architecture <1
STEM Astronomy & Astrophysics; 1 <1
STEM Automation & Control Systems; <1
STEM Biochemical Research Methods <1
STEM Biochemistry & Molecular Biology; <1
STEM Biodiversity Conservation; Environmental Sciences <1
STEM Biodiversity Conservation; Fisheries 1
STEM Biology; Mathematical & Computational Biology <1
STEM Biotechnology & Applied Microbiology; <1
STEM Cardiac & Cardiovascular Systems <1 <1
STEM Cell biology <1
STEM Chemistry 1
STEM Clinical Neurology 2 <1
STEM Computer Science 1 3 6 3
STEM Critical Care Medicine 3 1 1
STEM Demography 1
STEM Dermatology 1 <1
STEM Emergency medicine 1 1
STEM Endocrinology & Metabolism <1
STEM Engineering, 37 13 3 13
STEM Entomology <1 1
STEM Environmental Sciences 2 <1 4 4
STEM Food Science & Technology <1
STEM Forestry 8 1
STEM Gastroenterology <1
STEM Genetics & Heredity <1
STEM Geochemistry & Geophysics 12 5 1
STEM Geography, physical 2 3 1
STEM Geology <1 <1
STEM Geosciences, Multidisciplinary 17 8 1 3
STEM Geriatrics & Gerontology 1
STEM Horticulture <1
STEM Infectious Diseases 2 1
STEM Marine & Freshwater Biology 1
STEM Mathematical and computational biology <1 <1
STEM Medical Laboratory Technology <1 <1
STEM Medicine, General & Internal 1 4 2 3
STEM Medicine, Legal <1 16 <1
STEM Medicine, Research and Experimental <1
STEM Meteorology & Atmospheric Sciences 7 3











STEM Multidisciplinary Sciences 3 1 1 1
STEM Nanoscience <1
STEM Neurosciences <1 <1
STEM Obstetrics & Gynecology <1 <1
STEM Oceanography <1 1




STEM Orthopedics 2 <1
STEM Otorhinolaryngology; Surgery <1
STEM Pathology <1
STEM Pediatrics <1 1 <1
STEM Periipheral vascular disease <1
STEM Pharmacology & Pharmacy <1
STEM Physics <1 <1 <1
STEM Psychiatry 1 2 1 1
STEM Public, Environmental & Occupational Health 10 4 6
STEM Radiology, Nuclear Medicine <1
STEM Remote Sensing; <1 2 <1
STEM Rheumatology <1
STEM Robotics <1
STEM Soil Science <1
STEM Spectroscopy <1
STEM Statistics & Probability <1
STEM Surgery 2 1 <1
STEM Telecommunications <1
STEM Thermodynamics; Energy & Fuels <1
STEM Toxicology <1
STEM Urology & Nephrology <1 <1 1








Table 5: Broad categories of CES-related research activity coordinated through the NHRP 
 
List Of Acronyms (In Alphabetical Order) Used In Table 5: 
Geological sciences Aerial photography and LIDAR; ground 
penetrating radar (GPR); 
landslide/rockfall data;  
seismic fault trace data;  
aftershock shaking data 
Establishing uplift and subsidence; modelling seismic stress re-
distribution, aftershock forecasting, 
mapping the fault trace; identification of other seismic features; 
quantifying contributions to seismic hazard, stochastic ground 
motion simulation of Chch Earthquakes, mapping seismic 
faulting in the region; dynamic updates of state of current 
knowledge to inform agencies and the industry 
UC, GNS, VUW, (NZ) & 
international research partners 
 
End-users included:  
 
CDEM, CERA, OPMSA, TEC, 
MoE, MSD, CCC, WDC, 
SDC, ECAN, EQC, 
DBH/EAG;  
 
Also: Te Rūnanga o Ngāi 






Research informed:  
 
response & recovery 
decision-making;  
 
land use and other planning 
decisions including land 
zoning legislation;  
 
changes to building codes 
and practices;  
 
(2012) Royal Commission of 
Inquiry into Building Failure 
Caused by the Canterbury 
Earthquakes. 
Social Sciences Immediate and medium term social, 
demographic and economic impacts;  
Disaster risk and resilience data. 
Research advice and assessments:  psycho-social support 
regimes and information provision for individuals, staff, 
organizations and communities impacted by the earthquakes; 
socio-economic impacts of the earthquake on urban and rural 
businesses and communities; disaster resilience, community 
resilience and recovery monitoring; predictions of population 
and capital ‘flight’, and other short/medium term demographic 
and economic changes following damage, red-zoning and 
response, recovery and rebuild operations; risk communication 
MU, UC, GNS, LU, UoO, Opus; 
private providers of psycho-
social support and research 
Geotechnical Engineering Liquefaction-related land and 
foundation damage;  
aerial photography liquefaction;, slope 
stability data 
Risk assessments/safety issues; liquefaction mapping; 
establishing lateral displacement; mapping rockfall and 
landslide risk, including modelling rockfall trajectories; 
geotechnical life safety assessments 
UC; GNS; UA; Tonkin & Taylor; 
international research partners; 
Opus; other  private providers 
Structural  
Engineering 
Seismic performance of structures – 
buildings and infrastructure. 
Structural damage and safety assessments; dynamic updates of 
state of current knowledge to inform agencies and the industry; 
basic research on seismic performance of wide range of 
structures and buildings; seismic site response effects, 
acceptable seismic risk of older buildings, retrofit solutions for 
heritage unreinforced masonry buildings. 
Leads: UC and UA – included 
GNS, BRANZ and private 
providers; international 
research partners 
Lifeline & Natural 
Resources Engineering  
Seismic performance of lifelines & pipe 
networks/systems; disaster waste 
management; groundwater 
contamination of aquifers 
Damage and performance assessments, including 
interdependence; waste disposal options; reinstatement of 
lifeline services; design new lifeline approaches and solutions 








BRANZ – Funded by New Zealand Building Research Levy to invest in building research & provision of testing, research advice & knowledge. 
(www.branz.co.nz) 
CCC – Christchurch City Council (one of the three territorial authorities impacted by the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence) (www.ccc.govt.nz) 
CERA – Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority; established by the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act (2011). 
DBH – Department of Building and Housing, a branch of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE). (www.dbh.govt.nz) 
DBH/EAG – Department of Building and Housing Engineering Advisory Group ( www.dbh.govt.nz/canterbury-earthquake-eag)  
ECAN – Environment Canterbury, the Canterbury Regional Council, New Zealand (the regional council impacted by the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence). 
GNS – GNS Science, New Zealand Crown Research Institue (CRI) established by the CRI Act (1997). 
LIDAR – remote sensing technology using lasers to measure distance  
MU – Massey University, New Zealand 
MoE – NZ Ministry of Education 
MSD – NZ Ministry of Social Development 
NZTA – New Zealand national transport authority 
Opus – private NZ research provider 
OPMSA – Office of the Prime Minister’s Chief Science Advisor -  www.pmcsa.org.nz 
SDC – Selwyn District Council (one of the three territorial authorities impacted by the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence) (www.selwyn.govt.nz) 
Stanford – Stanford University, California, US (www.stanford.edu) 
Tonkin & Taylor – private NZ research provider 
TEC – New Zealand Tertiary Education Commission 
Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu – New Zealand tribal organisation with traditional authority in the Canterbury region (www.ngaitahu.iwi.nz/te-runanga-o-ngai-tahu) 
UA – University of Auckland, New Zealand 
UC – University of Canterbury, New Zealand 
UC Berkeley – University of California, Berkeley campus, US 
UoO – University of Otago, New Zealand 
VUW- University of Victoria, Wellington, New Zealand 











Task title Task outline Task initiator
1 11/03/11 1/03/11 Psycho-social Recovery Advisory Group Terms of Reference
Request for Terms of Reference document for provision to 
agencies and others requiring PRAG services.
Agency 1
2 16/03/11 22/03/11 Internal discussion of scientific advice delivery model
Discussions about the distinction and interface between mental 
health services and delivery of a wider set of mental health 
interventions.
Self-initiated (Agency 1 
included in some emails)
3 17/03/11 24/03/11
Commentary re: Offer of assistance (and request for 
funding) from Australian based company specialising in 
psychosocial advice and training 
Request for commentary on request/offer from Australian 
company wishing to be contracted to provide psycho-social 
recovery training. Comments provided.
Agency 1
4 23/03/11 1/04/11
Commentary re: a Disaster Relief NGO active in 
Christchurch
Request for clarification concerning an international NGO 
(operating at the time in Christchurch). Clarification was 
provided re (UN) auspices and contact details for NGO 
representative. 
Agency 1
5 24/03/11 1/11/11 Updates to ToR and Psychosocial Annex Document




Commentary re: Individual Recovery and Community 
Wellbeing Volunteer Training Services Application form
Request for feedback on  application form to be completed by 




Commentary re: Supporting Individual and Community 
Recovery Strategy, and National Planning Framework for 
the Psycho-Social Response 
Request for feedback on both strategy and plan before sign 
off. Comments provided. 
Agency 1
8 30/03/11 5/04/11 Commentary re: NGO Intervention
Request for clarification and commentary on NGO initiative 
providing psychosocial support program for children delivered 
by US experts. Comments provided included contact details 
for program representatives. 
Agency 1
9 01/04/2011 10/05/11 Engagement in: Agency 2 psycho-social recovery briefings
Psycho-social recovery workshop involving PRAG members and 
Agency 2; subsequent commentary on minutes from the 
workshop; PRAG invited to participate by Agency 2 to 
participate in support of Agency 2's briefing presentation to 
CERA on psycho-social recovery   
Agency 2
10 6/04/11 1/11/12 Project: Indicators and measures of recovery
The possibility of a  project identifying indicators and measures 
of successful psycho-social recovery was raised with the PRAG 





















Table 6:  PRAG tasks numbered 1-20 in order of inception date. Note that specific tasks have not been ascribed to named 
agencies, as per the consent form. In the text, agencies are named in relation to tasks already ascribed to those agencies in the 






Engagement in: Social and economic costs of non-
intervention literature review
Provision of 22 page literature review. Agency 3
12 1/05/11 22/08/11 Engagement: NZPsS conference presentation
Invitation to contribute Psychosocial Recovery  presentation at 
2011 New Zealand Psychological Society Conference
New Zealand 
Psychological Society
13 1/07/11 17/02/12 Engagement: Journal article for NZ Journal of Psychology
Invitation to publish an article based on the conference 




Commentary re:  Particular non-medical approach to 
treating post-traumatic stress
Request for rapid commentary on a particular non-medical 
treatment technique. Comments included recommending 
requiring registered practitioners, and treatments  founded on 
a scientific evidence-base.
(Private consultant)
15 1/08/11 30/10/11 Commentary re: draft CERA framework
Comments provided on the draft CERA framework (as part of 





Commentary re: CERA Community Events Planning
Commentary provided in the form of an eleven page summary 
of available literature, including examples of community-
initiated memorial events, and key principles.
Agency 4
17 10/01/12 17/01/12 Application for funding for joint research project
Funding application compiled and submitted for joint research 
project concerning public health approaches to addressing 
CES-related fear and avoidance  (application was unsuccessful)
Self initiated, in 
colaboration with 
Agency 3
18 12/04/12 10/05/12 Self Assessment project
Development of survey questionnaire to gather feedback from 
PRAG members; there was also discussion concerning a survey 
questionnaire for agencies. Neither survey had been finalised 
or distributed when the PRAG ceased (June 2012).   
Self,initiated
19 18/05/12 12-Jun-12
Commentary re: Guiding principles for evaluation of 
community initiated remembrance proposals




Commentary re: Use of existing wellbeing scales in CERA 
Wellbeing Survey
Request for commentary concerning possible utilisation of 
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University of Canterbury Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 8140, New Zealand. www.canterbury.ac.nz 
 
 





HUMAN ETHICS COMMITTEE 
 
Secretary, Lynda Griffioen 
Email: human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz  
 
Ref:  HEC 2014/21/LR-PS  
 
 




Department of Geological Sciences 





Dear Sarah  
 
Thank you for forwarding to the Human Ethics Committee a copy of the low risk application you 
have recently made for your research proposal “The Psycho-social Research Advisory Group 
(PRAG) - a case study of research advice and collaboration after the 22nd February Christchurch 
Earthquake”.     
 
I am pleased to advise that this application has been reviewed and I confirm support of the 
Department’s  approval  for  this  project. 
 
The committee wishes to emphasise strongly that ensuring confidentiality of the correspondence is 
vital given that typically such information flows are seen as drafts and, if released under the Official 
Information Act, would have the participant’s  names  redacted.    Furthermore, if participants in 
PRAG decline to have their correspondence in the study, the researcher must absolutely guarantee 
that. 
 



















Research Consent Form  
 
Department of Geological Sciences  




Project title:  ‘The Psycho-social Recovery Advisory Group (PRAG) – a case study 
of research advice and collaboration after the 22nd February Christchurch 
Earthquake.’  
 
Consent Form for PRAG advisors and clients 
 
I have been given a full explanation of this project and have had the opportunity 
to ask questions. I understand what is required of me if I agree to take part in the 
research. I understand the risks associated with taking part and how they will be 
managed. I understand that consent is voluntary and I may withhold it any time 
without penalty. Withholding consent will also include the withdrawal of any 
information provided on the basis of my granting consent, should this remain 
practically achievable. 
 
I understand that any information or opinions provided on the basis of this 
consent will be kept confidential to the researcher (Sarah Beaven) and her 
supervisory committee, namely Thomas Wilson, Lucy Johnston, David Johnston, 
Richard Smith, and that any published or reported results will not identify 
individuals, or organisations. I understand that a thesis is a public document and 
will be available through the UC Library, and that I am able to receive copies of 
any articles or other outputs based on this case study by contacting the researcher 
at the conclusion of the project. 
 
I understand that all data collected for the study will be kept in locked and secure 
facilities and/or in password protected electronic form and will be destroyed after 
five years. I understand that I can contact Sarah Beaven 
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(sarah.beaven@canterbury.ac.nz) or her supervisor, Thomas Wilson 
(thomas.wilson@canterbury.ac.nz) for further information. If I have any complaints, 
I can contact the Chair of the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee, 
Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human- ethics@canterbury.ac.nz) 
 


















Research Information Sheet 
 
Department of Geological Sciences  
Telephone: +64 211102442 
Email: sarah.beaven@canterbury.ac.nz 
[Date] 
Project title:  ‘The Psycho-social Recovery Advisory Group (PRAG) – a case study 
of research advice and collaboration after the 22nd February Christchurch 
Earthquake.’  
 
Information Sheet for PRAG advisors and clients 
 
Principal Researcher: Sarah Beaven (Research Associate and Doctoral Candidate, 
Department of Geological Sciences, University of Canterbury).  
 
The Psycho-social Recovery Advisory Group case study has been designed to 
contribute to a larger, doctoral project, entitled ‘Managing the science/policy 
boundary after disasters: a case study of the research response to the Canterbury 
earthquake sequence.’ This doctoral project draws from the research field that 
applies insights from complexity theory in the analysis of complex social systems 
and organisations. It proposes to apply frameworks from boundary management 
theory to review the research response to the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquake 
sequence (CES). The doctoral project has three related aims. In the first instance, it 
aims to establish the utility of the boundary organisation framework in the hazard 
and disaster context, in relation to both the analysis of the activities of existing 
large science/policy collaborations, and to the planning and design of future such 
collaborations across science and non-science boundaries. A second aim is to use 
this framework to analyse the management, during and after the CES, of the 
tensions and pressures generated around the science/policy boundary, and to 
draw lessons from this analysis concerning best practice in terms of balancing the 
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research needs of all stakeholders after disasters, and particularly those of 
researchers and research end-users. Thirdly, this project aims to use the lessons 
identified through this analysis in the development of a disaster research response 
model directly applicable in the New Zealand context. It is expected that the focus 
of this model on processes and functions will also make it relevant in a range of 
other national, cultural and geographical contexts.  
 
The PRAG case study that is the subject of this participant consent request has 
been designed to contribute to the larger doctoral project described above. It will 
be largely based on the secondary data generated as part of PRAG advisory 
activity between March 2011 and June 2012, and currently held at the Joint Centre 




The PRAG Terms of Reference informed advisory activity, and were usually 
provided to clients requesting advice. These made it clear from the outset that 
PRAG activities would be publicly reported, and so available in the public domain.  
 
This consent request relates, however, to the use of secondary data generated as 
part of these professional activities, including spreadsheets detailing advice 
requested and received, final reports provided by PRAG to clients, and email trails 
between PRAG members and clients. There are some risks associated with the use 
of this material, associated with the fact that you may not have expected that some 
of this secondary data, including emails and detailed reports, would be made 
available for research purposes. In order to minimise the risk of adverse outcomes 
to individuals or organisations, details identifying individual participants will not be 
included, and neither individuals nor organisations will be identifiable in 
discussions concerning the detail of requests and outcomes, beyond the 
distinction between the roles of PRAG members and clients. There is also some 
risk associated with the fact that the PRAG membership is small and publically 
available. This means that although material will not be attributed to individuals, it 
may not be strictly anonymous. Consent procedures and anonymity provisions 
have been designed to minimise the risks associated with the possibility that if this 
material were to become public, it might be disadvantageous to the participant. 
 
The risks to individuals and organisations are also reduced to some extent by the 
focus of this research, which is not concerned with issues of individual or 
organisational performance or responsibility. The boundary management 
approach dictates a focus on the systemic processes used to balance tensions 
found to be inevitable in all collaborations across the science/policy boundary. 
The emphasis will be on the evolution of relevant functions and procedures in this 
advisory group’s collaboration with clients requesting scientific advice and support 
concerning the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence over this time period.  
 
All secondary data provided by the Chair of the PRAG to the researcher for the 
purposes of this research will be kept strictly confidential, and will be stored 
electronically on two hard drives which will not be connected to the cloud. It will 
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be destroyed after five years (mid-2019).  
 
Since this is a doctoral project, I am also asking for consent to make this 
information available to members of the committee supervising the wider doctoral 
project, if and as the need arises, and as part of the supervision process only. 
Committee members are Dr Thomas Wilson (Senior Lecturer, Geological Sciences, 
UC) Professor Lucy Johnston (Professor of Psychology, Office of Vice-Chancellor, 
UC) Professor David Johnston (Director, Joint Centre for Disaster Research, 
Massey University, GNS Science) and Dr Richard Smith (Manager Research 
Investment, EQC).  
 
Consent is voluntary and you have the right to withhold it at any stage without 
penalty. If you withhold consent, I will remove relevant references from any 
outputs should this remain practically achievable. 
 
You may receive a copy of any articles based on this case study by contacting the 
researcher at the conclusion of the project. A Ph D thesis is a public document 
and will be available through the UC Library. 
 
The project is being carried out as part of a Ph D in Hazard and Disaster 
Management, by Sarah Beaven, under the supervision of Thomas Wilson, who can 
be contacted at thomas.wilson@canterbury.ac.nz. He will be pleased to discuss 
any concerns you may have about participation in the project. 
 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury 
Human Ethics Committee, and participants should address any complaints to The 
Chair, Human Ethics Committee, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, 
Christchurch (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz). 
 
If you agree to participate in the study, I would appreciate it if you would 
complete the consent form also attached to this email and return it as a scanned 
document attachment by email to (sarah.beaven@canterbury.ac.nz.) (If you are 
using Preview to open this PDF, you can use the signature function to sign it 
electronically).  
 
If you prefer to withhold consent, I would appreciate it if you would inform me of 
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